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Explaining Increases in the Stringency of State Campaign Finance Regulation, 1993–2002

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Christopher Witko*
Affiliation:
Saint Louis University

Abstract

Recent research has taught us much about the effects of campaign finance laws, but we know little about why states adopt the regulations that they do. I address this question by examining why states increased the stringency of their campaign finance laws from 1993 to 2002. As is the case with other policies regulating the conduct of elected officials, the popular perception exists that politicians resist stringent campaign finance out of a concern for their own electoral self-interest. As a result, I test whether campaign finance policymaking results from the selfish electoral incentives that politicians allegedly have on this issue or decisions on this issue are influenced by factors that influence other types of policies. I find evidence to support both views. Specifically, the initiative option, a liberal government, strong good government groups, legislative professionalism, and scandal increase the likelihood of a state increasing the stringency of their regulations, while states with expensive legislative elections are less willing to do so.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association, 2007

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