Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T21:58:11.776Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Why Are Some Institutions Replaced while Others Persist? Evidence from State Constitutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Adam Cayton*
Affiliation:
University of Colorado–Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA
*
Adam Cayton, University of Colorado–Boulder, UCB 333, Boulder, CO 80309, USA. Email: adam.cayton@colorado.edu

Abstract

Why are some institutions quickly replaced while others endure for more than a century? Majority cycling over institutions is theoretically unavoidable, but politics provides few opportunities to study it empirically. Using data on state constitutional characteristics and legislative composition from 1834 to 2012, this article advances the theory that institutions are more likely to be endogenously replaced when the society of actors differs from the time of enactment, and that institutional characteristics can exacerbate or mitigate these risks. Results show that political change interacts with institutional particularism to preserve or undermine state constitutions. More particularistic constitutions have shorter life spans because they are more vulnerable to changes in the political environment.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable