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The Political Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy: A Response to Kernell

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2002

Daniel Carpenter*
Affiliation:
The University of Michigan
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Bureaucrats are politicians of a sort, and bureaucracies are organizations of political actors. Bureaucracies gain a measure of autonomy when they are able to successfully practice a politics of legitimacy. When and where they are found, autonomous bureaucrats launch policy innovations that differ materially from the designs of elected authorities. Autonomous bureaucrats build these program innovations slowly, and they try to generate visible efficiency from these innovations. The most successful bureaucrats, however, transcend achievements such as “innovation” and “efficiency.” They get their hands dirty, and they engage in coalition politics. They assemble broadbased alliances behind their new programs, coalitions wrought from the multiple networks in which these unique bureaucrats travel.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2001