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The marginal cases argument: Animals matter too

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2009

Julia Tanner
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Abstract

If we are going to treat other species so very differently from our own — killing, eating and experimenting on pigs and sheep, for example, but never human beings — then it seems we need to come up with some morally relevant difference between us and them that justifies this difference in treatment. Otherwise it appears we are guilty of bigotry (in just the same way that someone who discriminates on the basis of race or sex is guilty of bigotry). But what is this morally relevant difference? Julia Tanner's article examines, and rejects, some of the most popular answers to this question.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 4 , Issue 10 , Summer 2005 , pp. 53 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2005

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References

Notes

1 Linzey, Andrew, Animal Rights. (SPCK: London, 1976), p. 24.Google Scholar

2 Scruton, Roger, Animal Rights and Wrongs (London: Demos, 2000), p. 53.Google Scholar

3 Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1993), p. 153.Google Scholar

4 Scruton, Roger, Animal Rights and Wrongs (London: Demos, 2000), pp. 54–5.Google Scholar

5 Frey, R. G., ‘Animal Rights’, Analysis, 37, (1977), p. 188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Jamieson, Dale and Regan, Tom, ‘Animal Rights: A Reply to Frey’ Analysis, 38, (1978), p. 35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Frey, R. G., ‘Animal Rights’, Analysis, 37, (1977), p. 188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar