¹ I shall refer below to some of the recent studies of Father Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., on Ockham. The study with which I am here mainly concerned appeared in the first volume of Traditio: Boehner, Ph., “The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents according to William Ockham” ( Traditio , I [1943], pp. 223–275).Google Scholar

² Moody, E., The Logic of William of Ockham (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935), p. 9. On Mr. Moody's book, cf. my review in Speculum, XII, 2 (April, 1937), pp. 274-277.Google Scholar

³ Baudry, L., Le Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae attribué à G. d'Occam (Paris: J. Vrin, 1936), pp. 42–43.Google Scholar

⁴ Cf. Moody, E., op. cit. , pp. 76, 99, etc.Google Scholar

⁵ Baudry, L., op. cit. , p. 22.Google Scholar

⁶ Baudry, L., op. cit. , pp. 40–42.Google Scholar

⁷ Baudry, L., op. cit. , pp. 39–40.Google Scholar

⁸ Baudry, L., op. cit. , p. 38. Cp. Hochstetter, E., Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1927), pp. 22–23.Google Scholar

⁹ Baudry, L., ibid. Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ibid. Google Scholar

¹¹ Boehner, Ph., “The Text Tradition of Ockham's Ordinatio” ( The New Scholasticism , XVI, 3 [July, 1942], pp. 203–241), p. 222.Google Scholar

¹² Boehner, Ph., “The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents according to William Ockham” ( Traditio , I [1943], pp. 223–275), p. 240. In this condemnation Father Boehner includes Erich Hochstetter as the source of a supposed confusion on Ockham's doctrine of intuitive knowledge which has misled modern historians (with the exception of Paul Vignaux): cf. Boehner, Ph., op. cit., pp. 238-239; Hochstetter, E., Studien…, p. 33 (not p. 22).Google Scholar

¹³ Gilson, E., The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), pp. 61–91.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Bonaventure, St., In II Sent. , d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, ad 6; ed. minor (Quaracchi, 1938), p. 460.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Thomas, St., Sum. Theol. , I, q. 25, a. 3, Resp.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Ockham is of the opinion that the immediate dominion of God over all being cannot be proved. His argument is, in substance, that the philosophers did not do it but rather upheld the mediate procession of things from God. Now whether or not Ockham is right in coming to this conclusion, the fact remains that it is his inability to disprove the errors of the philosophers which reduces him to believing in the divine liberty. It is perfectly legitimate, therefore, to speak of Ockham's concessions to the philosophers: he concedes that for him the philosophers' demonstrations of conclusions which are errors remain without refutation. Cf. Pegis, A. C., “Necessity and Liberty” ( The New Scholasticism , XV, 1 [Jan., 1941], pp. 18–45), pp. 22-32.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Boehner, Ph., ‘Ockham's Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus and its Main Problems’ ( Proceeings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association , XVI, [1941], pp. 177–192), p. 182, note 14.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Boehner, Ph., ibid. Google Scholar

¹⁹ Boehner, Ph., “The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents according to William Ockham,” p. 223. For a discussion of the question of the elimination of species, cf. Hochstetter, E., Studien …, pp. 35-46.Google Scholar

²⁰ The text that Father Boehner edits in Traditio is In II Sent., qq. 14-15. For the first question of the Prologue, cf. Boehner, Ph., Ockham, Guillelmi, Quaestio Prima Principalis Prologi in primum librum Sententiarum (Paderborn: F. Schoeningh, 1939).Google Scholar

²¹ Gilson, E., The Unity of Philosophical Experience , p. 82.Google Scholar

²² Gilson, E., op. cit. , pp. 80–81.Google Scholar

²³ Hochstetter, E., Studien … , pp. 58–59. Basing himself on Quodl. V, q. 5, Father Boehner has defended the infallibility of Ockham's intuitive knowledge (“The Notitia Intuitiva …,” pp. 231-236). But one sentence in Quodl. VI, q. 6, as we shall see, ruins what Ockham had said in Quodl. V, q. 5, and, unfortunately, what Father Boehner has inferred from it.Google Scholar

²⁴ Boehner, Ph., “The Notitia Intuitiva …,” p. 235, note 28.Google Scholar

²⁵ “Ideo circa istam quaestionem primo praemitto quasdam distinctiones: Una est, quod quaedam est cognitio intuitiva, quaedam abstractiva. Intuitiva est illa mediante qua cognoscitur res esse, quando est, et non esse, quando non est. Quia quando perfecte apprehendo aliqua extrema intuitive, statim possum formare complexum, quod ipsa extrema uniuntur vel non uniuntur, et assentire vel dissentire. Puta si vidcam intuitive corpus et albedinem, statim intellectus potest formare hoc complexum: corpus est album, vel: corpus non est album, et formatis istis complexis intellectus statim assentit. Et hoc virtute cognitionis intuitivae, quam habet de extremis, …” (In II Sent. q. 15E; ed. Boehner, Ph., op. cit. , p. 248).—The last sentence of this paragraph is not an independent sentence. Hence it is better to make it part of the previous sentence and introduce a semicolon after extremis. Google Scholar

²⁶ To translate complexa by judgments without any qualification would be wrong, for it would obscure the difference between Ockham and St. Thomas on this point. For St. Thomas Aquinas, the proper object of the judgment is ipsum esse rei (In B. de Trinitate, q. V, a. 3, Resp.). In this sense, a judgment cannot but be an assent—an assent to the being of a thing. On the other hand, the Ockhamist formatio complexi is entirely a deontologized judgment, for Ockham has called the complexum a cognitio abstractiva in the specific sense of prescinding from existence and non-existence.Google Scholar

So, too, the Ockhamist assent requires qualifications. For, in St. Thomas Aquinas, the distinction does not lie between judgment and assent, as it does in Ockham; the distinction rather lies between a direct and a reflexive judgment, both of which are assents. The direct judgment is an assent to being while the reflexive judgment is an assent to one's own act of assenting to being (cf. Thomas, St., Sum. Theol. I—II, q. 17, a. 6, Resp.). The Thomistic assent, therefore, does not, as in Ockham, , add the evidence of existence to the judgment. On the contrary, the evidence was recognized by the direct judgment, and the reflexive judgment or assent, basing itself on the same evidence of existence, accepts this recognition.Google Scholar

²⁷ “Sciendum tamen, quod licet stante cognitione intuitiva tam sensus quam intellectus respectu aliquorum incomplexorum possit intellectus complexum ex illis incomplexis intuitive cognitis formare modo praedicto et tali complexo assentire, tamen nec formatio complexi nec actus assentiendi complexo est cognitio intuitiva, quia utraque cognitio est cognitio complexa, et cognitio intuitiva est cognitio incomplexa. Et tunc, si ista duo, abstractivum et intuitivum, dividant omnem cognitionem tam complexam quam incomplexam, tunc istae cognitiones dicerentur cognitiones abstractivae et omnis cognitio complexa, sive sit in praesentia rei stante cognitione intuitiva extremorum sive in absentia rei et non stante cognitione intuitiva. Et tunc secundum istam viam potest concedi, quod cognitio intuitiva, tam intellectus quam sensus, sit causa partialis cognitionis abstractivae, quae praedicto modo habetur; et hoc quia omnis effectue sufficienter dependet ex suis causis essentialibus, quibus positis potest effectue poni et ipsis non positis non potest poni naturaliter, et a nullo alio dependet, sicut frequenter dictum est. Sed ista cognitio, qua evidenter assentio huic complexo: hoc corpus est album, cuius extrema cognosco intuitive, non potest esse naturaliter nisi stante utraque cognitione; quia si res sit absens et cognitio intuitiva corrumpitur, intellectus non assentit evidenter, quod illud corpus quod prius vidit sit album, quia ignorat utrum sit vel non. Sed respectu cognitionis apprehensivae, per quam formo complexum, non est cognitio intuitiva, nec sensitiva nec intellectiva, causa partialis, quia sine ipsis potest formari omne complexum, quod potest formari cum ipsis: quia ita in absentia sicut in praesentia” (Ibid.).Google Scholar

²⁸ Father Boehner reads: “… in determinata approximatione …” That is extremely-questionable, for the whole point of the discussion is that the distance of the object given in intuitive knowledge should be suitable rather than definite. Hence it would be better to read, with the 1495 text (Father Boehner's E), in debita approximatione. This is borne out by the phrase debito modo approximatum, which appears twice in the next twenty lines. For the same reasons, it is better to read in debita distantia with E (Father Boehner does not give this variant) in the same text.Google Scholar

²⁹ “Sic igitur patet, quod per cognitionem intuitivam iudicamus rem esse quando est, et hoc generaliter, sive intuitiva cognitio naturaliter causetur sive supernaturaliter a solo Deo. Nam si naturaliter causetur, tunc non potest esse, nisi obiectum existat praesens in determinata approximatione, quia tanta potest esse distantia inter obiectum et potentiam, quod naturaliter non potest potentia tale obiectum intueri. Et quando obiectum est sic praesens tali modo approximatum, potest intellectus per actum assentiendi iudicare rem esse modo praedicto. Si autem sit supernaturalis, puta si Deus causaret in me cognitionem intuitivam de aliquo obiecto existente Romae, statim habita cognitione eius intuitiva possum iudicare, quod illud quod inteuor et video est ita bene, sicut si illa cognitio haberetur naturaliter.” (In II Sent. q. 15E; ed. Boehner, Ph., op. cit. , pp. 248–249).Google Scholar

³⁰ Cf. note 28.Google Scholar

³¹ Ockham has already discussed and rejected Duns' arguments on the difference between intuitive and abstractive knowledge: cf. Ockham, , In I Sent. , Prol., q. I, AA-GG; ed. Boehner, Ph., pp. 26–29, where the Scotistic references are given.Google Scholar

³² “Si dicis, quod obiectum non est hic praesens nec debito modo approximatum. Respondeo: Licet cognitio intuitiva non possit naturaliter causari nisi quando obiectum est praesens in determinata distantia, tamen supernaturaliter posset. Et ideo differentiae quas dat Johannes inter cognitionem intuitivam et abstractivam: quod cognitio intuitiva est praesentis et existentis ut praesens et existens est, intelliguntur de cognitione intuitiva naturaliter causata, non autem quando supernaturaliter. Unde absolute loquendo non requiritur necessario ad cognitionem intuitivam alia praesentia, nisi quod possit actum intuitivum terminare. Et cum hoc stat, quod obiectum sit nihil vel quod sit distans per maximam distantiam; et quantumcumque distet obiectum cognitum intuitive, statim virtute eius possum iudicare illud esse, si sit modo praedicto. Sed tamen, quia cognitio intuitiva naturaliter non causatur nec conservatur, nisi obiectum sit debito modo approximatum in certa distantia existons, ideo non possum iudicare illud, quod cognoscitur naturaliter intuitive, nisi obiectum sit praesens” (In II Sent., q. 15E; ed. Boehner, Ph., op. cit. , p. 249).Google Scholar

³³ “Eodem modo per cognitionem intuitivam possum iudicare rem non esse, quando non est. Sed ista cognitio non potest esse naturalis, quia talis cognitio numquam est nec conservatur naturaliter nisi obiecto praesente et existente. Et ideo ista cognitio intuitiva naturalis corrumpitur etiam per absentiam obiecti; et posito quod maneat post corruptionem obiecti, tunc est supernaturalis quantum ad conservationem, licet non quantum ad causationem; et ideo etc. Ideo oportet quod cognitio intuitiva, qua cognosco rem non esse, quando non est, sit supernaturalis quantum ad causationem vel conservationem vel quantum ad utrumque: Puta, si Deus causet in me cognitionem intuitivam de aliquo obiecto non existente et conservet illam cognitionem in me, possum ego mediante illa cognitione iudicare rem non esse, quia video illam rem intuitive, et formato hoc complexo: hoc obiectum non est, statim intellectus virtute cognitionis intuitivae assentit huic complexo et dissentit suo opposito, ita quod illa cognitio intuitiva est causa partialis illius assensus, sicut prius dictum est de intuitione naturali. Et sic per consequens intellectus assentit, quod illud, quod intueor, est purum nihil quantum ad conservationem supernaturalem et non causationem. Exemplum est: si primo de aliquo obiecto causetur cognitio intuitiva naturaliter et post ipso obiecto destructo Deus conservet cognitionem intuitivam prius causatam, tunc est cognitio naturalis quantum ad causationem, et supernaturalis quantum ad conservationem. Tunc est idem dicendum hic per omnia, sicut si illa cognitio esset supernaturaliter causata, quia per illam possum iudicare rem esse, quando est, quantumcumque distet obiectum cognitum, et non esse, quando non est, posito quod obiectum corrumpatur. Et sic potest aliquo modo concedi, quod per cognitionem naturalem intuitivam iudico rem non esse, quando non est, quia per cognitionem naturaliter causatam licet supernaturaliter conservatam” (Ibid. ; ed. Boehner, Ph., op. cit. , pp. 249–250).Google Scholar

³⁴ “Ex istis sequitur, quod notitia intuitiva, tam sensitiva quam intellectiva, potest esse de re non existente. Et hanc conclusionem probo aliter quam prius sic: Omnis res absoluta distincta loco et subiecto ab alia re absoluta, potest per potentiam divinam absolutam existere sine illa, quia non videtur verisimile, quod si Deus vult destruere unam rem absolutam existentem in caelo, quod necessitetur destruere unam aliam rem existentem in terra. Sed visio intuitiva, tam sensitiva quam intellectiva, est res absoluta distincta loco et subiecto ab obiecto. Sicut si videam intuitive stellam existentem in caelo, illa visio intuitiva, sive sit intellectiva sive sensitiva, distinguitur loco et subiecto ab obiecto viso; ergo ista visio potest numere, Stella destructa” (In I Sent. Prol., q. I, HH; ed. Boehner, Ph., p. 29).Google Scholar

³⁵ “Ad septimum dubium dico, quod per notitiam intuitivam rei potest evidenter cognosci res non esse, quando non est, vel si non sit. Et quando quaeritur, a quo causabitur illud iudicium, potest dici, quod potest causari a notitia intuitiva rei. Et quando dicitur, quod illa habet causare effectum oppositum, si res sit, potest dici, quod non est inconveniens, quod aliqua causa cum alia causa partiali causet aliquem effectum, et tamen quod illa sola sine alia causa partiali causet oppositum effectum. Et ideo notitia intuitiva rei et ipsa res causant iudicium, quod res est. Quando autem ipsa res non est, tunc ipsa notitia intuitiva sine illa re causabit oppositum iudicium. Et ideo concedo, quod non est eadem causa illorum iudiciorum, quia unius causa est notitia sine re, alterius causa est notitia cum re tamquam cum causa partiali” ( In I Sent. Prol., q. I, ZZ; ed. Boehner, Ph., p. 50).Google Scholar

³⁶ Cf. Boehner, Ph., “The Notitia Intuitiva …',” pp. 228–229.Google Scholar

³⁷ Cf. Boehner, Ph., op. cit. , pp. 232–235, where the texts of Quodl. V, q. 5, are cited and analyzed.Google Scholar

³⁸ “Dico quod Deus non potest causare in nobis cognitionem talem, per quam evidenter appareat nobis res esse praesens, quando est absens, quia hoc includit contradictionem” ( Quodl. V, q. 5).Google Scholar

³⁹ “Ad argumentum principale dico quod contradictio est, quod visio sit et quod illud, quod videtur, non sit in effectu nec esse possit. Ideo contradictio est, quod chymaera videatur intuitive. Sed non est contradictio, quod id quod videtur nihil sit in actu extra animam, dummodo possit esse in effectu vel aliquando fuerit in rerum natura” ( Quodl. VI, q. 6). Cf. Hochstetter, E., Studien … , p. 59.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Vignaux, P., “Nominalisms” ( Dictionnaire de théologie catholique , XI, 1 [1931], col. 769).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Cf. Ockham, , Quodl. I, q. 14 and Hochstetter, E., op. cit., pp. 61-62.Google Scholar

⁴² Paulus, J., Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa metaphysique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938). For the origins of nominalism, cf. especially the long chapter on the categories (op. cit., pp. 137-198); for a general discussion of the doctrinal affinities between Henry of Ghent and Ockham, cf. op. cit., pp. 376-394.Google Scholar

⁴³ Cf. Boehner, Ph., “Ockham's Tractatus de Praedestinaione …” (loc. cit. [cf. note 17]), p. 183.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Cf. Paulus, J., op. cit. , p. 87; Pegis, A. C., “The Dilemma of Being and Unity” (Essays in Thomism , ed. Brennan, R. E., O.P., New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942, pp. 151-183), pp. 169 ff.Google Scholar