¹ The Port-Royal logicians rejected the Topics as ‘des livres étrangement confus.’ Bocheński, La logique de Théophraste (Fribourg 1947) 122, claims that Aristotle never gave us the meaning of τόπος, while Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik (Berlin 1929) 164 maintains that Rhet. 1403a 18–19 is Aristotle's only genuine statement on the essential character of the term. (All citations from the Rhetoric are from Roemer's edition, Teubner 1923.) Google Scholar

² Theophrastus, of course, wrote on the topics, and apparently Straton continued the work (D. Laert. Straton 5.3). Collections of τόποι for prooemia and epilogues apparently existed in the 4th century (PW Suppl. 7.1066.54ff.). For the general trend in rhetoric between Aristotle and Cicero see ibid. 1071–1089; and on the topics see Volkmann, , Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer (Leipzig 1885) 199ff., 299ff., 322ff.Google Scholar

³ He himself found Aristotle's work somewhat obscure (Topica 1); Wallies, W., Die griechischen Ausleger der aristotelischen Topik (Berlin 1891) 4. and Thionville, E. De la théorie des lieux communs (Paris 1855) 9 would agree with this, for they believe that Cicero's work in this field has nothing more in common with Aristotle's than its title. This is too severe, just as Viehweg, one of the latest to consider the topics, Topik und Jurisprudenz (Munich 1953) 10, is a bit too sanguine in his opinion that Cicero's work will help us to understand the Aristotelian topics. The diversity of Cicero's remarks, however, implies at times that he may have seen into the nature of Aristotle's topics; on this question see Riposati, B., Studi sui ‘Topica’ di Cicerone (Milan 1947); his bibliography, 15–30, is a good one for a study of the general problem.Google Scholar

⁴ See the pertinent chapters in Curtius, E., European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (New York 1953). TraditioGoogle Scholar

⁵ Top. 101 a 34ff. All citations from the Topics are from Strache, I.-M. Wallies (Teubner 1923).Google Scholar

⁶ Tuve, R., Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago 1947) c. XI. 3. The Aristotelian TopicsGoogle Scholar

⁷ Weaver, R., The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago 1953) cc. 3,4.Google Scholar

⁸ Ibid. 55.Google Scholar

⁹ Top. 100a 18.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Burke, K., A Rhetoric of Motives (New York 1950) 56. On 57f. he does see a difference in the topics: there are the ‘commonplaces’ just mentioned, and then ‘another kind of “topic” ’; this other kind, from his description of it, is actually the general topic as presented in this paper.Google Scholar

¹¹ For Aristotle the topics are the sources for the πϱοτάσεις and, as 1358a 10–35 and 1377b 16–24 would indicate, this means sources for both their content and form. Google Scholar

¹² Thionville, , op. cit. c. vi, traces briefly the development from Cicero to Marmontel. Nadeau, R. gives some attention to this area in a recent article ‘Hermogenes on “Stock Issues” in Deliberative Speaking,’ Speech Monographs 25.1 (1958) 59–66.Google Scholar

¹³ Solmsen, , op. cit. 163–6; Riposati, op. cit. 21ff.; Hambruch, E., Logische Regeln der platonischen Schule in der aristotelischen Topik (Berlin 1904) 31; Thionville, op. cit. 30ff.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Rhet. 1358a 10–35; 1377b 16–24.Google Scholar

¹⁵ 1358a 12–17. Google Scholar

¹⁶ Viehweg, , op. cit. 9; Solmsen, op. cit. 163–4; Thionville, op. cit. 30f.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Top. 100a 18f.; 102b 35–103a 5.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Solmsen, As, op. cit. 156 remarks: the Aristotelian idea is something new; he discusses the term in general 151–175; see also Schupp, F., ‘Zur Geschichte der Beweistopik in der älteren griechischen Gerichtsrede’ Wiener Studien 45 (1926–7) 17–28, 173–85.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Ast, , Lexicon Platonicum sub τόπος; this is also true of all the pertinent references in Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker ⁶ (Berlin 1952), with the exception of the Cicero and Quintilian citations which will be seen later.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Top. 105b 12–8 for the idea, and 112a 24ff. and Rhet. 1396a 34ff. where Aristotle says that what he was trying to do in the Topics was to determine the ὑπάϱχοντα. Google Scholar

²¹ Solmsen, , op. cit. 167 mentions these two references and he tries to connect the Helen citation with his idea of the Aristotelian τόπος as ‘Formprinzip,’ or a propositional, axiomatic topos. This appears no more possible here than Thionville's attempt, op. cit. 55–77, to formulate many of the τόποι in the Topics as propositional, axiomatic statements, a process of which he must say: ‘j'ai dû parfois retrancher, parfois interpréter, parfois changer la forme,’ 63.Google Scholar

²² In Panathenaicus 88 the use is ambiguous: it may mean the subject previously under discussion, but it more probably indicates the place in his speech at which he digressed. Google Scholar

²³ In Aristogeiton 76 (ed. Dindorf-Blass, Teubner 1888).Google Scholar

²⁴ Radermacher, L., Artium Scriptores (Vienna 1951), see the notes on 48–9, 224. It has been called to my attention by Raubitschek, A. E. that this use of καιϱούς may throw new understanding on the nature of Theophrastus’ πολιτικά πϱος τούς καιϱούς, on which see PW Suppl. 7.1517.31ff.Google Scholar

²⁵ What later rhetoricians called the τελικὰ κεφάλαια, see Radermacher, , op. cit. 226 note to 62.Google Scholar

²⁶ See the scholiast to Thucydides 3.9.1 (ed. Hude, Teubner 1927) where we find Thucydides doing this very thing for δημηγοϱία; or see Anaximenes 19 (ed. Spengel) where various meanings of δίκαιον and ἂδικον are given. Syrianus examines συμφέϱον in this manner and introduces the examination thus: ἐξετάσομεν δὲ το συμφέϱον διά τόπων ἓπτα (Rademacher, op. cit. 227); I mention Syrianus here since Radermacher in his note is of the opinion that the τόποι may be quite old. Google Scholar

²⁷ E.g. 1399a 15–7; 1400a 4–5; 1400b 15–7; 1402a 15; and see Radermacher, , op. cit. 221 note to 48.Google Scholar

²⁸ Brutus 12.46.8 (ed. Friedrich, G., Teubner 1893).Google Scholar

²⁹ Institutiones Oratoriae 3.1.12 (ed. Bonnell, E., Teubner 1891).Google Scholar

³⁰ Solmsen, , op. cit. 167–8 discusses the Cicero text.Google Scholar

³¹ Radermacher, , op. cit. 34.Google Scholar

³² E.g. ad 1398a 30ff; and see note of Radermacher, op. cit. 57 and 223 note to 52; and comment of Solmsen, op. cit. 166. Google Scholar

³³ Palmer, G., The TÓΠOI of Aristotle's Rhetoric as Exemplified in the Orators (Diss. Univ. of Chicago 1934).Google Scholar

³⁴ Marx, ‘Aristoteles’ Rhetorik,’ Sb. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig 52 (1900) 281ff. does not consider the εἴδη (i.e. ἴδιοι τόποι) to be topics, nor does Solmsen, op. cit. 17, 34ff. 165 and note 3. Google Scholar

³⁵ Quaest. conviv. 616 c-d (ed. Bernardakis): Plutarch remarks that to appreciate the social position of dinner guests who differ in so many ways — ηλικίᾳ, δυνάμει, χϱείᾳ, οἰκειότητι — one would need τοὺς Ἀϱιστοτέλους τόπους. These are particular topics. We also find such particular topics in the scholiast on the Staseis of Hermogenes (ed. Walz IV 352.5ff.); the scholiast calls them τόποι and finds them used in a work by Lysias.Google Scholar

³⁶ Diels, , Vorsokratiker ⁶ II 294ff.Google Scholar

³⁷ 1361a 33f. Google Scholar

³⁸ Radermacher, , op. cit. 49 number 27 with note.Google Scholar

³⁹ Ibid. 68f., numbers 7–11 with notes.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ibid. 226 note to 62.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Navarre, , Essai sur la Rhétorique grecque (Paris 1900) speaks of collections of τόποι that were made, 60ff. 124ff. 166–74.Google Scholar

⁴² Navarre, As, ibid. 166 says in comparing the treatment of ἢθη in the Rhetoric and in the Παϱασκεναί attributed to Lysias: ‘l'ouvrage de Lysias n'était pas un traité théorique, mais un recueil de modèles (τόποι γεγνμνασμένοι).’ As far as can be judged (see Navarre 166–74), these collected topoi appear to be concerned with stock offense and defense tactics for typical situations, not for an intelligent discussion of the problem, which was what Aristotle had in mind: Top. 101a 25ff.; Rhet. 1354a 11ff. In the Soph. El. 183b 36ff. Aristotle himself criticizes the formulaic quality of these collections.Google Scholar

⁴³ Cf. infra 14. Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Jebb's translation. In the interpretation of this text, I agree with Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles II 1 (Tübingen 1900) 497 note 1. Spengel in his commentary 71 (1867 edition) and Solmsen, op. cit. 15 note 1 substantially agree. The minor variant readings admitted by Spengel together with Vater (Animadversiones ad Aristotelis librum primum Rhetoricorum [Halle 1794]) are not substantial, once the correct antithesis of the sentence is understood: μεν setting off 4–6 against the δέ of 6–7. In the light of the context 9–28, this gives the idea of general and particular topics. Such a distinction is also seen in Anonymus, Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca 21.6. line 27 and Stephanus, ibid. 267, lines 1–23; but I would not accept their identification of the general topics. Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Solmsen, , op. cit. 15 note 4 appears more correct on the meaning of πεϱὶ ὧν than Cope-Sandy s (Cambridge 1877) I 49.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ It appears that τόποι are divided into κοινοί (12) and ἴδια (17). The neuter case is noted by Spengel in his commentary sub linea. I do not see any insurmountable problem in it, in the light of the neuter κἀκεῖνα (21) referring to κοινοὶ τόποι. See also Roemer, ‘Zur Kritik der Rhetorik des Aristoteles,’ Rhein. Mus. 39 (1884) 506 on similar instances at 1395a 11, 1355b 35. Confirmation of this division seems to be present in 1358a 21–32. Maier's note, op. cit. 497–8 does not appear correct in its exclusion of the notion of τόπος from the ἴδια; this would also be true for Solmsen, op. cit. 14ff.; Marx, op. cit. 281 note 2, 283 and 296 (if I read him correctly) would understand ἐνθυμήματα or εἴδη with ἴδια. On the contrary it would appear that the ἴδια, as they are presented here, are not only τόποι but are general enough to be ‘loci ex quibus quasi conspiciatur via quam insistere debeamus ut et adversarium refutemus et quod nobis placeat evincamus,’ as Waitz describes topos, Aristotelis Organon (Leipzig 1844) 438. Google Scholar

⁴⁷ 1358a 30–31. Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Ibid. 32.Google Scholar

^48a 1403b 13–14 : εἴϱηται δὲ καί τὰ ἐνθυμήματα πόθεν δεῖ ποϱίζεσθαι · ἒστι γὰϱ τὰ μὲν εἴδη τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, τὰ δε τόποι. Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Ibid. 32–3.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Thus Süss, Ethos (Leipzig-Berlin 1910) 170, would seem wrong in saying that Aristotle has not given us any sharp and satisfactory division between εἴδη and τόποι. Google Scholar

⁵¹ Spengel, , Ueber das Studium der Rhetorik bei den Alten (Munich 1842) 22ff. makes such a distinction. It may appear a quibble but ‘sources for material’ seems better than ‘material proofs’ (materielle Beweise). For it would appear that the ‘proof’ is the enthymeme and that the εἴδη offer material for inferential argument by syllogism or enthymeme, whereas the κοινοί τόποι present forms for inference by syllogism. There would be no objection to calling the κοινοί τόποι which are sources for formal reasoning by syllogism or enthymeme ‘formelle Beweise’ as Spengel does.Google Scholar

⁵² See 1396b on the use of ἴδια; and Stephanus, Commentaria Graeca 21.268 lines 12–15. Google Scholar

⁵³ Marx admits that there are εἴδη for deliberative, forensic, epideictic oratory, but only τόποι for the πάθη and ἢθη. This forces him to say on 1396b 28–34 that a ‘Redaktor’ has confused the words and incorrectly brought them together, op. cit. 299,307. Solmsen on the other hand, op. cit. 170 note 2 with his interpretation of τόπος, has a far differenct problem: he cannot understand how any of these εἴδη can be called τόποι by Aristotle: it is ‘prinzipwidrig.’ Google Scholar

⁵⁴ The note of Cope-Sandys, op. cit. II 228–9 indicates what is had in mind here. These εἴδη are always specific to the subject but may be particular or general, see 1396b 11–9, with which compare Isocrates, Philip 109. This idea I find frequently present in the Topics, e.g. 105b 12–8: one can discuss the idea of ‘good’ in itself, or that which constitutes ‘the good’ in this specific subject. Google Scholar

⁵⁵ 1396b 28–34 undoubtedly refers to the section on the εἴδη in Books I and II, and they are called τόποι here. This is made more probable still by the contrast between τϱόπος at 1396b 20 and 1397a 1. Here Aristotle contrasts the method already presented in the first two books, of seeking source material for enthymemes (a method called τοπικός, see Spengel in his commentary solitalic 1396b 20) with the method which he now intends to take up, namely the method of the κοινοὶ τόποι. See also Riccobono, Paraphrasis in Rhetoricam Aristotelis (London 1822) 206, who writes on 1396b 28ff. and 1358a 12ff.: ‘Constat igitur locos accipi aut latius aut strictius. Primo modo loci comprehendunt etiam formas [his translation for e ῖδη]. Secundo modo distinguuntur a formis.’ ⁵⁶ 1358a 31. Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Ibid. 23–26. ⁵⁸ Cf. supra 9f. ⁵⁹ 1358a 17–21.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See Stephanus, , Commentaria Graeca 21.267. lines 34ff.Google Scholar

⁶¹ 1358a 12ff; 1355b 25ff. ⁶² 1358a 2–7. ⁶³ Ibid. 10–14. ⁶⁴ Ibid. 17–18. Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Ibid. 18–19. ⁶⁶ Ibid. 22. ⁶⁷ Ibid. 15–16. ⁶⁸ See note 54. ⁶⁹ 1358a 17–26.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Havet, E., Étude sur la rhétorique d'Aristote (Paris 1846) 34, expresses the distinction precisely: ‘En un mot, les τόποι ne sont que des formes logiques, … τα εἴδη, au contraire, ce sont les observations, les faits ou les idées, qui font la matière du raisonnement, et sans lesquels les formes sont vides.’ In essence the idea of a distinction is found in Throm, Die Thesis (Paderborn 1932) 42–6; Jebb in an appendix to his translation of the Rhetoric (Cambridge 1909); Lane-Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle (New York 1932) xxiv.Google Scholar

⁷¹ 1358a 2–7. ⁷² 1358a 2–7, 14ff; 1359b 1–16. Google Scholar

⁷³ 1355b 25–34; 1359b 12–16. Spengel's long note in his commentary on 1355b 26 acquires, it seems, a greater significance in the light of this relation between rhetoric as a dynamis and the κοινοί τόποι. ⁷⁴ 1355b 31–34. ⁷⁵ 1358a 21–22. ⁷⁶ 172a 29-b1. Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Aristotle at 1397a 23ff. gives an example. Here we have the κοινòς τόπος from correlative terms. As we know, in true correlatives what is predicable of one is generally predicable of the other. As a general axiomatic proposition (assuming A and B to be correlatives) we may say: If A is x, then B is x. Aristotle applies this general form to the question of taxes (26–7). But he calls attention to the fact that it cannot be used indiscriminately and that before it can be applied to a subject (justice is his example) one must carefully determine the meaning of the terms (29ff). Such a determination must come from the εἴδη before the κοινòς τόπος of correlative terms can be used. Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Spengel apparently has this in mind when he writes that the function of rhetoric is to work up the special proofs of the εἴδη and combine them with the formal to make the subject of discussion universally understood, Ueber das Studium (n. 51) 22: ‘… ihr [Rhetorik] liegt ob, die Beweise, welche die einzelne Wissenschaft gibt, zu verarbeiten, mit den formellen zu verbinden, und den Gegenstand zur allgemeinen Kenntniss zu bringen.’ Google Scholar

⁷⁹ As found in c. 23 of Book II. Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Spengel in his commentary 1397a 1 maintains that some are not universal, i.e. common to all rhetorical argument; also Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric (London 1867) 129.Google Scholar

⁸¹ The Roman numerals refer to Roemer's numbering in his text. Google Scholar

⁸² Solmsen, , op. cit. 163 and note 5 says well: ‘Die als Beispiele beigebrachten ἐνθυμήματα der Rhetorik sind durchaus in sich geschlossene Gedankengänge. und verhalten sich zu den τόποι, die sie illustrieren, in der Tat wie die πολλά zum formbestimmenden ἓν.’ Google Scholar

⁸³ Cf. supra 8, and 1358a 10–17. Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Lukasiewicz, J., Aristotle's Syllogistic (Oxford 1951) 20, see also 2.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ And see Alexander, , Commentaria graeca II 2 p. 5 lines 21–28.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Bocheński, , op. cit. 122. Bocheński (and also Solmsen) does not think that the Theophrastean τόπος is the same as the Aristotelian. Throm, op. cit. 43 and Thionville, op. cit. 30–35 consider it Aristotelian. And Bonitz and Ross on Met. 1014b note that τόπος as στοι-χεῖον would be ‘an argument applicable to a variety of subjects.’ Top. 163b 18 - 164a appears to express a similar idea.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Waitz, , op. cit. 362.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ I believe that Thionville, op. cit. 74 sees this process at work but does not recognize it. Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Top. 101b 15ff.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ In the Topics, then, many of the τόποι are focal points for the analysis, criticism, and evaluation of terms, all within the framework of the four categories. For instance at 132a 22–4 it is by these τόποι (διὰ τῶνδε σκεπτέον, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωϱητέον) that we determine a thing as a property. Another summary expression of the method appears at 153a 6–28, on definition: to be a true definition a genus and differentia must be present, and to ascertain whether these are on hand, certain places (τόποι) must be examined. In this regard Solmsen's (op. cit. 156) observation on the origin of the τόποι is of significance to me, although I am confining it to the particular topics. He sees the genesis of the Aristotelian topoi in the attempt to specify one's subject, and traces their probable origin to the elenchic dialectic of the Socratic-early Platonic τί ἐστι questions. In general it does seem true (and a passage like Top. 152b 36–153a 5 would appear to strengthen this) that Aristotle is concerned with specifying the meaning of terms, and a meaning grounded in the metaphysical reality. In this sense his method may well have had in mind what Hambruch (op. cit. 29) says was the aim of one of Plato's dialectical methods: ‘die Bildung eines festgefügten und wohlgegliederten Begriffsystems …’ Google Scholar

⁹¹ In this regard Hambruch's attempt to discover the genesis of the methodology of Aristotle's topics appears valid in its general outline. He finds it (op. cit. 8–17) in the logical-metaphysical rules for Platonic διαίϱεσις, e.g. ἃμα καὶ πϱότεϱον φύσει, πϱός τι ὂντα, μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. This last rule is called the κοινòς τόπος of the more-less in the Rhetoric and is set down in this axiomatic form (1397b 12–14): τοῦτο γάϱ ἐστιν, εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπάϱχοι μὴ ὑπάϱχει, δῆλον ὃτι οὐδ’ ᾧ ἧττον. As I see it, Hambruch's rules are the same fundamental sort of rules which were discovered independently to be at work in the general topics (see supra 13). Google Scholar

⁹² E.g. in 114b 38ff. he uses κοινòς τόπος IV; in 116a-b, XI, XIII, XVII; in 119a 37ff. I and II are employed, and they are described as: μάλιστα δ’ἐπίκαιϱοι καὶ κοινοὶ τῶν τόπων; in 124a 15ff. we find III, and in 154a 12–22 he speaks of the general effectiveness of these topics that are τοὺς μάλιστα κοινούς. Google Scholar

⁹³ In terms of this distinction it is interesting to note that if a rough analogy is drawn between rhetoric as a part of practical philosophy and scientia as a part of speculative philosophy we seem to have something of a parallel between the principal elements leading to επιστήμη in one instance, and to πίστις in the other: Google Scholar