¹ The essay, originally Froehlich's inaugural lecture as Warfield Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Princeton Theological Seminary, was first published in Princeton Seminary Bulletin n.s. 1 (1978): 213–24, repr. in Biblical Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective: Studies in Honor of Karlfried Froehlich on His Sixtieth Birthday , ed. Burrows, Mark S. and Rorem, Paul (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1991), 1–15. I use this version of the essay. This remark occurs on p. 10.Google Scholar

An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Congress of Medieval Studies (Kalamazoo), May, 1994. Thanks to Bernard McGinn, Peter Casarella, and Carl Still for helpful comments made on that occasion. I should also like to thank Traditio‘s two referees for their generous and detailed reactions to earlier drafts of this paper. Peter Lombard's Sententiae and commentaries on it will be abbreviated Sent. in this essay. I will specify authors to avoid confusion.Google Scholar

² Saint Bonaventure's Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, trans. Hayes, Zachary (Binghamton, N.Y., 1992), 30.Google Scholar

³ As we shall see when we discuss Arius, and Athanasius's response to Arius below.Google Scholar

⁴ Instructive here is Aloys Grillmeier's remark on the role played by a few select texts in this controversy: “However much the whole of scripture continued to be read, theological polemics, precisely in trinitarian and christological discussion, restricted themselves to a certain number of important or disputed scriptural texts” (Christ in Christian Tradition [New York, 1965], 7).Google Scholar

⁵ Note that the Greek text says that Jesus increased in σoφίᾳ, while the Vulgate tells us that Jesus progressed in sapientia. However, Western medieval theological and exegetical discussion of this text usually centers on the question of whether Jesus progressed in knowledge (scientia, or sometimes cognitio).Google Scholar

⁶ See Claverie, A., “La science du Christ,” Revue Thomiste 18 (1910): 766–79; Vigué, P., “Quelques précisions concernant l'objet de la science acquise du Christ,” Récherches de Science Religieuse 10 (1920): 1–27. For the fifty years after the publication of Vigué's article, there was virtually no scholarly study of this subject. For more recent scholarship, see Ernst, Jan Th., Die Lehre der hochmittelalterlichen Theologen von der vollkommenen Erkenntnis Christi (Freiburg-Basel-Vienna, 1971), esp. 170–203; Kaiser, Philipp, Das Wissen Jesu Christi in der lateinischen (westlichen) Theologie (Regensburg, 1981), esp. 150–67; and Torrell, J.-P., “S. Thomas d'Aquin et la science du Christ: Une relecture des questions 9–12 de la ‘Tertia Pars’ de la Somme de Théologie,” in Saint Thomas au XXe siècle (Paris, 1994), 394–409. See Torrell's succinct summary of this scholarship: “Thomas a été le premier des médiévaux à admettre pleinement cette science acquise chez le Christ” (“Une Relecture,” 398).Google Scholar

⁷ As is well known, Thomas (and many other high-scholastic thinkers, including Bonaventure) distinguished two faculties or powers of the intellect. Relying upon Aristotle's famous distinction in De Anima 3.5, the high-scholastic thinkers distinguished between the active intellect (intellectus agens) and the receptive or passive intellect (intellectus possibilis). Basically, the active intellect has the capacity to abstract universal ideas from the data of sense experience (phantasmata), while the passive intellect serves as the “storehouse” of these abstract ideas.Google Scholar

⁸ I will concentrate on Arius, Athanasius, Ambrose, and John of Damascus. Ambrose and John are of particular interest because Thomas explicitly invokes them in his discussion of the question in the Summa Theologiae. I summarize the Athanasian position briefly. However, it must be stressed that Thomas did not know Athanasius directly, nor does he refer to him explicitly in his discussion of acquired knowledge in the Summa. I summarize Athanasius for two reasons. First, I wish to provide a rich exegetical context for understanding Thomas. Second, and more importantly, because the position that Athanasius develops in Orationes contra Arianos remained influential throughout the patristic and medieval period, even if unattributed or mediated through other writers (like Peter Lombard). I also briefly summarize the Arian exegesis of Luke 2:52 in order to understand the context of Athanasius's exegesis. We will not consider in detail in this essay the fifth major interpretation of the text in the early church, which ascribed progress in wisdom to the mystical body of Christ. Thus, Augustine, for example, will ascribe progress in wisdom to the church in De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, 75 (ed. Mutzenbecher, A., CCL 44A [Turnhout, 1975], 216–17).Google Scholar

⁹ See Hanson, R. P. C., The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318–381 (Edinburgh, 1988), 100–106. The following brief account of Arian metaphysics and theology is substantially indebted to chap. 4 of Hanson's book, “The Rationale of Arianism.” Google Scholar

¹⁰ The word πάθος in ancient trinitarian and christological discussion generally refers to what is involved in change or becoming and, more specifically, to experiences of limitation, finitude, and passion.Google Scholar

¹¹ Hanson designates the doctrine of the σώμα άψυχον one of the “two ideas which might almost be said to be the characteristic marks of Arianism.” See Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 110.Google Scholar

¹² We know of the Arian interpretation of the text from Athanasius's Contra Arianos 3.51–53. See The Orations of St. Athanasius against the Arians, ed. Bright, William (Oxford, 1884), 203–6.Google Scholar

¹³ This is now generally accepted. See Grillmeier, , Christ in Christian Tradition, 308–28; and Hanson, , Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 451–52, where the author points out that only after the year 362 did Athanasius realize “the necessity of allowing a human soul to Jesus.” The Orationes were probably written between 339 and 345.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Contra Arianos 3.52–53, 205–6.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Though see Contra Arianos 3.53, 206. At one point in this paragraph, Athanasius says τò ἀνθρώπινον ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ προέκοπτεν. That is, he ascribes progress in wisdom to the soulless “human part.” Google Scholar

¹⁶ Where Athanasius also tackles another favorite proof-text of the Arians, Mark 13:32: “But of that day or that hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father.” These two difficult texts pertaining to Christ's human knowledge were often dealt with together in the history of Christian thought, and the exegetical strategies used to interpret both are not dissimilar.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Contra Arianos 3.52, 205.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid. Google Scholar

¹⁹ Ibid., 3.51, 204.Google Scholar

²⁰ “… ἐπεὶ προκόπτειν οὐκ εiχε.” Ibid., 3.52, 205.Google Scholar

²¹ Ibid., 3.51, 204.Google Scholar

²² Ibid., 3.53, 206.Google Scholar

²³ See Hanson, , Christian Doctrine, 667 for a brief introduction to Ambrose's anti-Arian activity. See also the recent fine study of Williams, Daniel H., Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Nicene-Arian Conflicts (Oxford, 1995).Google Scholar

²⁴ See De Fide 2.7.56, ed. Faller, O., CSEL 78 (Vienna, 1962), 75.Google Scholar

²⁵ “Et ideo quia suscepit animam, suscepit et animae passiones” (De Fide 2.7.56, 75).Google Scholar

²⁶ “Nisi forte debilitatem illam impii putabatis, quando vulnera videbatis. Erant quidem illa corporis vulnera, sed non erat vulneris illius ulla debilitas, ex quo vita omnium profluebat” (De Fide 4.5.54, 175–76). See also 2.7.56, 75: “Non turbatur ut virtus, non turbatur eius divinitas, sed ‘turbatur anima,’ turbatur secundum humanae fragilitatis adsumptionem.” Google Scholar

²⁷ See, e.g., De Fide 2.5.44, 71; and 2.9.77–78, 84–85: “Servemus distinctionem divinitatis et carnis…. Quasi deus loquitur quae sunt divina, quia verbum est, quasi homo dicit quae sunt humana, quia in mea substantia loquebatur.” Google Scholar

²⁸ “Disce distantiam: rogat quasi filius hominis, imperat quasi dei filius” (De Fide 3.4.32, 119).Google Scholar

²⁹ See De Fide 5.16.193–197, 289–91.Google Scholar

³⁰ “Ut quasi hominis filius secundum susceptionem nostrae inprudentiae vel perfectus non plene adhuc scisse omnia crederetur” (De Fide 5.18.222, 301).Google Scholar

³¹ See De Sacramento 7.72, ed. Faller, O., CSEL 79 (Vienna, 1964), 261.Google Scholar

³² For a fine study of the Damascene's christology, see Rozemond, K., La christologie de saint Jean Damascène (Ettal, 1959).Google Scholar

³³ See Frances Young's stimulating discussion of the status quaestionis in From Nicaea to Chalcedon (London, 1983), 229–39.Google Scholar

³⁴ De Fide Orthodoxa 3.22, PG 94, col. 1088.Google Scholar

³⁵ John seems to be relying upon, without specifically invoking, the notion of communicatio idiomatum, the doctrine that, because of the personal unity of two natures in Christ, qualities that are properly divine may be predicated of the human nature (and vice versa). Google Scholar

³⁶ John's position seems to be significantly different from Athanasius's. Athanasius maintains that the wisdom of the logos is progressively revealed through the human instrument. John seems to have meant that the wisdom of the transformed σαρξ is revealed.Google Scholar

³⁷ “Ad quod sane dici potest ipsum, secundum hominem, tantam a conceptione accepisse sapientiae et gratiae plenitudinem, ut Deus ei plenius conferre non potuerit” (III Sent. 13.5, in Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, ed. Brady, I., 2 vols., 3rd ed. rev. [Grottaferrata, 1971–81], 85). I use only vol. 2 in this essay.Google Scholar

³⁸ “Si enim proficiebat sapientia et gratia, non videtur a conceptione habuisse plenitudinem gratiae sine mensura” (III Sent. 13.4, 85).Google Scholar

³⁹ “Aperte enim videtur Ambrosius innuere, quod Christus secundum humanum sensum profecerit, et quod infantia eius expers cognitionis, et patrem et matrem ignoraverit” (III Sent., dist. 13.9, 88–89).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ “Quod nec Ecclesia recipit, nec praemissae auctoritates patiuntur sic intelligi” (III Sent., dist. 13.9, 88–89).Google Scholar

⁴¹ “Proficiebat ergo humanus sensus in eo secundum ostensionem, et aliorum hominum opinionem” (III Sent., dist. 13.9, 88–89). Can the Lombard's position on Christ's human knowledge be tied to his understanding of the hypostatic union? It is tempting to appeal to the Lombard's famous report of three contemporary opinions on the hypostatic union in III Sent., dist. 6, 49–59 and to tie him to the habitus theory which he explains there. There are at least two problems with this. First, it is still not at all certain which, if any, of these three christological opinions Peter favors. To assume that he preferred the habitus theory is to fall into the error of Peter's contemporaries who, basing their verdicts on the earlier works of the Lombard, criticized him for sympathy with the habitus theory. See, e.g., Gerhoh of Reichersberg, Libellus de ordine donorum Sancti Spiritus, in Opera inedita , ed. van den Eynde, D. et al., 2 vols. in 3 (Rome, 1955–56), 1: 71; and Walter of St. Victor, Contra quatuor labyrinthos 3.1–2, ed. Glorieux, P., in ADHL 19 (1952): 246–49. Of course, one cannot accept Gerhoh's criticism as an accurate report of Peter's mature christological opinions. Second, Peter is vigorously critical of the habitus theory on several grounds, one of which is that it regards the humanity of Christ as quite accidental. Thus one should hesitate before recommending that Peter's views on the hypostatic union or his putative preference for the habitus theory be invoked to explain his reluctance to affirm real growth in Christ's human knowledge.Google Scholar

⁴² “Dicendum sine praejudicio, quod plus veritatis est in verbis Ambrosii quam Magister eliciat ex eis” (III Sent. 3.10. Sol., in Commentarii in IV Sententiarum, from B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia , ed. Borgnet, E., 38 vols. [Paris, 1890–95], 28: 249).Google Scholar

⁴³ The term habitus in the medieval discussion of Luke 2:52 really has two meanings. At the most basic philosophical level it is virtually synonymous with “concepts” or “ideas,” i.e., intellectual understanding of the data given to humanity through sense experience by exercise of its active intellect (and to Christ through “infusion”). Secondly, it refers to the mind's readiness to know and recognize again what it has been previously given through sense experience. For a discussion of the meaning of habitus in high-medieval christology, see Hayes, Zachary, The Hidden Center: Spirituality and Speculative Christology in St. Bonaventure (Ramsey, N.J., 1981), 106–7.

⁴⁴ Bonaventure furnishes us with this definition: “Cognitio simplicis notitiae consistebat in habitibus et speciebus ipsi animae Christi inditis a primordio suae conditionis ex beneficio Conditoris” (III Sent. 14.3.2. resp., in Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia , 11 vols. [Grottaferrata, 1882–1902], 3: 322).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Albert, III Sent. 13.10. Sol., 249–51; Thomas, III Sent. 14.3, Quaestiuncula 5, in Scriptum super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi , ed. Mandonnet, P. and Moos, M. F., 4 vols. (Paris, 1929–47), 3: 461; Bonaventure, III Sent. 14.3.2., 322.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ “Quoniam ergo habitus et species impressae fuerunt ipsi animae Christi in omnimoda plenitudine, hinc est quod Christus proficere non potuit cognitione simplicis notitiae” (III Sent. 14.3.2. Resp., 322). See also Bonaventure's discussion in III Sent. 15.2.1, Resp., 337: “… anima eius debuit esse deiformis, ac per hoc repleta luce sapientiae et rectitudine iustitiae; ignorantia autem privatio est scientiae et potest esse via in errorem et obliquationem a rectitudine iustitiae, ac per hoc Christo non competebat.” Here we see another reason, aside from that of divine goodness and omnipotence, that medieval exegetes stress Christ's omniscience: namely, that ignorance could lead to error and sin.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ “Christus non proficiebat veniendo in notitiam rei prius incognitae” (III Sent. 14.3.2. Resp., 322). See also the extended discussion in III Sent. 15.2.1, 337, which concludes: “Concedendum est igitur Christum defectum ignorantiae nequaquam in se habuisse.” Google Scholar

⁴⁸ As Bonaventure puts it: “Quia vero sensus exterior ad aliquid convertabatur de novo ad quod prius conversus non fuerat, hinc est quod cognitione experientiae proficiebat” (III Sent. 14.3.2. Resp., 322).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ III Sent. 3.13.10. Sol., 249.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ III Sent. 14.3.2. Resp., 322.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Thomas lectured for four years on the Sentences (1252–56) while sententiarius in Paris. As will be evident in a moment, Thomas's early opinion on the possibility of acquired knowledge is highly dependent on previously written commentaries. Indeed, his position is much like the one developed by Albert the Great and Bonaventure.Google Scholar

I am not arguing that the whole of the Scriptum is derivative or dependent on contemporary opinion. But there is no doubt that this opinion was highly derivative. This is proveable not only by comparing the texts, but because Thomas later explicitly admits his debt at Summa 3a. 12.2. Resp. For Thomas's relationship in the Scriptum to earlier and contemporary commentators on the Sentences, see Emery, Gilles, La Trinité creatrice: Trinité et création dans les commentaires aux Sentences de Thomas d'Aquin et de ses précurseurs Albert le Grand et Bonaventure (Paris, 1995). Here Emery convincingly argues that, in the first two books of Thomas's Scriptum, Thomas both borrowed from contemporary commentators (such as Albert the Great and Bonaventure, as well as from the Summa Halensis, and others) and departed from them in significant and original ways. Lest we make unwarranted assumptions about the whole of the Scriptum, however, it is crucial to note here that Emery did not analyze the third book of Thomas's Scriptum, or its relationship to contemporary commentaries on the Sententiae, i.e., the christological book under consideration in this study. Thus it would be gross error to assume, without further research or reflection, that the third book of the Scriptum is also an original and personal work. One cannot apply Emery's research and conclusions about the first two books of the Scriptum to the third book as well. It may be that Thomas also charts his own way in that book. But that point has not been proved, or even studied, yet. In any case, it is certain that, on this opinion at least, Thomas was far from original.Google Scholar

⁵² “… Omnia scivit a primo instante suae conceptionis” (III Sent. 14.3. Sol. V, 461).Google Scholar

⁵³ “Crevit autem quantum ad aliquem modum certitudinis” (III Sent. 14.3. Sol. V, 461).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ “… Et quantum ad hanc crevit scientia Christi, inquantum quotidie aliqua videbat sensibiliter quae prius non viderat” (III Sent. 14.3. Sol. V, 461).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ “Ambrosius intelligit profectum scientiae Christi quantum ad experientiam secundum novam conversionem ad sensibile praesens” (III Sent. 14.3. Sol. V ad 4um, 461–62).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ “Non autem crevit ad essentiam” (III Sent. 14.3. Sol. V, 461).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ “Non fuit aliqua species de nova recepta in intellectu possibili ejus” (III Sent. 14.3. Sol. V ad 3um, 462).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ “Une Relecture,” 398.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Thomas wrote the Tertia Pars while teaching in the Dominican priory of San Domenico in Naples, where he served as regent master at the mendicant studium and at the University of Naples. See Weisheipl, , Friar Thomas, 298–314.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ “Sed quantum ad ipsum habitum scientiae, manifestum est quod habitus scientiae infusae in eo non est augmentatus, cum a principio plenarie sibi fuerit omnis scientia infusa” (Summa Theologiae 3a. 12.2. Resp., in Opera Omnia [Rome, 1887–], 11:167).Google Scholar

⁶¹ “Si igitur praeter habitum scientiae infusum non sit in anima Christi habitus aliquis scientiae acquisitae, ut quibusdam videtur, et mihi aliquando visum est, nulla scientia in Christo augmentata fuit secundum suam essentiam sed solum per experientiam, idest per conversionem specierum intelligibilium inditarum ad phantasmata. Et secundum hoc dicunt quod scientia Christi profecit secundum experientiam, convertendo scilicet species intelligibiles inditas ad ea quae de novo per sensum accepit” (Summa 3a. 12.2. Resp., 167). This remark occurs, of course, in a theological textbook, not a scriptural commentary. Nonetheless, let there be no doubt that Thomas had Luke 2:52 in mind when he wrote this article. Indeed, he explicitly cites the scriptural text in Summa 3a. 12.2 as evidence for the increase in Christ's experiential knowledge. And no less an authority than Torrell has concluded that Thomas arrives at his mature position sous l'influence de l'Écriture, specifically Luke 2:52. See “Une Relecture,” 398–99.Google Scholar

⁶² “Sed quia inconveniens videtur quod aliqua naturalis actio intelligibilis Christo deesset, cum extrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus sit quaedam naturalis actio hominis secundum intellectum, conveniens videtur hanc etiam actionem in Christo ponere” (Summa 3a.12.2. Resp., 168).Google Scholar

⁶³ “Sed quia inconveniens videtur quod aliqua naturalis actio intelligibilis Christo deesset, cum extrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus sit quaedam naturalis actio hominis secundum intellectum agentem, conveniens videtur hanc etiam actionem in Christo ponere. Et ex hoc sequitur quod in anima Christi aliquis habitus scientiae fuit per huiusmodi abstractionem specierum potuerit augmentari” (Summa 3a. 12.2. Resp., 168).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ “Et ideo non fuit conveniens ejus dignitati ut a quocumque hominum doceretur” (Summa 3a.12.3. Resp., 169).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod scientia rerum acquiri potest non solum per experientiam ipsarum, sed etiam per experientiam quarundam aliarum rerum: cum ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis possit homo procedere ad intelligendum effectus per causas, et causas per effectus, et similia per similia, et contraria per contraria. Sic igitur, licet Christus non fuerit omnia expertus, ex his tamen quae expertus est, in omnium devenit notitiam” (Summa 3a. 12.1 ad lum, 166).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ “Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Damasceni intelligitur quantum ad illos qui dicunt simpliciter factam fuisse additionem scientiae Christi: scilicet secundum quamcumque eius scientiam; et praecipue secundum infusam, quae causatur in anima Christi ex unione ad Verbum. Non autem intelligitur de augmento scientiae quae ex naturali agente causatur” (Summa 3a.12.2 ad 3um, 168).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ It has long been recognized that there are “Platonist” elements in Thomas's explanation of the beatific vision, especially, and in other opinions of his as well. Here I cite only Inge, W. R., The Philosophy of Plotinus (London, 1918), 15; Henle, R. J., St. Thomas and Platonism (The Hague, 1956); Hankey, W. J., God in Himself (Oxford, 1987); and, what is probably the clearest demonstration of Platonic influence in the realm of epistemology (especially in the beatific vision), the book recently published by Quinn, Patrick, Aquinas, Platonism and the Knowledge of God (Aldershot, 1996).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ None more usefully than Jordan, Mark D., The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas, The Etienne Gilson Series 15 (Toronto, 1992).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Aquinas, Platonism and the Knowledge of God , 2–3.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See Thomas's lengthy discussion in Summa la.75–79. Thomas's reservations about the limitations and unreliability of the mind's ability to know God from the world around us are, of course, famously muted in the first book of the Contra Gentiles. Google Scholar

⁷¹ See, generally, Summa 3a. 4–5, as well as Thomas's comment at the beginning of Summa 3a.9.4. Resp. that the human nature assumed by God the Word lacks nothing implanted by God in human nature as such, a remark analyzed in more detail below.Google Scholar

⁷² Summa 3a. 12.2. Resp., 168.Google Scholar

⁷³ How, then, to explain the earlier Thomistic position? I think the answer here lies, again, in Thomas's heavy dependence for this opinion, on other commentators on the Sentences, particularly Albert. Thomas's position there was quite derivative, and he did not develop his own, reflective position until he revisited the question in the Summa. Note, again, that the argument I am trying to make about the nature of Thomas's dependence applies only to this opinion. Again, I am not trying to make a general argument about Thomas's method in the third book of the Scriptum. One of the ways we know that Thomas's earlier argument is derivative is that at Summa 3a. 12.1 he explicitly acknowledges the identity of his earlier position and that of his mendicant contemporaries.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See, e.g., Bonaventure on this point: “Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus agens in Christo potuit abstrahere; dicendum, quod abstractio speciei a conditionibus materialibus quaedam ordinatur ad generandum habitum, quaedam vero consistit in iudicio eius quod apprehensum est per sensum, iudicio, inquam, facto ab intellectu. Et prima non fuit in Christo, cum intellectus eius haberet habitus et species rerum, illa autem abstractio ordinaretur ad acquisitionem habitus et scientiae nondum adeptae, et ita haberet annexum defectum ignorantiae” (III Sent. 14.3.2. Resp., 322).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ De Caelo et Mundo 1.4.27a33.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Summa 3a. 12.1. Resp., 166. See also this comment: “Si autem in aliis Deus et natura nihil frustra fecerunt, ut Philosophus dicit, in I de Caelo et Mundo, multo minus in anima Christi aliquid fuit frustra. Frustra autem est quod non habet propriam operationem…. Propria autem operatio intellectus agentis est facere species intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas a phantasmatibus…. Sic igitur necesse est dicere quod in Christo fuerunt aliquae species intelligibiles per actionem intellectus agentis in intellectu possibili eius receptae” (Summa 3a.9.4. Resp., 144).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis [the reference is to Summa 3a.4, where Thomas talks at length about the humanity assumed by God the Word] patet, nihil eorum quae Deus in nostra natura plantavit, defuit humanae naturae assumptae a Verbo Dei. Manifestum est autem quod in humana natura Deus plantavit non solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam intellectum agentem. Unde necesse est dicere quod in anima Christi non solum intellectus possibilis, sed etiam intellectus agens fuerit” (Summa 3a.9.4. Resp., 144).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Summa 3a.12.2, 168.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ See Summa 3a. 12.2 Resp., 168.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ “Une Relecture,” 399.Google Scholar

⁸¹ “… Anima eius debuit esse deiformis, ac per hoc repleta luce sapientiae et rectitudine iustitiae; ignorantia autem privatio est scientiae et rectitudine iustitiae; ignorantia autem privatio est scientiae et potest esse via in errorem et obliquationem a rectitudine iustitiae, ac per hoc Christo non competebat” (III Sent. 14.3.2, 322); “Concedendum est igitur Christum defectum ignorantiae nequaquam in se habuisse” (III Sent. 15.2.1, 337). Thomas comes to a similar conclusion at Summa 3a. 15.3. Resp., 188. This assertion, when juxtaposed with his insistence that Christ acquired his omniscience, creates an unresolved tension in Thomas's thought.Google Scholar

⁸² Bonaventure concludes that Christ's active intellect did not create new knowledge because, already, haberet habitus et species rerum (III Sent. 14.3.2 Resp. ad 4um, 322).Google Scholar

⁸³ “Duae formae ejusdem specie non possunt esse in eodem subjecto: habitus autem cognitionis omnium fuit in Christo ab instanti suae conceptionis: ergo non fuit susceptibilis alicujus habitus per cognitionem experimenti” (III Sent. 13.10 sed contra 1, 249).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ On this Augustinian theme and its influence, see Ernst, , Die Lehre, esp. 29–34, 124–28, and 144–67. On the importance of the Augustinian epistemological tradition to Bonaventure and contemporaries, see also Gilson, E., The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure (Paterson, N.J., 1965). Bonaventure himself reveals his epistemological preferences in several places, nowhere more clearly in relation to Christ's knowledge than in the second and fourth of his questions De Scientia Christi, in Opera Omnia 5 (1891): 6–10 and 17–27.Google Scholar