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Applied Ethics: What is Applied to What?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 January 2009
Abstract
This paper criticizes the conception of applied ethics as the top-down application of a theory to practical issues. It is argued that a theory such as utilitarianism cannot override our intuitive moral perceptions. We cannot be radically mistaken about the kinds of considerations which count as practical reasons, and it is the task of theoretical ethics to articulate the basic kinds of considerations which we appeal to in practical discussions. Dworkin's model of doing ethics ‘from the inside out’ is used to illustrate the appropriate role for theory in a broader sense. In conclusion, some sceptical questions are raised about how far theoretical ethics can contribute to public policy, especially if this requires a consensus.
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References
1 Hare, R. M., Essays on Bioethics, Oxford, 1993, p. 147Google Scholar.
2 Ibid., pp. 147 f.
3 Hare, R. M., ‘Why Do Applied Ethics?’, in Essays in Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1989, p. 10Google Scholar.
4 I elaborate this conception of practical reasons as located in a ‘shared vocabulary’ in ch. 3 of my book Reasons for Actions, Oxford, 1971Google Scholar, and in my paper ‘Public Reasons and the “Private Language” Argument’ (forthcoming in Philosophical Investigations). My defence of my position appeals to Wittgensteinian claims that, just as meaningful language requires shared standards to determine what counts as correct, so likewise meaningful action presuppose shared normative standards and these are what provide us with practical reasons.
5 Williams, Bernard, ‘Internal and external reasons’, in Moral Luck, Cambridge, 1981CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 I attempt to provide an example of this kind of exercise in my paper ‘Interfering with Nature’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, xiii (1996)Google Scholar, where I try to make sense of, without uncritically endorsing, the use in moral arguments of the idea that certain kinds of activities, and in particular certain developments in bio-technology, are ‘contrary to nature’.
7 Dworkin, Ronald, Life's Dominion, London, 1993, p. 29Google Scholar.
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9 Of course, in this case there was no overall consensus on the legitimacy of the bombing, but each camp, the supporters and the opponents of the bombing, had its own consensus, and each was a consensus reached from diverse theoretical positions. Protest movements and campaigns are typically coalitions.
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12 Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’, repr. many times, e.g. in Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed., War and Morality, Belmont, 1970, where the relevant passage is on pp. 50 f.
13 The Independent, 13 May 1999.
14 British Medical Association, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Medical Treatment, London, 1999Google Scholar. I am grateful to Robin Gill for emphasizing to me the significance of this report for my argument.
15 For comments on earlier drafts I am very grateful to colleagues in a Philosophy research seminar at the University of Kent, to participants in a joint day conference of the London Philosophy Programme and the Society for Applied Philosophy, to participants in a seminar at the University of Utrecht, to Professor Robin Gill, and to the editor of Utilitas.
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