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Comments on the Commentaries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 July 2004

J. B. SCHNEEWIND
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins University
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Abstract

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Adams's suggestion that there must be one really right way of presenting the history of moral philosophy seems implausible to me, so I reject – with additional reasons – his charges against the structure of Invention of Autonomy. Skorupski's way of stating the ‘equal moral abilities’ thesis is not, I argue, very Kantian; a more Kantian version is not open to his objections. I am unconvinced by Schultz's claim that Sidgwick did not really hold that thesis. Deigh raises questions I cannot reply to here, but I do offer some texts that seem to show that Sidgwick is not guilty of the confusion about ‘ought’ with which Deigh charges him.

Information

Type
SYMPOSIUM ON J. B. SCHNEEWIND'S PHILOSOPHY
Copyright
© 2004 Cambridge University Press