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A Non-proportional Hybrid Moral Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2009

Abstract

A common objection to consequentialism is that it makes unreasonable demands upon moral agents, by failing to allow agents to give special weight to their own personal projects and interests. A prominent recent response to this objection is that of Samuel Scheffler, who seeks to make room for moral agents by building agent-centred prerogatives into a consequentialist moral theory. In this paper, I present a new objection to Scheffler's account. I then sketch an improved prerogative, which avoids this objection by incorporating a non-proportional account of the relationship between values, costs and reasons.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1997

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