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Principia Then and Now

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2009

Robert Shaver
Affiliation:
University of Manitoba, bshaver@cc.umanitoba.ca

Abstract

Moore is taken to have followed Sidgwick in his arguments against naturalism and in his consequentialism. I argue that there are differences on both issues. Sidgwick's arguments against naturalism do not rely on a controversial view of analysis, and one of his arguments for consequentialism gives him greater resources against critics of consequentialism such as T. M. Scanlon.

Information

Type
G. E. Moore Centennial Essay
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

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