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Rawls and Cohen on Facts and Principles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 November 2009

A. FAIK KURTULMUS*
Affiliation:
The Queen's College, Oxfordfaik.kurtulmus@queens.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

G. A. Cohen has recently argued for a thesis about the relationship between facts and principles. He claims that Rawls denies this thesis, and the truth of this thesis vitiates Rawls's constructivist procedure. I argue against both claims by developing an account of Rawls's justificatory strategy and the role of facts in this strategy, which I claim is similar to the role of facts in some defences of utilitarianism.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009