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Unknowable Obligations*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 January 2009
Extract
You face two buttons. Pushing one will destroy Greensboro. Pushing the other will save it. (Sorry, doing nothing also destroys Greenboro.) There is no way for you to know which button saves and which destroys. What ought you to do? Answer: You ought to make the correct guess and push the button that saves Greensboro. Second question: Do you have an obligation to push the correct button?
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995
Footnotes
*
Ted Sider has graciously permitted me to become a moving target. I have revised in response to his initial reply and he has revised in response to this revision. I am also grateful to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Sigrun Svavarsdottir for detailed criticisms and tips.
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