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Environmental Interest Groups and Authoritarian Regime Diversity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Tobias Böhmelt
Tobias Böhmelt*
Affiliation:
University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UKETH Zurich, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
*
e-mail: tbohmelt@essex.ac.uk; tobias.boehmelt@ir.gess.ethz.ch
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Abstract

The literature increasingly disaggregates political systems for examining the differences in international policies and domestic decision-making according to diverse regime typologies. The following research adds to this literature by studying the impact of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) on the likelihood of ratifying international environmental agreements in different types of autocratic regimes. Building on a theory that focuses on the provision of environmental public goods, the author distinguishes between single-party regimes, military juntas, monarchies, and personalist dictatorships. The core argument claims that the provision of public goods varies among those regime typologies, ultimately leading to the expectation that the lobbying efforts of ENGOs should be most weakly pronounced in those autocracies that are likely to provide more environmental public goods anyway, i.e., single-party regimes. The empirical analysis using data on the ratification of international environmental agreements and autocratic regime types between 1973 and 2006 supports the theory.

Résumé

Résumé

La littérature catégorise de plus en plus les systèmes politiques pour étudier les différences entre les politiques internationales et les décisions nationales en fonction des divers types de régimes. L’étude suivante amène sa pierre à l’édifice en examinant l’impact des organisations non gouvernementales environnementales (ONGE) sur la probabilité de ratification des accords environnementaux internationaux pour différents types de régimes autocratiques. En s’appuyant sur une théorie centrée sur la fourniture de biens collectifs environnementaux, l’auteur fait la distinction entre les régimes à parti unique, les juntes militaires, les monarchies et les dictatures personnalistes. Cette théorie soutient principalement que la fourniture de biens collectifs varie selon le type de régime et qu’en conséquence finale, le lobbying des ENGO devrait être le plus faible dans les autocraties qui ont par ailleurs davantage tendance à fournir des biens collectifs environnementaux, c’est-à-dire les régimes à parti unique. L’analyse empirique réalisée à partir des données de ratification des accords environnementaux internationaux et des types de régimes autocratiques entre 1973 et 2006 va dans le sens de cette théorie.

Zusammenfassung

Zusammenfassung

In der Literatur werden politische Systeme vermehrt disaggregiert, um die Unterschiede zwischen internationalen Politiken und innerstaatlichen Entscheidungsprozessen entsprechend den verschiedenen Regimetypologien zu untersuchen. Die folgende Forschungsarbeit leistet einen Beitrag zu dieser Literatur, indem die Einflussnahme nicht-staatlicher Umweltorganisationen auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Ratifizierung internationaler Umweltverträge in verschiedenen autokratischen Regimen untersucht wird. Der Autor stützt sich auf eine Theorie, die sich auf die Bereitstellung ökologischer öffentlicher Güter konzentriert, und unterscheidet zwischen Einparteienregimen, Militärjunten, Monarchien und personalistischen Diktaturen. Im Wesentlichen wird behauptet, dass die Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter je nach Regimetypologie variiert, was letztendlich zu der Erwartung führt, dass die nicht-staatlichen Umweltorganisationen in den Autokratien, die wahrscheinlich ohnehin mehr ökologische öffentliche Güter bereitstellen, d. h. in den Einparteienregimen, die geringste Lobbyarbeit leisten sollten. Die empirische Analyse, die Daten über die Ratifizierung internationaler Umweltverträge und autokratische Regimetypen im Zeitraum von 1973 bis 2006 verwendet, unterstützt die Theorie.

Resumen

Resumen

El material publicado desglosa cada vez más los sistemas políticos para examinar las diferencias en las políticas internacionales y en la toma de decisiones nacionales según las diversas tipologías de régimen. La siguiente investigación se añade a este material publicado estudiando el impacto de las organizaciones no gubernamentales medioambientales (ENGO, del inglés environmental non-governmental organizations) sobre la probabilidad de ratificar acuerdos medioambientales internacionales en diferentes tipos de regímenes autocráticos. Partiendo de una teoría que se centra en la provisión de bienes públicos medioambientales, el autor distingue entre regímenes de partido único, juntas militares, monarquías y dictaduras personalistas. El argumento principal plantea que la provisión de bienes públicos varía entre dichas tipologías de régimen, llevando finalmente a la expectativa de que los esfuerzos de presión política de las ENGO deben ser pronunciados más débilmente en aquellas autocracias que es probable que proporcionen más bienes públicos medioambientales, es decir, regímenes de partido único. El análisis empírico utilizando datos sobre la ratificación de acuerdos medioambientales internacionales y tipos de régimen autocrático entre 1973 y 2006 apoya la teoría.

摘要

摘要

该文献日益分散政治制度,依照各种政权类型检查国际政治和国内决策的差别。通过研究环境非政府组织 (ENGO) 对不同独裁政权类型批准国际环境协议可能性的影响,以下研究被添加到文献。基于专注于提供环保公共物品的理论,作者划分了一党制政权、军政府、君主政权和独裁政权。核心争议在于这些政权类型提供公共物品的方式不同,最终导致ENGO的游说努力在可能提供更加环保公共物品的这些独裁政权发出最弱声音,即一党制政权。经验分析使用批准国际环境协议的数据,同时1973年至2006年之间的独裁政权类型支持该理论。

要約

要約

文献では、国際政策と多様な政権類型による国内の意思決定の違いを調べるための政治システムが集計化されていない。次の研究では、さまざまな種類の独裁政権での国際環境協定の批准の可能性が環境の民間非営利団体 (ENGO) に与える影響を研究して、文献に追加する。環境の公共財の供給に焦点を当てる理論は、一党体制、軍事政府、君主制、人格主義者、専制国家を区別する。公共財の供給は政体類型間で異なるが、独裁政治、例えば単一党体制により多くの環境の公共財を提供する可能性がある場合、最終的に ENGOのロビー活動が脆弱化されなければならないという期待に対して中心的な議論が集中している。本論では1973 年~2006年における独裁政権と国際環境協定の批准に関するデータを用いた実証分析理論を支持する。

ملخص

ملخص

الأنماط المتنوعة. تضيف البحوث التالية لهذا الأدب من خلال دراسة تأثير المنظمات الغير حكومية البيئية ( ENGOs ) على إحتمال التصديق على الإتفاقيات البيئية الدولية في أنواع مختلفة من الأنظمة الإستبدادية. إستنادا˝ على النظرية التي تركز على توفير السلع العامة البيئية، يميز المؤلف بين أنظمة الحزب الواحد ، المجالس العسكرية ، الملكيات ، الديكتاتوريات الشخصية. الحجة الأساسية تدعي أن توفير السلع العامة يختلف بين أنماط النظام ، مما يؤدي في نهاية المطاف إلى توقع أن جهود الضغط من المنظمات الغير حكومية البيئية ( ENGOs )ينبغي أن يكون أكثر وضوحا˝ ضعيف في تلك الأنظمة الإستبدادية التي من المرجح أن توفر المزيد من المنافع العامة البيئية ، على سبيل المثال٬ نظام الحزب الواحد. التحليل التجريبي بإستخدام بيانات بشأن التصديق على الإتفاقيات البيئية الدولية وأنواع النظام الإستبدادي بين عامي 1973 و 2006 يدعم هذه النظرية.

Keywords

Autocratic regimesEnvironmental governanceEnvironmental non-governmental organizationsTreaty ratification

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , February 2015, pp. 315 - 335
Copyright
Copyright © International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2013

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Footnotes

This paper has been written in the context of the Swiss NCCR research program “Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century.” I thank Gabriele Spilker, the anonymous reviewers, and the journal’s editor, Bernard Enjolras, for helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi: 10.1007/s11266-013-9434-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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