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Decision Process, Choice, and Consequences: Israel's Deep-Penetration Bombing in Egypt, 1970

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Avi Shlaim
Affiliation:
University of Reading (England)
Raymond Tanter
Affiliation:
The University of Michigan, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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Abstract

Weapons systems have a great impact on national security decision making. In particular, the use of air power for political coercion or “compellence” is a tempting option when a nation has overwhelming aerial capabilities relative to an opponent. Israel's decision to launch air attacks deep within Egypt during the 1970 War of Attrition suggests that coercive bombing may not yield expected benefits and effect unanticipated costs. The decision process that produced the bombing choice was characterized by inadequate search for alternatives; conservative revision of opinion; faulty evaluation of consequences in terms of likelihood, benefits, and costs; a failure to consider value trade-offs between military and political dimensions; and overestimation of the probability of preferred outcomes, coupled with underestimation of the likelihood of undesirable outcomes.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1978

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