¹ The problems posed by regional economic and demographic imbalances have been addressed in a number of recent works. Koropeckyj, I. S. and Schroeder, Gertrude, eds., Economics of Soviet Regions (New York: Praeger, 1981)Google Scholar, contains several important contributions. A useful guide to the earlier literature on regional development is contained in Bahry, Donna and Nechemias, Carol, “Half Full or Half Empty? The Debate over Soviet Regional Development”, Slavic Review 40 (No. 3, 1981), 366–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Demographic trends are summarized in Murray Feshbach and Rapawy, Stephen, “Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies”, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in a New Perspective (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1976), 113–54.Google Scholar See also the separate contributions of these authors to U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in a Time of Change (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1979)Google Scholar. Some of the policy problems posed by these trends are also explored in Besemeres, John F., Socialist Population Politics: The Political Implications of Demographic Trends in the USSR and Eastern Europe (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1980)Google Scholar; Rywkin, Michael, “Central Asia and Soviet Manpower”, Problems of Communism 28 (No. 1, 1979)Google Scholar, 1–13; and Feshbach, Murray, “The Soviet Union: Population Trends and Dilemmas”, Population Bulletin 37 (No. 3, 1982)Google Scholar. The potential rise of Muslim nationalism is treated in Bennigsen, Alexandre, “Several Nations of One People? Ethnic Consciousness among Soviet Central Asian Muslims”, Survey 24 (No. 3, 1979), 51–64Google Scholar, and in Bennigsen, and Broxup, Marie, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (New York: St. Martin's, 1983).Google Scholar

² Hodnett, Grey, in his study, Leadership in the Soviet National Republics (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1978)Google Scholar, displays data that suggest the period from 1955 to 1972 was actually characterized by marginal decreases in the number of native cadres occupying positions at the very highest levels of the Central Asian republics (see table 2.11, p. 100). If we examine the broader “social elite" of these republics, however, we find evidence of a dramatic xpansion in the number and proportion of natives. For these data, see Burg, Steven L., Russians, , Natives and Jews in the Soviet Scientific Elite: Cadre Competition in Central isia”, Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique 20 (No. 1, 1979), 43–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ See Burg, , Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ For the suggestion of such influence, see Goble, Paul A., “Ideology, Methodology, and Nationality: The USSR Academy of Sciences Council on Nationality Problems”, a paper prepared for delivery at the National Convention of the APSA, Washington D.C., August 1980Google Scholar, and Azrael, Jeremy R., “Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR”, in Azrael, , ed., Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices (New York: Praeger, 1978), 363–90Google Scholar, but esp. 365. My own more sanguine estimate of the role of academic expertise in the formulation of Soviet nationality policy is the result of conversations with several of the most prominent Soviet ethnosociologists—some of them members of the scientific council mentioned above—during my recent tenure as a visiting researcher at the Institute of Ethnography of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences in Moscow, home institution of the council.

⁵ Iulian V. Bromlei, director of the Institute of Ethnography and a leading figure in the study of the nationality question in the U.S.S.R., for example, is also a specialist of ethnicity in Yugoslavia and refers to that country as an “analogous” case for the study of the emergence of a common “international” identity among the population of a multinational state in “XXVI s'ezd KPSS i zadachi izucheniia sovremennykh natsional'nykh protsessov” [The XXVI Congress of the CPSU and the task of studying contemporary national processes], in Bromlei, , ed., Razvitie natsional'nykh otnoshenii v SSSR v svete reshneii XXVI s'ezda KPSS [The development of national relations in the USSR in light of the decisions of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU], (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 25.Google Scholar It should be noted, however, that in direct conversation other Soviet researchers from Bromlei's own institute are quite reluctant to acknowledge the relevance of any comparison of the Soviet and Yugoslav cases.

⁶ Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are particularly well suited for comparison on the basis of a “comparable cases” or “most similar systems" approach. See Lijphart, Arend, “The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research”, Comparative Political Studies 8 (No. 2, 1975), 158–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Przeworksi, Adam and Teune, Henry, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), 32–34.Google Scholar

⁷ Pre–1966 Yugoslav politics are analyzed in Shoup, Paul, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968)Google Scholar and Milen-kovitch, Deborah D., Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).Google Scholar

⁸ On the role of the official Islamic hierarchy in adapting the faith to modern circumstances, see Rorlich, Azade-Ayse, “Islam under Communist Rule: Volga-Ural Muslims”, Central Asian Survey 1 (No. 1, 1982), 5–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 21ff, and Rorlich, , “Notes on the Dynamics of Religion and National Identity in Central Asia”, in Halle, David, ed., Conference on the Study of Central Asia (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1983), 29–38,Google Scholar esp. 31–34.

⁹ On the development of a Muslim nationality in Yugoslavia see Hadžijahić, Muhamed et al., Islam i Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini [Islam and Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina] (Sarajevo: Starjesinstvo Islamske Zajednice u SR Bosne i Hercegovine, 1977)Google Scholar; Hadžijahić, , Od tradicije do identiteta: geneza nacionalnog pitanja bosanskjh Muslimana [From Traditioto Identity: The Genesis of the National Question of the Bosnian Muslims] (Sarajevo: Svetlost, 1974)Google Scholar; Ćerić, Salim, Muslimani srpskphrvatskpg jezika [Muslims of the Serbocroatian language] (Sarajevo: Svetlost, 1968)Google Scholar; Purivatra, Atif, Nacionalni i politički razvitak Muslimana [The National and Political Development of the Muslims] (Sarajevo: Svetlost, 1969)Google Scholar; Rusinow, Dennison I., “Yugoslavia's Muslim Nation”, UFSI Report, No. 8, Europe (DIR-1–82) (1982)Google Scholar; and Burg, , “The Political Integration of Yugoslavia's Muslims: Determinants of Success and Failure”, The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, No. 203 (1983).Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Burg (fn. 2).

¹¹ “Rorlich (fn. 8).”

¹² Hodnett (fn. 2) classifies the Ukraine as “largely self-administering” in four out of five political-administrative categories (table 2.13, p. 105).

¹³ The most recent data available on the number of CPSU members in the Central Asian republics and of Central Asian nationality, reported in “KPSS v tsifrakh [The CPSU in Figures]” Partinaia zhizn' 14 (July 1981), 13–26Google Scholar, esp. 14 and 18, suggest that nativization of local institutions continues unabated. See also the comments by Andropov on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the creation of the U.S.S.R. concerning the nationalities question, reported in Broadcast, Foreign Information Service [henceforth FBIS], Soviet Union—Daily Report, December 21, 1982Google Scholar, pp. P4-P5.

¹⁴ See Shoup (fn. 7), 208ff and 254ff.

¹⁵ The Ukrainians identified by Bialer as members of the central leadership in 1974, for example, have since lost their positions (Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors [Cambridge: At the University Press, 1980], 223)Google Scholar. This trend has continued under Andropov, with the ouster of the Byelorussian party secretary and the co-optation to full membership in the Politburo of the premier of the Russian republic. The most important indicator of a contrary trend is, of course, the promotion to full membership of the Azerbaidzhani party secretary, Aliev, and his assignment to important responsibilities in the Council of Ministers, discussed below.

¹⁶ Azrael (fn. 4) points to the activation of the scientific council on nationality problems as evidence of “mounting official concern” (365). See also Goble (fn. 4) for additional discussion. At the very least, this reflected growing interest in the subject on the part of a large number of scholars in a broad range of disciplines.

¹⁷ The post-Khrushchev leadership began its tenure with a warning against such practices (see Pravda, September 5, 1965, as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press [henceforth CDSP] 17, No. 34 [November 15, 1965], p. 4), and Brezhnev ended his rule with a similar warning (see “Brezhnev's report to the Congress—II”, CDSP 33, No. 9 [April 1, 1981], p. 6).

¹⁸ Events in Kosovo are summarized in Ramet, Pedro, “Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia”, Orbis 25 (No. 2, 1981), 369–88.Google Scholar

²⁰ Inter-nationality friction between Russians and native elites was first suggested by the H sociological research of Iu. Arutiunian, V. (“A Concrete Sociological Study of Ethnic Relations”, The Soviet Review 14 [No. 2, 1973], 14–15).Google Scholar At the time, Arutiunian's findings, although consistent with a growing literature on the politics of multiethnic states in the West, were unusual for the U.S.S.R. Recently, however, even Andropov acknowledged that “economic and cultural progress of all nations and nationalities is accompanied with the growth of their national self-awareness” and that this necessitates “great tact in selecting; and posting cadres” (FBIS [fn. 13]).

²⁰ Per capita national income in Kosovo declined from 53 percent of the Yugoslav level in 1953 to 36 percent in 1961. It was only 48 percent of that in Croatia (29 percent of that I in Slovenia) in 1953 and declined to only 30 percent (21 percent of the Slovenian level) in 1961. Calculations based on data in Savezni Zavod za Statistiku [Federal Institute for Statistics, henceforth SZS], Statistički Godišnjak Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije 1963 [Statistical Yearbook of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1963, henceforth SGFNRJ] (Belgrade: SZS, 1964), 356Google Scholar; and SZS, Statistički Bilten, No. 1295 (Belgrade: SZS, May 1982), 8–17.Google Scholar

²¹ For data on Bosnia, see sources cited in fn. 20. Comparisons are to data presented in Martin C. Spechler, “Regional Developments in the U.S.S.R., 1958–78” in Soviet Economy in a Timeof Change (fn. 1), table 3, p. 151; James W. Gillula, “The Economic Interdependence of Soviet Republics”, ibid., table 5, p. 629; and McAuley, Alistair, Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979)Google Scholar, table 5.1, p. 109.

²² ” Inter-regional differences in living standards favoring Central Asia are summarized in Feshbach, “Prospects for Massive Outmigration from Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the Next Decade”, in Soviet Economy in a Time of Change (fn. 1), 656ff, esp. 659–60; and Gertrude E. Schroeder, “Regional Living Standards”, in Koropeckyj and Schroeder (fn. 1), 118–56.

²³ Milenkovitch (fn. 7) and Shoup (fn. 7) report extensively on this political debate within the Yugoslav leadership.

²⁴ Burg (fn. 3) reports on these developments.

²⁵ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone inventories a series of leadership purges in the nonRussian republics in the sixties and seventies in “The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR”, Problems of Communism 23 (No. 3, 1974), 1–22,Google Scholar esp. 12–13.

²⁶ An occurrence alleged by one Yugoslav informant who served in the central apparatus in the sixties.

²⁷ Data on national income produced, and on invested capital and its sources, for 1955 and 1960 are reported in SZS, SGFNRJ 1957 (Belgrade: SZS, 1958), 132 and 302Google Scholar; and SZS, SGFNRJ 1962 (Belgrade: SZS, 1963), 344 and 419–21Google Scholar, respectively. Unfortunately, data for investments in Kosovo are not broken out separately from those for Serbia in these sources.

²⁸ Sources of expenditures for investment in the regions for the period 1963 to 1971 are shown in Burg (fn. 3), table 2.10, pp. 58–59.

²⁹ Gillula (fn. 21), throughout.

³⁰ On the lower productivity of investment in the underdeveloped regions, see Spechler (fn. 21), and Gillula (fn. 21), as well as Connock, Michael, “Is industry inefficient in Yugoslavia's poor regions?” South Slav Journal, 3 (No. 4, 1980), 3–9.Google Scholar On the assertiveness of Ukrainian leadership, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, “Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest: An Essay on the Persistence and Limits of Ukrainian National Communism”, in Azrael (fn. 4), 105– 43. For a broader treatment of the economic and political position of the Ukraine, see Koropeckyj, I. S., ed., The Ukraine within the USSR (New York: Praeger, 1977).Google Scholar

³¹ James W. Gillula, “The Growth and Structure of Fixed Capital”, in Koropeckyj and Schroeder (fn. 1), 162–63.

³² ibid., 177ff; and Gillula (fn. 21), 649–52.

³³ Inter-regional bargaining processes are reviewed in Burg (fn. 3), 242ff. The scope of inter-regional capital transfers in the period from 1971 to 1980 is reported in Bombelles, Joseph T., “Transfer of Resources from More to Less Developed Republics and Autonomous Provinces of Yugoslavia 1971–1980”, Occasional Papers OP-69, Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe (1981).Google Scholar

³⁴ The New York Times, December 16, 1983, p. 1.

³⁵ See the obituary of Uzbek party secretary Rashidov (Pravda, November 1, 1983, p. 2.) for official praise of his successful representation of regional interests as manifest in the development of his republic during his tenure as first secretary.

³⁶ Joseph Berliner has suggested that precisely such political costs may constitute important constraints on the ability of the Soviet leadership to undertake economic reform [“Managing the USSR Economy: Alternative Models”, Problems of Communism 32 (No. 1, 1983), 40–56 esp. 54–55]Google Scholar; a similar argument is made by Soviet scholars in the so-called “Novosibirsk memorandum” (excerpted in The New York Times, August 5, 1983, p. 4.).