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Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

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Extract

This paper considers the role of reputation and signaling in establishing deterrence. The cost-benefit calculations of rational deterrence are extended to allow for incomplete or imperfect information. The author uses requirements of a sequential equilibrium (and its refinements) to impose consistency restrictions on how strategic players signal a reputation for strength. This provides a way to interpret potentially misleading reputations and offers a resolution to the reputation paradox of Jervis.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1991

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