¹ Levy, Marion J. Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton 1966)Google Scholar, II.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. 85.

⁴ See Russett, Bruce M. and others, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven 1964), 298Google Scholar. These fourteen societies are the Netherlands, West Germany, France, Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States.

⁵ These five characteristics are adopted from Black, Cyril E., The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York 1967), 9–34Google Scholar.

⁶ von Ranke, Leopold, “A Dialogue on Politics,” reprinted in Von Laue, Theodore H., Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years (Princeton 1950), 168Google Scholar.

⁷ Friedrich, Carl J., “Intranational Politics and Foreign Policy in Developed (Western) Societies,” in Farrell, R. Barry, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston 1966), 97Google Scholar.

⁸ See Russett and others, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 308-309.

⁹ Stanley Hoffmann offers another argument on “low policies” and “high policies” in his essay “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus, xcv (Summer 1966), 862-915. Hoffmann feels that nuclear stalemate has served to reinforce the attributes of the nation-state by stabilizing the structure of postwar international society, and diat low policies do not generate the spillover expected of them by prophets of international integration. Although Hoff-mann is quite right in saying that the integrationists overestimated the potential of economic exigencies for creating international integration, his denial of any effect of low policies is overstated.

¹⁰ In definitions of public goods, the emphasis is usually placed on one society rather dian on a group of societies. The focus is then on nonexclusivity or the incapacity of a single organization or government to prevent any individual members from receiving its benefits. See Olson, Mancur Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass. 1965)Google Scholar. It is also true, however, that incentives exist for cooperation within a group, based on the lure of greater benefits.

¹¹ For a discussion of the transfer of action referents from transcendental to empirical ones, see Levy, Marion J. Jr., “Rapid Social Change and Some Implications for Modernization,” International Conference on the Problems of Modernization in Asia, June 28-July 7, 1965 (Seoul 1965), 657–58Google Scholar.

¹² Wolfers, ArnoldDiscord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore 1962), 91–102Google Scholar. Wolfers adds a third category “self-abnegation,” which fits a logical but not an empirical gap.

¹³ Levy, “Rapid Social Change,” 657.

¹⁴ Knorr, Klaus, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton 1966), 21Google Scholar.

¹⁵ This is the argument in Osgood, Robert E. and Tucker, Robert W., Force, Order, and Justice (Baltimore 1967), 325Google Scholar.

¹⁶ A balanced analysis of both schools of thought can be found in Hassner, Pierre, “The Nation-State in the Nuclear Age,” Survey, LXVII (April 1968), 3–27Google Scholar.

¹⁷ See Viner, Jacob, “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” World Politics, i (October 1948), 1–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power, 22.

¹⁹ Recent economic thought on the relation between war and economic growth falls into a great tradition of non-Marxist economic-political theory. For a history of these writings, see Silberner, Edmund, La guerre et la paix dans Vhistoire des doctrines économiques (Paris 1957)Google Scholar.

²⁰ , Harold and Sprout, Margaret, “The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources,” World Politics, xx (July 1968), 660–93Google Scholar.

²¹ Ibid., 685.

²² Ibid., 690-91.

²³ See, for example, the organismic metaphors, and their rationalization, in Deutsch, Karl W., The Nerves of Government (Glencoe 1963)Google Scholar.

²⁴ An important explication of these models is found in Allison, Graham T., “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review, LXIII (September 1969), 689–718CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ See Hammond, Paul Y., “Foreign Policy-Making and Administrative Politics,” World Politics, xvii (July 1965), 656–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ Kaiser, Karl, “The Interaction of Regional Subsystems: Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers,” World Politics, xxi (October 1968), 91Google Scholar. Also see his article, “Transnationalepolitik: Zu einer Theorie der multi-nationalen Politik,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift (1969), 80-109.

²⁷ Ibid., 92.

²⁸ Tinbergen, Jan, On the Theory of Economic Policy, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam 1963), 37–38Google Scholar.

²⁹ Ibid., 41.

³⁰ Cooper, Richard N., The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York 1968), 155Google Scholar.

³¹ See the recent works of Deutsch, Karl W., including Deutsch and others, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York 1967)Google Scholar; and “The Impact of Communications upon International Relations Theory,” in Said, Abdul A., ed., Theory of International Relations: the Crisis of Relevance (Englewood Cliffs 1968), 74–92Google Scholar.

³² For an elaboration of this point, see Richard Cooper, Economics of Interdependence, 10.

³³ Halpern, Manfred, “The Revolution of Modernization in National and International Society,” in Friedrich, Carl J., ed., Revolution (New York 1966), 195Google Scholar.

³⁴ General Motors, for example, with global net sales of $20.2 billion, would rank as the eighteenth most important state in such a ranking. See War/Peace Reports (October 1968), 10Google Scholar.