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Why the Soviets Buy the Weapons They Do

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Robert P.Berman and John C.Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982, 171 pp.

AndrewCockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. New York: Random House, 1983, 323 pp.

DavidHolloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, 211 pp.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Matthew A. Evangelista
Affiliation:
Cornell University
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Abstract

The authors of three recent books attempt to account for Soviet military developments by exploring a wide range of possible explanations. In Soviet Strategic Forces, Berman and Baker adopt a“requirements“approach; they argue that the Soviet strategic posture has developed mainly in response to threats generated by the West. Andrew Cockburn, in The Threat, maintains that internal factors—in particular, bureaucratic politics and the workings of the military-industrial complex—are responsible for Soviet weapons decisions. David Holloway's more eclectic explanation, in The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, describes both the internal and external determinants of Soviet military policy. The evolution of Soviet regional nuclear policy, and particularly the deployment of the SS-20 missile, can be accounted for by several different explanations—indicating a problem of overdetermination of causes. One way to resolve this problem is by adopting a framework developed by James Kurth to explain U.S. weapons procurement. It suggests that the“modes of causation” for Soviet weapons decisions are generally the opposite of those for American decisions. This generalization is consistent with what an analysis based on the relative strengths of state and societal forces in the two countries would predict.

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Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1984

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