¹ This complication is explored in Russett, Bruce M., What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense (New Haven 1970Google Scholar), particularly 13, 178.

² This point refers to the classic dilemma of intentions versus capability. It would seem to me that, in the current superpower arms race, defense decisions taken to appease domestic lobbies may have the same consequences as if they were unambig-uously competitive in the arms race context. A somewhat more optimistic view is provided by Petersen, N., “The Arms Race Implications of Anti-Ballistic Missile De-fences,” in Barnaby, C. F. and Boserup, A., eds., Implications of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Pugwash Monograph II (London 1969), 40Google Scholar.

³ Alternative definitions may be found in ibid., 40; Huntington, Samuel P., “Arms Races: Pre-Requisites and Results,” in Friedrich, Carl S. and Harris, Seymour E., eds., Public Policy, 1958 (Cambridge, Mass. 1958Google Scholar), 41; Burns, Arthur L., “A Graphical Approach to Some Problems of the Arms Race,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, in (December 1959), 326CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Urs Schwarz, and Hadik, Laszlo, Strategic Terminology: A Trilingual Glossary (New York 1966), 35Google Scholar; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1968/69 [hereafter cited as SIPRI Yearbook] (Stockholm 1969), 44. The definitions of these authors are all too exclusive; Huntington and Burns stress the interstate nature of arms race phenomena, Schwarz and Hadik require participants to endeavor to stay ahead in the race, and the SIPRI authors equate an arms race with the “action-reaction phenomenon.”

⁴ The debate over the various ABM decisions announced by the U.S. Government since September 1967 has drawn attention to the possible role of different kinds of Soviet-American interactive patterns in strategic armaments. The strongest statement endorsing an action-reaction interpretation of the superpower arms race is to be found in Rathjens, George W., “The Dynamics of the Arms Race,” Scientific American, ccxx (April 1969Google Scholar), particularly the diagram on 24. On the other side, consider-able scepticism concerning the action-reaction cycle may be found in Martin, Laurence W., Ballistic Missile Defence and the Alliance, The Atlantic Papers (Paris 1969), 25Google Scholar; Lee, William T., “The Rationale Underlying Soviet Strategic Forces,” 142Google Scholar–78, and Foster, Richard B., “The Safeguard BMD Proposal and Arms Control Prospects for the 1970's,” 242–77, in Kintner, William R., ed., Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense (New York 1969Google Scholar); Stone, Jeremy J., “When and How to Use ‘SALT,’” Foreign Affairs, XLVHI (January 1970), 262CrossRefGoogle Scholar–73.

⁵ See Lee (fn. 4), 168–71, and Wolfe, Thomas W., Soviet Power and Europe, 1970 (Baltimore 1970Google Scholar), chap. 16.

⁶ Ibid., 503–504; Lee (fn. 4), 147; Foster (fn. 4), 259–60.

⁷ Smoker, Paul, “Fear in the Arms Race: A Mathematical Study,” in Rosenau, James, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York 1969), 579Google Scholar.

⁸ Ibid., 573. Arms races comprise a single class of phenomena in international relations and (with due caution) a comparative analysis of different arms races will yield a measure of general wisdom. With respect to the empirical base of the article, the bulk of the historical illustrations refers to the following arms races: England-France and Russia (naval, 1884–1904, with Italian, German, and Austro-Hungarian complications); England-Germany (naval, Phase I, 1898–1905, Phase II, 1906–1914); England-United States-Japan (naval, 1918–1922, with many complications-principally respecting France and Italy; also, it could be argued that the nature of the Washington Treaty restrictions caused a redirection rather than a termination of the race); Soviet Union-United States (all categories of armaments, from 1946 to the present, with Chinese complications after 1964). Other races are very briefly mentioned in the text. A detailed inventory of arms races, by type, awaits the attention of a further study. As may be deduced from the breadth of the definition offered in the text, the arms race phenomenon is far more prevalent than many students of politics will commonly allow. See Huntington (fn. 3), and Wright, Quincy, A Study of War, II (Chicago 1942), 690Google Scholar. Itemization is dependent upon definition. Huntington's “duel” focus for arms races and Wright's insistence upon the “general” nature of recent races renders the empirical bases of both works somewhat suspect to me.

⁹ See Hoag, Malcolm W., “On Stability in Deterrent Races,” World Politics, XIII (July 1961), 515Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Provided the word “exploitable” is qualified, it presents no problems. However, a Senate Report in 1968 referred to the unqualified and mystifying notion of “exploitable superiority.” See U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Status of U.S. Strategic Power [hereafter cited as Status of U.S. Strategic Power], 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington 1968), 3Google Scholar.

¹¹ Huntington (fn. 3), 42.

¹² This possibility has been well-explored by Harry Gelber, “The Impact of Chinese ICBM's on Strategic Deterrence,” in Kintner (fn. 4), 179–206.

¹³ Watt, Donald C., “The Possibility of a Multilateral Arms Race: A Note,” International Relations, 11 (October 1962), 372CrossRefGoogle Scholar–77, 397.

¹⁴ See Sir Richmond, Herbert, Sea Power in the Modern World (London 1934), 123Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Among the most helpful guides to Anglo-German naval rivalry are Steinberg, Jonathan, Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (London 1965Google Scholar); Woodward, E. L., Great Britain and the German Navy (London 1964Google Scholar, first publ. 1935) and Marder, Arthur, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I: The Road to War, 1904–1914 (London 1961Google Scholar).

¹⁶ See Huntington (fn. 3), 65–79.

¹⁷ “Today's ‘arms race' is qualitative rather than quantitative.” This comment by Dr. Edward Teller would be endorsed by most contemporary strategic analysts. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, [hereafter cited as Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems], Hearings, Part II, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 517. See also SIPRI Yearbook (fn. 3), chap. 2.

¹⁸ Status of U.S. Strategic Power (fn. 10), 2.

¹⁹ Huntington (fn. 3), 71. 20 Ibid., 52.

²¹ For a case study of just such an example see Armacost, Michael H., The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-]upiter Controversy (New York 1969Google Scholar).

²² Oppenheimer, Martin, Urban Guerrilla (London 1970Google Scholar, first publ. 1969), chap. 7.

²³ Le Bon, Gustave, The Crowd (New York 1960Google Scholar, first publ. 1895); Lasswell, Harold, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York 1965Google Scholar, first publ. 1935), 63, fn. 10.

²⁴ See the Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1969-1970 (London 1969Google Scholar), 5; SIPRI Yearbook (in. 3) , 198–99; William T. Lee, “Calculating Soviet National Security Expenditures,” in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Economy in Government, The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities, Part 3: The Economic Basis of the Russian Military Challenge to the United States, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 932–34; Russett (fn. 1), 8–10, 193–94. For an overview of this problem area see Pertti Joenniemi, “Aspects on the Measurement of Armament Levels,” Cooperation and Conflict, in (1970), 141–51.

²⁵ Note the comments on this point in Thomas C. Schelling, “War Without Pain, And Other Models,” World Politics, xv (April 1963), 474Google Scholar.

²⁶ Richardson, Lewis F., Arms and Insecurity (London 1960), 74–75Google Scholar.

²⁷ Where t is time and x and y are the respective armaments of two sides, k and l being positive constants or defense coefficients, a and b being positive constants or fatigue and expense coefficients, g and h representing the unchanging level of grievance held by each state against the other. For the basic and comprehensive statement of the Richardson theory of arms interdependence see ibid., particularly chap. II. Important critical analyses of the Richardsonian world view may be found in Anatol Rapoport, “Lewis Fry Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (September 1957), 249–99; Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor 1960), chap. I; Boulding, Kenneth, Conflict and Defense (New York 1962Google Scholar); Smoker, Paul, “Trade, Defense, and the Richardson Theory of Arms Races: A Seven Nation Study,” Journal of Peace Research, 11 (1965), 161CrossRefGoogle Scholar–76; Caspary, William R., “Richardson's Model of Arms Races: Description, Critique, and an Alternative Model,” International Studies Quarterly, xi (March 1967), 63–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McGuire, Martin C., Secrecy and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 33–38Google Scholar. Excellent overviews of the whole field of mathematical arms race modelling are provided by Peter Busch's Appendix in Russett (fn. 1), 193–233, and by Saaty, Thomas L., Mathematical Models of Arms Control and Disarmament (New York 1968Google Scholar).

²⁸ See Smoker, Paul, “The Arms Race as an Open and Closed System,” Paper presented to the 4th Peace Research Conference (Chicago, November 7–8, 1968), 13Google Scholar.

²⁹ Fuller, J.F.C., Armament and History (London 1946), 21Google Scholar.

³⁰ A good exploration of Arab-Israeli rivalry (and one that is explicitly concerned with the structure of the regional arms race) is to be found in Hurewitz, J. C., Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York 1969), chaps. 24–25Google Scholar.

³¹ See Joynt, C. B., “Arms Races and the Problem of Equilibrium,” in The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1964 (London 1964), 34–35Google Scholar.

³² By way of analogy, it should be recalled that Clausewitz wrote of war: “It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself.” Carl von Clause-witz, On War, III (London 1966, first publ. 1832), 122.

³³ An excellent theoretical analysis of the arms race significance of high-yield weapons is in Colonel Glenn A. Kent, On the Interaction of Opposing Forces Under Possible Arms Agreements, Occasional Paper No. 5, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (March 1963).

³⁴ Richardson, Lewis F., “Could an Arms Race End Without Fighting?” Nature, CLXVIII (September 29, 1951), 567CrossRefGoogle Scholar–68.

³⁵ Wright (fn. 8), II, 690–91.

³⁶ Schelling (fn. 25), 476.

³⁷ York, Herbert F., “Military Technology and National Security,” Scientific American, ccxxi (August 1969), 26Google Scholar.

³⁸ Hoag (fn. 9), 508, 515.

³⁹ A dimension of arms race strategy that (on grounds of space) I have not singled out for separate investigation is the question of the effect on an arms race of the possible different knowledge-states of each arms race participant concerning the strategies of rivals. Explicit and vigorous attention to this question may be found in Knut gaard, Mid, “Arms Races, Arms Control, and Disarmament,” Cooperation and Conflict, No. I (1970), 34–40Google Scholar; an McGuire (fn. 27).

⁴⁰ Note the speculation on the preemption point in one recent and excellent analysis, Wolfe (fn. 5), 437, fn. 45.

⁴¹ “SeeLee(fn.4), 175.

⁴² Woodward (fn. 15), 11.

⁴³ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittees on Department of Defense and on Military Construction, Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 59 [Mr. Laird, May 22, 1969].

⁴⁴ A radically different view is to be found in Foster (fn. 4), 254–55.

⁴⁵ Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems (fn. 17), Part I, 189–90.

⁴⁶ Gelber (fn. 12), 186.

⁴⁷ See Richmond (fn. 14), 209.

⁴⁸ In a battle between two naval forces of 12 and 9 ships, the larger side should emerge with both a meaningful victory and with 7 or 8 ships undamaged (or only slightly damaged). Lanchester, F. W., Aircraft in War (London 1916Google Scholar), 28, 36. A useful discussion of Lanchester's ideas is offered by Hoag, Malcolm W., “Increasing Returns in Military Production Functions,” in McKean, Roland, ed., Issues in Defense Economics (New York 1967), 12–14Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Woodward (fn. 15), 242, fn. 1.

⁵⁰ Status of U.S. Strategic Power (fn. 10), 12; Wolfe (fn. 5), 432–33.

⁵¹ U.S. Senate, Committee on Relations, Foreign, Intelligence and the ABM, Hearing, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 63Google Scholar [June 23, 1969].

⁵² Quoted in Woodward (fn. 15), 235.

⁵³ Noel-Baker, Philip, The Arms Race (London 1958), 74Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 78.

⁵⁵ Wright (fn. 8), 690–91. Single, general arms races were identified as occurring between the following dates: 1787–1815; 1840–1871; 1886–1919; and 1932–1941 (date of writing).

⁵⁶ Richardson (fn. 26), 61.

⁵⁷ Lasswell (fn. 23), 64.

⁵⁸ Albert Wohlstetter has replied to this view very effectively in U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Planning-Programming-Budgeting, Defense Analysis: Two Examples, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969Google Scholar), 5 [September 10, 1969].

⁵⁹ Huntington (fn. 3), 63–65.

⁶⁰ Richardson (fn. 26), 61.

⁶¹ See the three studies in Warner Schilling, Hammond, Paul, and Snyder, Glenn, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York 1962Google Scholar).

⁶² Wright (fn. 8), I, Tables 58–59 on 670–71.

⁶³ The Institute for Strategic Studies (fn. 24), 1, 5, 57. Also see Joenniemi (fn. 24).

⁶⁴ See Höist, Johan and Schneider, William Jr., eds., Why ABM? (Elmsford, New York 1969Google Scholar), chap. 7; Lee (fn. 4), 173; Foster (fn. 4), 248; Wolfe, Thomas W., “Soviet Approaches to SALT,” Problems of Communism, xix (September-October 1970), 1–3Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ The imagery of bankruptcy continues to stalk the halls of arms race rhetoric: “If we do not adopt more discrimination in choosing these many weapon systems we are going to bankrupt the country.” So said Senator Symington in Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems (fn. 17), Part I, 57.

⁶⁶ Woodward (fn. 15), 431.

⁶⁷ The Institute for Strategic Studies (fn. 24), 55.

⁶⁸ Quoted in Status of U.S. Strategic Power (fn. 10), 2.

⁶⁹ Sir Richmond, Herbert, Statesmen and Sea Power (London 1946), 293Google Scholar. It would be only fair to assert that for Germany this treaty was more a “hunting license” than a restraint.

⁷⁰ Richmond (fn. 14), 257–58.

⁷¹ See the comments of Marshall Shulman on the desirability of decoupling political relations from the issues of strategic confrontation in “The Effect of ABM on US-Soviet Relations,” in Chayes, Abram and Wiesner, Jerome, eds., ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System (New York 1969), 158Google Scholar.

⁷² See Noel-Baker (fn. 53), chaps. 6–7; Singer, J. David, “Threat Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma,” The ]ournal of Conflict Resolution, 11 (March 1958), 90–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷³ Scott, Andrew, The Functioning of the International Political System (New York 1967), 27Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Smoker (fn. 27), 173.

⁷⁵ Hoist and Schneider (fn. 64), 162.

⁷⁶ See Leitenberg, Milton, “The Present State of the World's Arms Race,” Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3 (1970), 188Google Scholar–89.

⁷⁷ Remarks before United Press International Editors and Publishers, San Francisco, Calif., September 18, 1967, Appendix 4 in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on Military Applications, Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile Programs, Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1967), 107Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ Note Watt's criticism of Huntington on this question (fn. 13), 374. Also see Russett (fn. 1), chap. 4.

⁷⁹ Shulman (fn. 71), 154–55.

⁸⁰ One of the most persuasive statements of this view is provided by Steinberg (fn. 15), Introduction. Steinberg's comment upon Anglo-German naval rivalry is applicable to the 1960's. “The treadmill aspect of the Anglo-German arms race was not caused by the technology but by the politics of the participants” 24.

⁸¹ Any resource disparity may prove significant if all competitors are equally alarmed. However, the evidence would suggest that alarm is unlikely to persist. Thus, economically weaker states are not necessarily priced out of a competition.

⁸² See Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates (fn. 27), Part I, chap. 3; Lasswell (fn. 23), chaps. 3–4.

⁸³ See Huntington (fn. 3), 50–54.

⁸⁴ Russett draws attention to the difficulty of controlling military expenditures in a political system that ensures a wide dispersion of authority. The degree of Cabinet or Politburo control of expenditure is limited in any executive structure by the plurality of strong vested interests. However, the U.S. government offers an extreme example of how an institutionalized balance of power may frustrate attempts to brake arms racing activity (fn. I), 184–91.

⁸⁵ Rathjens (fn. 4) , 19.

⁸⁶ One group of authors has referred to such “laws.” See Union of Concerned Scientists, ABM:ABC, in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture, FY 1970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 2140Google Scholar–54.