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Assessing Strategic Arms Reduction Proposals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

M. Krepon
Affiliation:
American Committee on East-West Accord
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Abstract

A number of options were available to the Reagan Administration for achieving the President's stated objective of deep cuts in nuclear weapons. However, various deep-cut proposals can have dramatically different prospects of being negotiated successfully, as well as varying impacts on strategic and crisis stability. Moreover, some arms reduction proposals may not be compatible with programs to accentuate nuclear war-fighting capabilities, another objective of the Reagan Administration. In rejecting the SALT II framework for reductions, the Administration set aside a relatively quick way to achieve reductions, although not of the kind championed by the President. Instead, a more ambitious approach was chosen-but one that has provided few positive incentives for the Soviets to reach agreement. If the U.S. position is seriously held, the prospect is for lengthy, acrimonious, and inconclusive negotiations.

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Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1983

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