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Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Charles Lipson
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Abstract

Cooperation among creditors has been the foundation of international debt arrangement! and is critical to preserving the value of foreign capital. Such cooperation is inherently difficult because every debt rescheduling involves hundreds of banks worldwide, each witr its own financial interests. Nevertheless, large money-center banks have been able to devisi common negotiating positions and conclude rescheduling agreements. Their cooperation i based partly on their extensive daily interactions, which permit both reciprocity and retal iation. In addition, most large banks are permanent fixtures in international capital markets; their ties to other banks and foreign borrowers could be jeopardized if they obstructed a rescheduling. Smaller banks, which lack these international ties, are more apt to hold out from joint arrangements. To secure their agreement, creditor committees (composed of large banks) rely on their domestic ties to these smaller institutions, which is occasionally reinforced by support from central banks.

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Type
Part III: Applications to Economic Affairs
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1985

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