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Bridging the Gap: Lottery-Based Procedures in Early Parliamentarization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2019

Alexandra Cirone
Affiliation:
Department of Government, Cornell University email: aec287@cornell.edu
Brenda Van Coppenolle
Affiliation:
University of Leiden email: b.k.s.van.coppenolle@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

Abstract

How is the use of political lotteries related to party development? This article discusses the effects of a lottery-based procedure used to distribute committee appointments that was once common across legislatures in nineteenth-century Europe. The authors analyze the effects of a political lottery in budget committee selection in the French Third Republic using a microlevel data set of French deputies from 1877 to 1914. They argue that the adoption and benefit of lottery-based procedures were to prevent the capture of early institutions by party factions or groups of self-interested political elites. The authors find that partial randomization of selection resulted in the appointment of young, skilled, middle-class deputies at the expense of influential elites. When parties gained control of committee assignments in 1910, selection once again favored elites and loyal party members. The authors link lottery-based procedures to party development by showing that cohesive parties were behind the institutional reform that ultimately dismantled this selection process. Lottery-based procedures thus played a sanitizing role during the transformation of emerging parliamentary groups into unified, cohesive political parties.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2019 
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Table 1Nineteenth-Century European Examples

Figure 1

Figure 1Party Families

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Figure 2Parties

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Table 2Summary Statistics

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Figure 3Proportion of Deputy Type by Party Family, 1898–1919

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Figure 4Deputy Characteristics: Chamber versus Budget Committee under Bureaux

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Figure 5Change in Log Odds of Budget Committee Selection, 1910 versus 1906

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Figure 6Change in Selection Probability in 1910 for Disloyal (in 1906) Deputies

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Table 3Logit Regression: Party Loyalty and Budget Committee Selectiona

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Figure 7Proportion of Disloyal Deputies by Partya

aRadicals are parties within the Radical Socialist and Moderate Republican families. Individual parties are abbreviated as follows: rs (Républicain Socialiste), ps (Parti Socialiste), Rad Soc (Républicains Radicaux-Socialistes), r (Radicaux), ard (Gauche Démocratique), ur (Union Républicaine), rp (Républicains-Progressistes), al (L’Action Libérale), d (Droite). Note that ps, ur, al, and d have zero instances of switching in this period.
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Figure 8Log Odds of Voting for 1910 Reform

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Figure 9Average Disloyalty by Party Family over Time

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Figure B1Deputy Party Affiliation: Chamber versus Budget Committee under Bureaux

Supplementary material: Link

Cirone and Van Coppenolle Dataset

Link