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² Sluggett, Peter, “Blunder Books: Iraq since Saddam,” Middle East Journal 60 (Spring 2006Google Scholar); Dodge, Toby, “How Iraq Was Lost,” Survival 48Google Scholar (Winter 2006-7).

³ Friedrich, Carl J., “Nation-Building?” in Deutsch, Karl W. and Foltz, William J., eds., Nation-Building (New York:Atherton, 1963), 31Google Scholar.

⁴ Halpern, Manfred, “Toward Further Modernization of the Study of New Nations,” World Politics 17 (October 1964CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Connor, Walker, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics 24 (April 1972), 322CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 326.

⁵ Deutsch, Karl W., “Some Problems in Nation-Building,” in Deutsch, and Foltz, Google Scholar (fn. 3), 3. This concept of nation-building was not unchallenged, and Friedrich asked, “[A]re nations really built? Or, rather, do they grow?” Friedrich (fn. 3), 27.

⁶ Hippel, Von, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation-Building,” Washington Quarterly 23 (Winter 2000), 96Google Scholar.

⁷ Indeed the definition recognized by von Hippel runs counter to some comparativists'judgment that nationhood and stateness are chronologically and causally prior to democratization. For two influential discussions, see Rustow, Dankwart, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970), 350CrossRefGoogle Scholar–52; Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 24–29Google Scholar.

⁸ A more general definition, encompassing democratic and nondemocratic outcomes, is “intervention in a state to prevent civil unrest or to promote a form of government.” Watson, Cynthia A., Nation-Building: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara:ABC-cuo, 2004), 2Google Scholar.

⁹ Deutsch, Karl W.Google Scholar, “The Study of Nation-Building, 1962–1966,” in Deutsch and Foltz (fn. 3), viii.

¹⁰ Gilman, Nils, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 6Google Scholar.

¹¹ This attention is relatively recent. As Tony Smith describes in his authoritative survey of U.S. foreign policy: “Until the 1980s, American scholarship neglected to investigate with any comparative framework or historical depth the consequences for foreign peoples... [of the US ambition] to foster democracy abroad as a way of ensuring national security”; Smith, , America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Strugglefor Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1994), 348Google Scholar.

¹² The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.:The White House, 2002), 1Google Scholar.

¹³ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.:Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2005), 4Google Scholar.

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¹⁷ Carothers, Thomas, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1991Google Scholar); Lowenthal, Abraham, Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991Google Scholar); Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999Google Scholar); Ikenberry, G. John, “America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Postwar Era,” in Cox, Michael, Ikenberry, G. John, and Inoguchi, Takashi, eds., American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2000Google Scholar); Carothers, Thomas and Ottaway, Marina, eds., Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East (Washington, D.C. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005Google Scholar).

¹⁸ Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven:Yale University Press 1971), 200Google Scholar; Jackson, Robert H., Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1990), 202Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Compare, for example, Muravchik, Joshua, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling Americas Destiny (Washington, D.C.:American Enterprise Institute, 1992), 91Google Scholar; Robinson, William I., “Globalization, the World System, and 'Democracy Promotion' in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Theory and Society 25 (October 1996), 626CrossRefGoogle Scholar–27.

²⁰ A focus on capacity ameliorates the risk of retrospectively imputing intentions based on outcomes, for example, seeing “genuine effort” where success obtained. At the same time, research on nation-building still needs to take into account the motivations and goals of foreign occupiers. Full consideration of a nation-builder's motives is a serious issue itself, but one that falls outside the scope of this review because it is not an analytic emphasis of the chosen books. The contribution of the selected works lies in their evaluation of nation-building capacity and their insight into how that capacity shapes the boundaries of achievable outcomes. Future scholars may revisit the issue of intent and investigate how the objectives of nation-building are intertwined with the attempt at changing local society.

²¹ Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis 2 (1990), 131; King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., and Verba, Sidney, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton:Princeton Uni versity Press, 1994), 129Google Scholar.

²² Tony Smith's America's Mission is one of the few comparative works that addresses how post-Civil War reconstruction anticipated the challenges of modern nation-building; see Smith (fn. 11), 19–33.

²³ Ayers, Edward L., What Caused the Civil War? Reflections on the South and Southern History (New York:W. W. Norton, 2005Google Scholar); Blair, William, “The Use of Military Force to Protect the Gains of Reconstruction,” Civil War History 51 (December 2005CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

²⁴ Friend, Theodore, Between Two Empires: The Ordeal ofthe Philippines, 1929–1946 (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1965), 35Google Scholar; Kramer, Paul A., The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 32Google Scholar.

²⁵ Wurfel, David, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1988), 9Google Scholar.

²⁶ Anderson, Benedict, “Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams,” New Left Reviewing (May-June 1988), 10–11Google Scholar.

²⁷ Judis, John B., The Folly of Empire: What George W. Bush Could Learnfrom Theodore Roosevelt Woodrow Wilson (New York:Scribner, 2004), 67–68Google Scholar.

²⁸ Sayre, Francis B., Glad Adventure (New York:MacMillan, 1957), 196Google Scholar.

²⁹ They are Cuba (1898–1902), Panama (1903–6), Cuba (1906–9), Nicaragua (1909–33), Haiti (1915–34), Cuba (1917–22), and the Dominican Republic (1916–24); Pei, Amin, and Garz, “Building Nations: The American Experience,” in Fukuyama, 66.

³⁰ The authors under review seemingly disagree about the total number of cases that count in assessing American nation-building efforts. Whereas they all include the same few cases of successful nation-building (for example, Germany, Japan), they differ in the number and type of unsuccessful cases they recognize. For example, Dobbins and his team limit themselves to post-World War II experiences, whereas Pei and his coauthors address the many early-twentieth-century U.S. interventions as well. These discrepancies are not randomly or evenly distributed. The omitted cases fall mainly at lower values of the dependent variable, raising the risk of a truncated sample and biased inferences. The only fully satisfactory solution to this problem will be for future scholars to concur in definitively specifying the full universe of cases. Pending such an agreement, analytic gains in robustness and reliability argue for considering the fullest range of nation-building efforts, thereby maximizing the number of observations and the range of variance in outcomes while maintaining internal validity around the shared definition of nation-building as imposed democratization. On truncation and selection bias, see Collier, David and Mahoney, James, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” World Politics 49 (October 1996), 61–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³¹ This compromise matches what John Ikenberry has called “institutional binding,” a process by which victorious powers incorporate the defeated party's preferences to increase their own authority; Ikenberry, G. John, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding ofOrder after Major Wars (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2001), 63Google Scholar.

³² Dower, John W., Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York:W.W. Norton, 1999), 27Google Scholar, 212.

³³ Dower, John W., “A Warning from History,” Boston Review (February-March 2003Google Scholar), http:// www.bostonreview.net/BR28.1/dower.html (accessed February 27, 2007).

³⁴ An estimated 920 Japanese, most of them military officers, were eventually executed for war crimes; Dower (fn. 32), 447.

³⁵ Smith (fn. 11), 150.

³⁶ The U.S. government would seem to provide a case of multidivisional hierarchy, but Cooley notes that truly federal systems are nonhierarchical ("H-form” in organizational theory) (pp. 27–28).

³⁷ Mann, Michael, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results,” in Hall, John A., ed., States in History (Oxford:Blackwell, 1986), 109Google Scholar–36; Migdal, Joel S., Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1988Google Scholar); Migdal, Joel S., Kohli, Atul, and Shue, Vivienne, eds., State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1994CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Boone, Catherine, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2003CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

³⁸ The Philippines under American colonial rule, which Cooley does not code, would have been an M-form hierarchy, structurally akin to those credited with success in Germany and Japan.

³⁹ Smith (fn. 11), 198.

⁴⁰ Kohli, Atul, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2004), 64–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴¹ Peceny, Mark, “Forcing Them to Be Free,” Political Science Quarterly 52 (September 1999), 564Google Scholar; Edelstein, David M., “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” International Security 29 (Summer 2004), 88Google Scholar.

⁴² Smith (fn. 11), 230–31.

⁴³ Ibid., 200.

⁴⁴ John F. Kennedy, “Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at the Conference on Vietnam Luncheon in the Hotel Willard, Washington, D.C., June 1,1956,” available at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum; http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/ JFK+Pre-Pres/002PREPRES12SPEECHES_56JUN01.htm (accessed February 23,2007).

⁴⁵ John F. Kennedy, “Address in New Orleans at the Opening of the New Dockside Terminal,” May 4,1962, available at the American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. php?pid=8633&st=&stl= (accessed February 23, 2007).

⁴⁶ Young, Kenneth T., “United States Policy and Vietnamese Political Viability, 1954–1967,” Asian Survey 7 (August 1967), 508CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁷ Takashi Inoguchi, “Three Frameworks in Search of a Policy: U.S. Democracy Promotion in Asia-Pacific,” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi (fn. 17), 283.

⁴⁸ See, for example, Young, Marilyn B. and Gardner, Lloyd, eds., Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam: Or, How Not to Learn from the Past (New York:New Press, 2007Google Scholar).

⁴⁹ Shacochis, Bob, The Immaculate Invasion (New York:Penguin, 1999Google Scholar).

⁵⁰ For alternative inferences from a similar set of cases, see Coyne, Christopher J. and Davies, Steve, “Empire: Public Goods and Bads,” Eton Journal Watch 4 (January 2007), 33–37Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Dobbins underlines the point in his chapter; Dobbins, “Learning the Lessons of Iraq,” in Fu-kuyama, 223.

⁵² Phillips (fn. 1), 145, 149; Woodward (fn. 1), 193–98.

⁵³ Ibid.; Packer (fn. 1), 195–96; Shadid (fn. 1), 151–52.

⁵⁴ Woodward (fn. 1), 234.

⁵⁵ Recalling Ikenberry's work, it would seem that Bremer was unable to “dominate” the population or to “bind” U.S. forces with Iraqis into a “mutually acceptable postwar order.” See Ikenberry (fn. 31), 50–51.

⁵⁶ Woodard(fn. 1), 264.

⁵⁷ In the next chapter Feldman writes: “The nation builder will not stand directly for election, so it follows as a matter of course that he can never be as accountable as elected politicians can be” (p. 100).

⁵⁸ On media censorship in post-Saddam Iraq, see Lynch, Marc, Voices ofthe New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today (New York:Columbia University Press), 214Google Scholar–27.

³⁹ At points contradictory statements follow one another: “In the end . . . not we, but the Iraqis, will have to run these institutions and make them work-and there is just too much that we do not understand about the complexities of Iraqi politics and society. My skepticism, however, does not lead me to conclude that we should abandon any role in the process whereby institutions must be designed”; Feldman, 82.

⁶⁰ For a critical accounting based on international law, see Falk, Richard, Gendzier, Irene, and Jay Lifton, Robert, Crimes of War: Iraq (New York:Nation Books, 2006Google Scholar).

⁶¹ Juan Cole, “The United States and Shi” ite Religious Factions in Post Ba” thist Iraq,” Middle East JournalSl (Autumn 2003), 552–53; Etherington (fn. 1), 88.

⁶² “U-turn as U.S. Tries to Revive Iraq State Industry,” Financial Times, March 8, 2007; “Iraq Moves to Ease Rules on Baathists,” Financial Times, March 28, 2007.

⁶³ Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101,” Atlantic Online (January-February 2004), http:// www.theatlantic.com/doc/200401/fukuyama (accessed February 27,2007).

⁶⁴ The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was created on August 5, 2004. Its principal mission “is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy”; http://www.state.gOv/s/crs/ (accessed March 12, 2007).

⁶⁵ Packenham, Robert, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Sciences (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1973Google Scholar); Latham, Michael E., Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 2000Google Scholar).

⁶⁶ Dahl (fn. 18), 200.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 201.