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Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Lisa L. Martin
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Extract

The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading sender's” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on the credibility of these issue-linkages. The use of high-cost sanctions and international institutions raises the potential for high audience costs if the leading sender reneges. These policies thus indicate credible commitments. Data on ninety-nine cases of post-1945 economic sanctions show that costly measures coincide with high levels of international cooperation.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1993

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