¹ The main exception is Juan Linz's article, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,” in Allardt, E. and Littunen, Y., eds., Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology (Helsinki 1964), 291–341Google Scholar. Recent works, including the present article, which borrow elements of Linz's definition, are Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, G. Bingham Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston 1966)Google Scholar; Anderson, Charles W., The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an Authoritarian System (Madison 1970)Google Scholar; Huntington, Samuel P. and Moore, Clement H., eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems (New York 1970)Google Scholar; Schneider, Ronald M., The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a “Modernizing” Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970 (New York 1971)Google Scholar; and Schmitter, Philippe C., Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford 1971)Google Scholar.

² It should be noted that neither this writer nor the authors cited in the preceding footnote implicitly or explicitly include arbitrary use of power or unresponsiveness in their definition of an authoritarian regime.

³ The profit-sharing decision was selected for analysis because it involved the most important interest groups—the organized labor movement and the organized industrial and commercial interests (referred to as the “private sector” in Mexico), and their interaction with the executive branch of the government. Since the labor groups were officially members of the dominant political party, the PRI, and the private-sector groups were formally excluded from the party, the decision could elucidate the role of the PRI in the decision-making process. The decision was not chosen because it was typical, but rather because it was particularly complex. It was redistributive in that it proposed to transfer income from the private sector to the organized labor movement. Consequently, it had the potential for generating substantial opposition. The decision also embodied regulatory and distributive aspects, and thus could provide insight into the full range of decisions made in the Mexican political system.

⁴ For a discussion of these differing interpretations, see Carolyn and Needle-man, Martin, “Who Rules Mexico? A Critique of Some Current Views of the Mexican Political Process,” Journal of Politics, xxxi (November 1969)Google Scholar.

⁵ The concept of limited pluralism is borrowed from Linz (fn. i), 297-300.

⁶ Even if one rejects many of the arguments of the pluralists in the pluralist/power-elitist controversy, one must admit that interest groups in the United States, for example, clearly are structurally more independent of the government than they are in authoritarian regimes. One might question the representativeness of the interest-group system in democratic regimes, but that is not at issue here.

⁷ The concept of low mobilization is borrowed from Linz (fn. 1), 304-11. The terms “subject” and “participant” are borrowed from Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston 1965).

⁸ The idea of separating patrimonial authority from patrimonial style of rulership comes from Roth, Guenther, “Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States,” World Politics, xx (January 1968), 194–206CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Bendix, Reinhard, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York 1962), 424Google Scholar.

¹⁰ For an elaboration of this point, see Purcell, Susan Kaufman, “Authoritarianism,” Comparative Politics, v (January 1973), 301–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ Richmond, Patricia Mclntire, “Mexico: A Case Study of One-Party Politics,” Ph.D. diss. (University of California, Berkeley 1965), 190–91Google Scholar.

¹² Miller, Richard Ulric, “The Role of Labor Organizations in a Developing Country: The Case of Mexico,” Ph.D. diss. (Cornell University 1966), 293Google Scholar; Everett, Michael David, “The Role of the Mexican Trade Unions, 1950-1963,” Ph.D. diss. (Washington University, Missouri 1967), 71Google Scholar. The effectiveness of the above-mentioned mechanisms in the control of the organized labor movement is indicated by the low correlation between strikes and the economic cycle, and the high correlation between the number of strikes and a favorable attitude toward organized labor on the part of a Mexican president. Cf. Casanova, Pablo Gonzalez, La Democracia en Mexico (Mexico 1965), 24Google Scholar.

¹³ Brandenburg, Frank, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964), 230Google Scholar. The Mexican government owns or controls other industries which, while not economically important, are politically significant, such as the manufacture and distribution of newsprint, and motion picture distribution and exhibition.

¹⁴ In 1970, the PRI received 86% of the total votes. All figures are from Wilkie, James W., “New Hypotheses for Statistical Research in Recent Mexican History,” Latin American Research Review, VI (Summer 1971), 5Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Wilkie, James W., The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910 (Berkeley 1967), 182Google Scholar. The 1970 figure is from McDonald, Ronald H., Party Systems and Elections in Latin America (Chicago 1971), 253Google Scholar. The significance and implications of the increasing electoral strength of the PAN will be discussed in Part VII of this article.

¹⁶ González Casanova (fn. 12), 116-17.

¹⁷ McDonald (fn. 15), 243.

¹⁸ González Casanova (fn. 12), 27.

¹⁹ According to González Casanova (ibid., 240), the figures for 1958 and 1964 are 49.4% and 54.5% respectively. McDonald (fn. 15, 252), cites 56% for 1958, 52% for 1964, and 56.3% for 1970.

²⁰ On a list of 19 Latin American countries (excluding Cuba), Mexico ranked tenth. Venezuela ranked highest with 77.7%, and Guatemala ranked lowest with 18.4%. Needier, Martin C., Politics and Society in Mexico (Albuquerque 1971), 96Google Scholar. Comparable figures for the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain are 99.6%, 64.4%, and 78.0% respectively. Russett, Bruce M. and others, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven 1964), 84–85Google Scholar.

²¹ Almond and Verba (fn. 7), 311, 247, 144, and 62, respectively.

²² Gonzalez Casanova (fn. 12), 39-41.

²³ Foster, George, Tzintzuntzan: Mexican Peasants in a Changing World (Boston 1967), 214Google Scholar.

²⁴ Padgett, L. Vincent, The Mexican Political System (Boston 1966), 56–57Google Scholar; Excelsior, Mexico City (March-November 1965); also, discussions which this writer had with PRI leaders, Mexico City, 1967-1968.

²⁵ Excelsior, Mexico City (December 1964-April 1965).

²⁶ Brandenburg (fn. 13), 10-11.

²⁷ For a more detailed account of the profit-sharing decision, see Susan Beth Kaufman, “Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: The Politics of Profit-Sharing in Mexico,” Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University 1970). The major sources used to reconstruct the profit-sharing decision include Comisión Nacional para el Reparto de Utili-dades, Memoria de la Primera Comisión, 3 vols. (Mexico City 1964); interviews with members and the technical staff of the National Profit-Sharing Commission, Mexico City and Washington, D.C., 1968; COPARMEX, Departamento para el estudio de la participación de utilidades y salarios mínimos, Estudio sobre la participación de utilidades, II vols. (Mexico City 1963); Excelsior, Mexico City (1950-1970); Cetetne (newspaper of the CTM), 1951-1970; CONCAMIN and CONCANACO Circulars (1960-1967); and Bulletins of COPARMEX.

²⁸ The following interpretation supports the conclusion of Douglas A. Chalmers regarding the diffuse nature of “agenda-setting stimuli” in the Latin American policymaking process. See Douglas A. Chalmers, “Parties and Society in Latin America” (paper prepared for delivery at the 1968 meeting of the American Political Science Association), 17.

²⁹ See, for example, Ross, Stanley, ed., Is the Mexican Revolution Dead? (New York 1966)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Margáin's skill as head of the Commission subsequently received formal recognition when President Díaz Ordaz named him Ambassador to the United States. He served as Minister of the Treasury in the Echeverria government until June 1973.

³¹ Izquierdo, Rafael, “Protectionism in Mexico,” in Vernon, Raymond, ed., Public Policy and Private Enterprise in Mexico (Cambridge, Mass. 1964), 245–89Google Scholar.

³² Theodore Lowi, in his article “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics, XVI (July 1964), 707, hypothesizes that “issues that involve redistribution cut closer than any others along class lines and activate interests in what are roughly class terms.”

³³ The term “multi-sector” is used by Constantine Menges in “Public Policy and Organized Business in Chile: A Preliminary Analysis,” Journal of International Affairs, xx, No. 2 (1966), 358-59.

³⁴ Since the 1940's, the Mexican government has been committed to industrialization based on capital-intensive technology. The preference given to capital-intensive firms reflects the congruence of interest between the Mexican technocrats and the representatives of the modern industries in the private sector. Furthermore, in comparison with labor-intensive firms, capital-intensive firms earn higher profits and have a relatively smaller labor force. If the latter had been required to distribute the same proportion of their profits among their workers as the former, individual workers in the capital-intensive firms would have received substantially more money than their counterparts in the labor-intensive firms.

³⁵ Frederic Meyers, “Party, Government and the Labor Movement in Mexico: Two Case Studies” (paper prepared for the International Institute for Labour Studies, Research Conference on Industrial Relations and Economic Development, Geneva 1964), 46; Lie. Ignacio Pichardo, “Algunas consideraciones generales sobre la participacion de utilidades,” Comercio Exterior (January 1964), 12.

³⁶ Lowi (fn. 32), 690-91.

³⁷ In 1960, 38% of Mexico's population lived in cities of at least 10,000 inhabitants. It is estimated that by 1980, this figure will increase to over 70%. Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., “Urbanization as an Agent of Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico,”American Political Science Review, LXIII (September 1969), 837-38.

³⁸ In 1940, 13.3% of the total population voted in the presidential election. By 1970, 27.6% of the total population was voting. Needier (fn. 20), 97.

³⁹ For examples of this argument, see ibid., 14; Walton, John and Sween, Joyce A., “Urbanization, Industrialization, and Voting in Mexico: A Longitudinal Analysis of Official and Opposition Party Support,” Social Science Quarterly, LII (December 1971), 744Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 732.

⁴¹ Ames, Barry, “Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party,” American Political Science Review, LXIV (March 1970), 165Google Scholar.

⁴² Ugalde, Antonio, Power and Conflict in a Mexican Community (Albuquerque 1970), 153Google Scholar.

⁴³ Ibid., Walton and Sween (fn. 39), 735.

⁴⁴ Ames found that in general, die larger the PRI percentage of die vote, die larger the turnout. Ames (fn. 41), 167.