¹ Thus: “in the hands of George and Smoke, the case study approach helps generate theory in a very direct way” (p. 156); “we emphatically believe that they [case studies] are essential to the development and testing of social science theory” (p. 167); “indeed, analytic theory cannot do without case studies” (p. 169; see also p. 159). Achen, and Snidal, , “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” World Politics 41 (January 1989), 143–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ George, Alexander L. and Smoke, Richard, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974)Google Scholar. Since publishing this book, we have worked steadily to raise standards and explicate procedures for improving the quality of case studies and their contribution to theory development. We have given serious attention to most of the concerns about them raised by Achen and Snidal. See George, A. L., “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Lauren, Paul Gordon, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979)Google Scholar; George, A. L., “Case Studies and Theory Development,” paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, October 15–16, 1982Google Scholar; George, A. L. and McKeown, T. J., “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Coulam, Robert and Smith, Richard, eds., Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, CT:Press, 1985), 21–58Google Scholar. Case-study methodology is discussed also in Smoke, Richard, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chap. 3 and app. B. George continues efforts to improve case-study methodology and plans additional publications. A discussion of the uses and limitations of the controlled comparison method of studying a small number of cases for theory development should not overlook the importance of singlecase studies. Lack of space prevents us from summarizing the arguments on behalf of the contributions a single case study can make to theory development that have been advanced by such writers as Eckstein, Harry, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Greenstein, F. I. and Polsby, N. W., eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–138Google Scholar, and Lawrence B. Mohr, “The Reliability of the Case Study As a Source of Information,” in Coulam and Smith, op. cit., 65–97.

³ The description of this method in George and Smoke (fn. 2), 95–103, has since been elaborated, and related methodological and theoretical issues more fully discussed, in the two articles by George (fn. 2) and in the George-McKeown article (fn. 2).

⁴ The formulation of contingent generalizations is necessary in order to capture the fact that deterrence is characterized by the phenomenon of what General Systems Theory refers to as “equifinality” (and what John Stuart Mill referred to as “plurality of causes” when he warned that his “method of agreement” and “method of difference” could not be easily employed for inferring causal relationships). Equifinality refers to the fact that similar outcomes on a dependent variable (e.g., deterrence failures) occur as a result of different causal processes, thus making the search for robust universal causal generalizations infeasible. Abstract deductive deterrence theory has thus far ignored the phenomenon of equifinality.

⁵ See George (fn. 2, 1979), 59–60.

⁶ This kind of disaggregated theory is an example of what Paul Diesing, drawing upon Kaplan, Abraham, has referred to as “concatenated theory” in his Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), 22–24Google Scholar.

⁷ Particular attention must be given not only to the strength of the Initiator's motivation to challenge the status quo but also to the time he has in which to do so. Moreover, asymmetry of motivation favoring the Initiator can sometimes compensate for asymmetry of power favoring the Defender. On this point see, for example, George, A. L. et al. , The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)Google Scholar; Maoz, Zeev, “Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (June 1983), 195–229CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Levy, Jack S., “When Do Deterrent Threats Work?” British Journal of Political Science 18 (October 1988), 433–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Robert Wilson notes the difficulty that game-theoretic models encounter with contextual variables, which render most situations indeterminate; “Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition,” in Stern, Paul C. et al. , eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

⁹ Examples of difficulties encountered in attempts to apply deterrence strategy at substrategic levels of conflict are provided in the analysis of the Eisenhower administration's Middle East policies in George and Smoke (fn. 2), chap. 11. For a discussion of thirteen ways in which the characteristics of deterrence at the strategic level differ from those at lower levels of conflict, see chap. 2.

¹⁰ Ibid., 520–22.

¹¹ Ibid., chap. 18.

¹² See particularly fn. 24 in Achen and Snidal (fn. 1): “Analysts continue to struggle painfully for a fully satisfactory version of this game; as Harrison Wagner has remarked to us, 'the rational theory of deterrence' doesn't exist.” However, they go on to offer the confident assurance that “the principal conclusions of a legitimate theory of deterrence are foreseeable even if the supporting arguments are at present incomplete; it is the former that we call 'rational deterrence theory.' “

¹³ Huth, Paul and Russett, Bruce, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900–1980,” World Politics 36 (July 1984), 496–526CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ George and Smoke (fn. 2), chap. 17.

¹⁵ Schelling, , Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 4Google Scholar. For a fuller statement of our concern over the limitations of the rationality assumption in deterrence theory see George and Smoke (fn. 2), 73–77.

¹⁶ See, for example, the discussion of different ways in which individuals attempt to cope with the cognitive limits on rationality (i.e., inadequate information, inadequate knowledge, and value complexity) in George, A. L., Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), chap. 2Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Simon, , “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science,” American Political Science Review 79 (June 1985), 293–304CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See especially pp. 295 and 300.

¹⁸ See de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ George and Smoke (fn. 2), chap. 18.

²⁰ See, e.g., ibid., chap. 3.

²¹ On situational analysis and the diagnostic function of theory, see George and Smoke (fn. 2), chap. 16; also George (fn. 16), chap. 14. For a more detailed discussion of policy-relevant theory see George and Smoke (fn. 2), app. A longer version of this appendix was published by Smoke, and George, , “Theory for Policy in International Relations,” Policy Sciences 4 (December 1973), 387–413CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² See George and Smoke (fn. 2), 77–78.

²³ Ibid., chap. 21.

²⁴ For additional discussion see George and Smoke (fn. 2), 5–6; also George (fn. 16), 252–54. The importance of “promises” (as against “threats”) was briefly noted by Schelling (fn. 15), 43–46,131–37, 175–77. Important leads for the development of a broader influence theory were given by Baldwin, David A., “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics 24 (October 1971), 19–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Inter-Nation Influence Revisited,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 15 (December 1971), 471–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The importance of conceptualizing the strategy of coercive diplomacy to include possible use of “carrots” as well as “sticks” was emphasized and illustrated in George et al. (fn. 7). The concept of “crisis bargaining” developed by Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing includes accommodative as well as coercive actions; Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)Google Scholar. Other writers, too numerous to mention here, have also emphasized the need for a broader, multifaceted theory of inducement or influence. More recently, Janice Gross Stein and Richard Ned Lebow have emphasized the need for more attention to various forms of “reassurance” to supplement or replace deterrence in conflict situations.