Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T03:38:43.501Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Information Systems in Treaty Regimes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Xinyuan Dai
Affiliation:
University of Illinois
Get access

Extract

One of the most influential arguments in international relations is that international institutions influence states' behavior by monitoring their compliance with treaties, which in turn facilitates reciprocity. Empirically, however, many treaty organizations are not mandated to monitor compliance. The article develops a parsimonious theoretical framework to address the empirical diversity of monitoring arrangements. By mapping strategic environments onto monitoring arrangements, it accounts for who detects noncompliance and who brings it to light. In particular, two factors—the interest alignment between noncompliance victims and their states and the availability of noncompliance victims as low-cost monitors—largely shape the organizational forms of information systems. This simple theory sheds light on a wide range of substantiveh/important treaty regimes.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2002

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable