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Intelligence and Warning: Implications and Lessons of the Falkland Islands War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Gerald W. Hopple
Affiliation:
Defense Systems, Inc.
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Abstract

Was the Falkland conflict either preventable or predictable? Based on the available evidence, it is apparent that the British could not have been expected to foresee the outbreak of the war. Both Argentina and Britain relied on simplistic and misleading preconceptions or strategic assumptions, leading to a war that might have been avoidable. Issues of conflict and crisis warning are illuminated in this essay, and the Falklands War is related to past instances of “warning failure” and surprise attack. The crucial importance of the strategic logic of decision makers is emphasized. In addition, the lessons of the war for the 1980s highlight the changing nature of the international systemic context and the heightened prospects for crisis and conflict both between allies and within the third world.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1984

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