¹ The logic of the analysis requires that I exclude the unintended consequences of revolutions and confine the points of comparison to those consequences that are prefigured in the goals of the historical actors who eventually appropriate the revolution.

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¹⁰³ These variations become intelligible in the light of Linz's demonstration that the extent of organized preemption of the political space by Christian-democratic or Catholic-conservative parties was a decisive factor in inhibiting the growth of fascism (as in Spain and Belgium). Where such parties existed and had carved up electoral territories for themselves, fascism found a formidable rival. Fascism would also tend to be anticlerical in order to differentiate itself from the rival religious party (as were the Belgian Rex and the Nazis vis-à-vis the Zentrum party). See Linz (fn. 45), 16–28, 52, 84; Linz (fn. 57), 156; Hamilton (fn. 45). 37–41.

Mexican fascism, the Sinarquism of the late 1930s and early 1940s, also fits Linz's pattern. The movement declined when its middle-class supporters defected to the Catholic Accion National. See Hennessy (fn. 41), 280–82. Linz's account of cases in which fascism was not anticlerical but intensely Christian is unsatisfactory, however; see Linz (fn. 45), 16, and Linz (fn. 57), 164, 184, n. 51. The reverse side of Linz's argument is well put by Merkl: “There is ample evidence that religious decline and confrontations played a role in fascist development …, creating a massive reservoir of confused quasi-religious fears and longings open to exploitation by fascist demagogues.” Merkl (fn. 45), 757.

¹⁰⁴ Yeshayahu Jelinek, “Clergy and Fascism: The Hlinka Party in Slovakia and the Croatian Ustasha Movement,” in Larsen and others (fn. 42).

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