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Justice as Checks and Balances

Indigenous Claims in the Courts of Colonial Mexico

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2021

Abstract

The centralization of conflict resolution and the administration of justice, two crucial elements of state formation, are often ignored by the state-building literature. This article studies the monopolization of justice administration, using the historical example of the General Indian Court (gic) of colonial Mexico. The author argues that this court’s development and decision-making process can show us how the rule of law develops in highly authoritarian contexts. Centralized courts could be used strategically to solve an agency problem, limiting local elites’ power and monitoring state agents. To curb these actors’ power, the Spanish Crown allowed the indigenous population to raise claims and access property rights. But this access remained limited and subject to the Crown’s strategic considerations. The author’s theory predicts that a favorable ruling for the indigenous population was more likely in cases that threatened to increase local elites’ power. This article shows the conditions under which the rule of law can emerge in a context where a powerful ruler is interested in imposing limits on local powers—and on their potential predation of the general population. It also highlights the endogenous factors behind the creation of colonial institutions and the importance of judicial systems in colonial governance.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2021
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Table 1Dimensions and parameters of Decision-Making in the gica

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Table 2Key Terms Related to protection

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Figure 1PROPORTION OF DOCUMENTS BY TYPE OF RULING (1590–1820)aaTemporal distribution of documents with a favorable outcome within the Indians subarchive. The documents with a protective outcome are those that contain the terms shown in Table 2.

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Table 3Key Terms for Topics

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Table 4Favorable Ruling, Topics, and Balance of Power a

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Figure 2Predicted Probability of Favorable Ruling Conditioned on Topics and Local Balance of PoweraaPredicted probability is calculated from estimates in models presented in Table 4. Population change is measured by decade. Provinces with strong local elites are those in which the indigenous population under encomienda is higher than the period average. Vertical lines over the point estimates represent the 95-percent confidence interval. The dashed line represents the average favorable ruling under population decline (panel (a)) and the average ruling when local elites are strong (panel (b)). The dotted line represents the average favorable ruling when population is increasing (panel (a)) and the average favorable ruling when local elites are weak (panel (b)).

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Figure 3Estimates of Favorable Ruling by Perpetrator and Type of ClaimaaPoint estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for the effect of actors on favorable ruling conditioned on case topics. The results can be found in Appendix 2, Table A2.3.

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Figure 4Determinants of Total ClaimsaaEstimates and 95-percent confidence intervals from column 1 in Table A4.1 in Appendix 4. The dependent variable is the total number of claims in a province by decade.

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Figure A1Example of a Document from the General Indian court

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Table A2.1Favorable Ruling, Topics, and Balance of Power (Interactive Models)a

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Table A2.2Simple Regression Effects and Wald Tests for Linear Equality a

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Figure A2First Differences under Diverse ScenariosaaMarginal effect on the predicted values for each topic calculated with a logistic model and an asymptotic normal approximation of the log-likelihood.

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Table A2.3Favorable Ruling, Topics, and Actors a

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Table A2.4Favorable Ruling, Topics, and Actors (with Province Controls and Unit-Specific Time Trends)a

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Table A3.1Favorable Ruling and Topics of Claims (Human Coding)a

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Table A3.2Favorable Ruling, Balance of power, and Topics (Human coding)a

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Table A4.1Determinants of the Number of Claimsa

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Table A4.2Distribution of Documents by Number of pages

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Table A4.3Determinants of the Number of Claims (High-Merit Cases)a

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Table A4.4High Merit and Local Balance of Powera

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Table A4.5Favorable Ruling, Topics, and Balance of power (High-Merit cases/complexity)a

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