¹ See, for example, Armacost, Michael H., The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press 1969)Google Scholar; Art, Robert J., The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown 1968)Google Scholar; Head, Richard G. and Rokke, Ervin J., eds., American Defense Policy (3rd ed.; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1973)Google Scholar, esp. the essays by Vincent Davis, “The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Naval Cases,” and Richard G. Head, “Doctrinal Innovation and the A-7 Attack Aircraft Decisions.” Also see the essays in the volume by Halperin and Kanter cited in note 2.

² For major works on the bureaucratic politics approach, see Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown 1971)Google Scholar; Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution 1974)Google Scholar; and Halperin, Morton H. and Kanter, Arnold, “Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework,” in Halperin, and Kanter, , eds., Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown 1973).Google Scholar For a some-what different but related approach, see Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974)Google Scholar, and the application of this theory to the F-111 in Coulam, Robert F., Illusions of Choice: The F-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977).Google Scholar

³ Allison, Graham T. and Morris, Frederic A., “Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons,” in Long, Franklin A. and Rathjens, George W., eds., Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control (New York: W. W. Norton 1976), 126Google Scholar; emphasis in original.

⁴ Beard reports a favorable experience with this procedure. If a proposal is approved, the researcher takes notes on the classified material and leaves them with the Air Force—whereupon they are, if declassified, sent to the scholar.

⁵ Greenwood does add, however, that “[f]ull documentation of [the] interviews, telephone conversations, and letters is maintained in…files, and inquiries concerning…sources from serious scholars will be given careful consideration.”

⁶ Air-to-surface (Rascal) and air-to-air (Falcon) missiles retained priority because, as manned-bomber armament, they fit with the Air Force's concept of its mission. The two surface-to-surface missiles under development (Navaho and Snark) were cruise missiles rather than ballistic ones because they were extensions of existent technology and not radically new ventures.

⁷ Sapolsky's four-fold categorization has proven useful to others. See, for example, Head, Richard G., “The Weapons Acquisition Process: Alternative National Strategies,” in Horton III, Frank B., ed., Comparative Defense Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1974), 418.Google Scholar

⁸ On the use of MIRV as a bargaining chip in SALT, see Bresler, Robert J. and Gray, Robert C., “The Bargaining Chip and SALT,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 92 (Spring 1977), 74–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Quoted in The Vladivostok Accord: Implications to U.S. Security, Arms Control, and World Peace, U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: G. P. O. 1975), 68.

¹⁰ The major reform is OMB Circular A-109 on Major Systems Acquisitions, the purpose of which is to “ensure that each major system fulfills a mission need.” On p. 310 of his Annual Report for Fiscal Year igyg, Secretary of Defense Brown states that this reform will be implemented and that “programs will start when the Secretary of Defense approves a mission element need statement (MENS) which states the requirement in general operational terms.”

¹¹ The consideration of arms control implications is, in theory at least, more likely now because of legislation requiring arms control impact statements for “a request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations.” For an excellent critique of the actual statements for fiscal year 1978 (and some suggestive model impact statements), see Analysis of Arms Control Impact Statements Submitted in Connection with Fiscal Year 1978 Budget Request, U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: G.P.O. 1977).

¹² It is necessary to underscore such an obvious recommendation because of the cases in which it has not been followed (e.g., delay on ICBM and excessive alacrity on MIRV).

¹³ For one interesting comparative effort, see Arthur J. Alexander, “Weapons Acquisition in the Soviet Union, the United States, and France,” Horton, (fn. 7), 426–44.Google Scholar