¹ The term “Moderates” will be used throughout to designate the Indépendants, the Indépendants Paysans, the Paysans, and the ARS. For convenience, and in accordance with the political slang of the period, the term “cédiste” will be used to refer to an advocate of EDC, and “anti-cédiste” will refer to an opponent.

² Cf. Mendès-France, October 7, p. 4569. Page references are to the Journal Officiel of the National Assembly. Unless otherwise indicated, the debates referred to or quoted from took place in 1954.

³ Cf. de Pierrebourg, October 7, p. 4579; Vallon, October 12, p. 4671; Léon-Noël, December 21, p. 6705.

⁴ The following are the meanings of the terms used in the Journal Officiel: Extreme Right—Républicains sociaux; Right—Modérés; Center—MRP and Indépendants d'Outre-Mer; Left-Radicals, UDSR, Socialists; Extreme Left—Communists.

⁵ The treaty might have appeared less unacceptable to many if, without changing the true content of a single article, it had called for an “association of European armies,” among them, the French army. On the other hand, me fact that such rephrasing would have meant me inclusion of me German army as well would have cost the treaty a number of votes (e.g., from the Socialists), which might have offset the gains on the “right” side of the Assembly. In this context it may be interesting to recall a statement by Mendès-France on December 23: “Between the EDC and the Paris Agreements … there are immense differences of a political, technical, psychological kind.… But on the strictly military plane the differences are … insignificant” (p. 6814).

⁶ From this position it is not far to the idea of using changes in institutions as a means for offsetting unfavorable developments in the relationship of real forces. Thus, at one point, M. Palewski accepted the entrance of Germany into NATO only on condition of a reform of that organization “… which would in particular tend to give the Standing Group—and we must remain one of its three members—a function of real strategic and political leadership” (October 12, p. 4670).

⁷ Cf. Paul Reynaud, October 7, p. 4576.

⁸ When the London Agreements were debated, M. Palewski was alone in asking that Washington make an approach to equality with London and Paris by assuming military obligations similar to those offered by Sir Anthony Eden at the London Conference.

⁹ The desire to avoid a position of manifest inferiority to Britain was evident also in the October debates on the London Agreements, which were criticized by the ex-cédistes for “discriminating in favor of Britain.”

¹⁰ Practically no mention was made in parliamentary discussions of the clause by which Britain could withdraw her forces from the Continent (a) if, for instance, she obtained the agreement of Benelux, or (b) if the British government were to declare that “an acute overseas emergency” existed. (The latter provision recalls Agreement No. 6 of the Additional Protocols to the EDC treaty of March 24, 1953, which gave France similar freedom “in case of a grave crisis in a non-European territory in regard to which a member state of EDC assumes defense responsibilities.”)

¹¹ Cf. Paul Reynaud, December 22, p. 6760; Alfred Coste-Floret, December 22, p. 6770; Felix Gaillard, December 29, p. 6935.

¹² Cf. Soustelle, December 21, p. 6697.

¹³ This seems implied when M. Delbos foresaw (or pretended to foresee) as the immediate consequence of the rejection of the Paris treaty—apparently without any Soviet ultimatum or aggression—the reduction of France to satellite status (cf. December 27, p. 6876).