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Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Eduardo Alemán
Affiliation:
University of Houston
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Abstract

Ten Latin American presidents have a power that has not received the study that it deserves: the ability to make positive suggestions to vetoed bills. These “amendatory observations” return to Congress for afinalround of voting. Sometimes the presidential version of the bill becomes the default alternative automatically and may require qualified majorities to be overturned. The authors analyze veto procedures in eighteen Latin American countries and argue that amendatory veto power significantly increases presidential weight in legislative decision making.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2005

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