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Salt I: An Evaluation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Raymond L. Garthoff
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Abstract

The SALT I Agreements, concluded in 1972, are assessed with the benefit of several years’ perspective. This study examines the negotiations and agreements from the standpoint of achievements and shortcomings. It finds a number of each, but on balance a substantial positive achievement. SALT I marked a beginning to collaborative efforts at strategic arms control by the two superpowers, and in a number of respects—especially the ABM Treaty—it had a clear and favorable effect in mitigating the arms competition. The main shortcoming was the failure to reach significant restraints on strategic offensive arms, especially a ban on MIRV's at a time when that was still possible. Also, the pursuit of “bargaining chips” for arms negotiations can impede arms control and contribute to arms competition. An “oversell” étente and SALT in 1972 prompted a swing to undervaluing both in the late 1970's. netheless, on balance SALT I was a significant step forward.

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Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , October 1978, pp. 1 - 25
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1978

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References

1 Subsequent developments suggest that President Johnson may have been in error in his judgment that sentiment on the Hill in favor of ABM deployment was wide and growing. He was especially influenced by Senator Richard Russell; a number of other Southern Democrats were among those in favor of ABM and of large military programs in general.

2 Bresler, Robert J. and Gray, Robert C., “The Bargaining Chip and SALT,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 92 (Spring 1977), 65–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 The development of such a dialogue was an objective of at least some American officials—and perhaps some Soviet officials as well—although not a central aim of President Nixon or Dr. Kissinger, nor probably of the senior Soviet leaders. Secretary of State Rogers, on the eve of the SALT talks, stated in an informal speech that, while the nature and forms of possible agreements in SALT were not yet clear, “what counts at this point is that a dialogue is beginning about the management of the strategic relations of the two superpowers on a better, safer, cheaper basis than uncontrolled acquisition of still more weapons.” New York Times, November 14, 1969. In the Johnson Administration's exchanges with the Soviet leadership on SALT in 1968, both sides had agreed that one purpose of the talks would be “to improve US-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the strategic situation.” This point was reaffirmed by Secretary Rogers in the same address, when he referred to another of the basic objectives of SALT as reducing the risk of war “through a dialogue about issues arising from the strategic situation.” ibid.

4 The reader is advised to read Ambassador Gerard C. Smith (Chief of the U.S. Delegation in SALT I), SALT: The First Strategic Arms Negotiation (New York: Doubleday, forthcoming); Newhouse, John, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1973)Google Scholar; and Garthoff, R., “Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT,” International Security, 1 (Spring 1977), 3–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 See Garthoff (fn. 4), 14–17.

6 If any thought had been given to making a later “concession” by dropping on-site inspection if the Soviets showed interest in a MIRV ban (as may have been in Dr. Kissinger's mind), it was a badly misplaced idea, as Washington gave the Soviets no reason to believe it was seriously interested in a MIRV ban.

7 There are those who believe that even now a complete ban of further MIRV-MRV flight-testing could so weaken confidence over time that a MIRV ban could be made effective.

8 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, transcript of press backgrounder, December 3, 1974.

9 See Leslie H. Gelb, “Another U.S. Compromise Position Is Reported Reached on Strategic Arms,” New York Times, February 17, 1976; also see Gelb, “Cruise Missiles Provoke Conflict within the Military as Well as with Soviet,” New York Times, January 21, 1976.

10 See Garthoff (fn. 4), 8–15.