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Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Hans Speier
Affiliation:
Social Science Division of The RAND Corporation
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Extract

The uncertainty about whether atomic weapons will be used in future war, whether local or general, lends itself to political exploitation in the cold war. The efficiency of nuclear weapons in wartime, and their resulting threat-value in either war- or peacetime, constitute their political-military worth. In peacetime, the threat-value of weapons can be exploited in many ways: by an ultimatum, by authoritative or inspired statements on capabilities or intentions, by studied disclosures of new weapons at ceremonial occasions, by means of maneuvers, redeployments of forces, or by so-called demonstrations.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1957

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