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The Soviet Reaction to Vlasov
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Extract
IN recent years a good deal of attention has been focused on the Vlasov movement as an outstanding example of “Soviet opposition to Stalin” and as a wartime opportunity (largely missed by Germany) to utilize defectors and prisoners for military as well as political propaganda purposes. One important facet of the Vlasov problem has eluded systematic investigation: the reaction of the Soviet authorities to the movement. The themes employed in their campaign to reduce the political force of the Vlasov challenge provide some insight into their political behavior under the stress of indigenous opposition.
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- Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1956
References
1 The standard accounts are Fischer, George, Soviet Opposition to Stalin, Cambridge, Mass., 1952CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and ürgen Thorwald(pseud.), Wen sie verderben wollen, Stuttgart, 1953.
2 There were certain facets of his background that might have aroused some suspicion—among them, his peasant origin; his past association with some of the purged generals; and his advocacy of the reduction of authority of political commissars in me army (a view which, incidentally, was shared by such “reliable” commanders as Marshal Timoshenko). Vlasov's reliability, however, seems never to have been questioned prior to his defection, for Stalin personally received him and entrusted him with the special operation assigned to the Second Assault Army. Also, he was singled out to be interviewed by such important foreign correspondents as Eve Curie.
3 X. A.K., Ic, “Tätigkeitsbericht,” November 1, 1942. This citation and the Germansources cited hereinafter refer to captured records now in the custody of the Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, U.S. Army, in Alexandria, Va.
4 XXVII. A.K., Ic, “Vernehmung des Gefangenen,” July 14, 1942.
5 ; AOK 18, Ic, to OKH/Gen.z.b.V., July 22, 1942. Vinogradov and Afanas'ev had been officers on Vlasov's staff.
6 Many of the above comments were reported by captured Soviet officers and officials, in particular by Captain Boris Rusanov, adjutant to Strokach, who worked in Khrushchev's headquarters for some time and was captured by the Germans when his plane crashed behind the German lines in the summer of 1943. Rusanov was interrogated by experienced “Russia hands,” and parts of his testimony were utilized for German radio and newspaper propaganda; other portions remained unpublished. (See Reichsführer-SS [Himmler], Persönlicher Stab, “Betr. Kapitän Boris Russanow,” October 19, 1943.)
7 281. Sich. Div., Ic, “übersetzung aus den Beutepapieren des am 3.6. vernichteten Stabes des r. Regiments der 3. Leningrader Brigade.”
8 In other instances, the suspicion remains strong but unproved; in still others, it was apparently based on nothing more than denunciation by political foes among the émigrés.
9 OKH/GenStdH/FHO(IIIf), “übersetzung: Gesamtergebnis der Vernehmung des Spions Ssemjon Nikolajewitsch Kapustin,” July 22, 1943.
10 Rumors also circulated in other areas. According to one Vlasovite officer, Soviet agents or partisans around Pskov were spreading the clandestine theme that “the weapons are now in the hands of the people. The people will oust Stalin after the war. However, one should not forget that the Germans are the most treacherous enemy and must therefore be beaten first. In order not to weaken the fight against the Germans, we must, for the time being, continue to fight under Stalin's leadership.” Such a notion may have been the product of a partisan's spontaneous, rather sophisticated, construct. Its exploitation by Soviet agents, however, is surprising. Another Soviet effort to respond to the Vlasov theme was reported in the summer of 1943 by a German security unit in the Ostrov area: “In one case it has been reported that partisans pretended to be members of the Vlasov army in order to recon-noiter popular attitudes in this manner and to spread insecurity in the ranks of the population” (281. Sich. Div., Ic, “Erfahrungsbericht,” June 25, 1943).Google Scholar
11 This Soviet tactic of ignoring the matter also extended to the Western Allies. There was no confirmation that the defector was identical with the Andrei Vlasov who had been a lieutenant general in the Red Army—a fact which led to such unwitting distortions as the comment of Eve Curie in a later edition of her book that the German-held Vlasov was “not to be confused” with the Vlasov she had interviewed in January 1942 (Curie, Eve, Journey Among Warriors, Garden City, N.Y., 1943, p. 180)Google Scholar—a statement repeated by others; for example, Schuman, Frederick L., Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad, New York, 1946, p. 631.Google Scholar
12 AOK 20, Ic, “Nr. 214/43,” June 26, 1943.
13 Pavlov, A., “Iudushka Vlasov,” Za sovetskuiu rodinu, No. 5 (May 15, 1943), p. 4.Google Scholar
14 Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie Armii, Krasnoi, “Smert' prezrennomu predateliu Vlasovu, podlomu shpionu i agentu liudoeda Gitlera!” Za pravoe delo, No. 76 (July 4, 1943). p. 4.Google Scholar
15 WBfh. Ostland, Ic/WPr., “übersetzung eines Feindflugblattes,” May 15, 1943 (Archives of the Yiddish Scientific Institute [YIVO], New York, Document Occ E 3).
16 OKH/GenStdH/FHO(IIId), “Sowjetpropaganda zur Wlassow-Aktion,/GenStdH/FHO(IIIa), “Unterredung Obertsleutnant Tarassow,” June 29. 1943.
19 Such rumors were not entirely unfounded. From the end of 1942 on, the partisans and, within limits, the Red Army “accepted” returning collaborators, thoughof course keeping diem under surveillance.
20 WBfh. Ostland, Ic/WPr., “übersetzung eines Feindflugblattes,” May 15, 1943 (YIVO, Occe 3).
21 For the protocol of this conference, see Fischer, , op. cit., pp. 176–87.Google Scholar
22 AOK 2, Ic/AO, “Auszüge aus Gefangenenvernehmungen,” August 19, 1944.
23 This image is confirmed by interrogations of recent defectors who were at that time in the Red Army. To postwar defectors he appears invariably as a negative symbol.
24 Luftwaffen Ic beim AOK 2, “Auszug,” November 25, 1944.
25 Pravda, August 2, 1946.
26 The movement and wartime collaborators generally are the implicit subjects of the striking political amnesty decree issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on September 17, 1955 (Izvestia, September 18, 1955). Its tenor and treatment tend to support the thesis of this paper. The oversensitivity to indigenous (and émigré) political opposition, it would seem, was not a personal idiosyncrasy of Stalin, but apparently extends to his “collective” heirs as well. The amnesty—curiously ignored by the bulk of the Soviet press, including Pravda—was geared to a campaign aimed atneutralizing or recapturing Soviet émigrés abroad.