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Theater Nuclear Weapons: Doctrines and Postures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Colin S. Gray
Colin S. Gray
Affiliation:
Institute for Strategic Studies, London
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Abstract

Few people in any NATO country are satisfied with the existing theater nuclear posture and doctrine—yet radical revision is politically impossible. There is a marked absence of consensus within NATO on the proper functions of theater nuclear weapons: to Europeans they are, above all, a near-guarantee of a wider war and symbolic of American commitment (thereby enhancing deterrence), while to Americans they are, essentially, a means for reversing a deteriorating battlefield situation. A guide to the debate of recent years is organized around the systematic discussion of four alternative theater nuclear postures: Current NATO, Revised NATO, The Covering Force, and Battlefield Use. The ideas inherent in, and the means for the accomplishment of each, are presented, as are the claimed advantages and disadvantages. The debate occasioned by the Nunn Amendment has focused attention on the question of the relationship between defensive utility and deterrent value.

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Type
Research Note
Information
World Politics , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , January 1976, pp. 300 - 314
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1976

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References

1 ”The Evolution of Operations Research and its Impact on the Military Establishment: the Air Force Experience,” in Wright, Monte D. and Paszek, Lawrence J., eds., Science, Technology and Warfare. Proceedings of the Third Military History Symposium, U.S. Air Force Academy (Washington 1969), 89Google Scholar.

2 For details of deployment, see Arms Control Today, iv (April 1974), 4.

3 The Nunn Amendment to the Military Authorization Bill for FY 1975, PL93–365, August 5, 1974, required, inter alia, that the Secretary of Defense ”study the overall concept for use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe” and ”how the use of such weapons relates to deterrence and to a strong conventional defense.” Secretary Schlesinger was to report ”on the results of the above study on or before April 1, 1975.” See James R. Schlesinger, The Theater 'Nuclear Force Posture in Europe: A Report to the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 93–365,. 1975.

4 An alternative menu of TNW postures is on offer in Record, Jeffrey, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives (Washington: Brookings Institution 1974Google Scholar), chap. 7.

5 In peacetime the military utility of new technologies is almost invariably misjudged. See Gray, , ”New Weapons and the Resort to Force,” International Journal, xxx (Spring 1975), 238CrossRefGoogle Scholar–58; Watt, Donald C., Too Serious a Business: European armed forces and the approach to the Second World War (London: Temple Smith; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1975Google Scholar), chap. 3.

6 Although I have very definite views on the characteristics of desirable TNW posture and doctrine (see fn. 16), the characterization of each posture and the framing of the advantages and disadvantages are intended to be preference-neutral. Without conscious partiality, the most telling arguments for and against each option have been selected.

7 On the GSP, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, U.S. Security Issues in Europe: Burden Sharing and Offset, MBFR and Nuclear Weapons, Staff Report, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, pp. 19–22.

8 Ibid., 14.

9 The scale of effort required before a major innovation in strategy can be adopted by NATO is convincingly portrayed in Richardson, R. C., ”Can NATO Fashion A New Strategy?” Orbis, xvii (Summer 1973), 415Google Scholar–38.

10 See Steven Canby, The Alliance and Europe: Part IV: Military Doctrine and Technology, Adelphi Papers No. 109 (London 1974/75).

11 The lethal radius of blast (itself a calculation that is challengeable on technical grounds, with its ready assumption of a regularity of effect) is smaller than is that of prompt and delayed radiation. See Bennett, W. S., Gard, R. P., and Reinhardt, G. C., Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Objectives and Constraints, LA-5712-MS, Informal Report (Los Alamos: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 1974), 4–6Google Scholar.

12 Pershing, admittedly, is an extreme case. However, while granting that such TNW-capable systems as the TV-guided Walleye glide bomb and the 105mm and 203mm artillery tubes are in the sub- and low-kilotonic ranges, the free-fall nuclear bombs available for NATO's tactical aviation are almost all of obsolescent design and relatively high yield (certainly in excess of the 14KT ”nominal” yield that destroyed Hiroshima). See U.S. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on Military Applications, Military Applications of Nuclear Technology, Hearing, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, pp. 7–17.

13 Washington 1975, pp. III-2–3.

14 The degree of Soviet interest in non-nuclear operations in Europe is an issue that is much in dispute at present. It is a fact that thoroughgoing modernization of the ground and tactical air forces has begun to accord the Soviet Union a major non-nuclear blitzkrieg capability. For a careful analysis, see Erickson, John, ”Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 120 (March 1975), 65–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 The principal document advocating this concept is Martin, Laurence, ”Theatre Nuclear Weapons and Europe,” Survival, xvi (November/December 1974), 268CrossRefGoogle Scholar–76.

16 Variants of this orientation include Bennett, W. S., Sandoval, R. R., and Shreffler, R. G., United States National Security Policy and Nuclear Weapons, LA-5785-MS (Los Alamos: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 1974Google Scholar); Gray, , ”Deterrence and Defence in Europe: Revising NATO's Theatre Nuclear Posture,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 119 (December 1974), 3–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 A great deal of study has been devoted of recent years to the problems of reducing the unwanted collateral damage that would attend TNW use. For example, see Brookman, M. A., Reduction of Collateral Damage for Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Volume i: Executive Summary (Menlo Park, Cal.: Stanford Research Institute 1974Google Scholar).