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Designing Competition Clauses in Preferential Trade Agreements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 October 2023

Zhiyuan Wang*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Florida, USA
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Abstract

Competition policy is one important aspect of trade liberalization. However, when examining preferential trade agreements (PTAs), a major type of policy tools to liberalize trade, competition provisions are revealed not to be uniformly distributed across these treaties. What explains the variation in the design of competition clauses in PTAs? Borrowing insights from the rational design of international institutions and combining them with those from treaty ratification and policy diffusion literatures, I identify five major causal mechanisms through which competition provisions are incorporated into PTAs. In evaluating them, I employ a range of operationalization techniques to capture the proposed mechanisms. A treaty-level analysis of 319 PTAs over the period 1960–2015 lends strong and robust support to most of the hypothesized relationships. By integrating theoretical frameworks across international political economy literatures with that from law and economics scholarship, this study demonstrates the utility of political science thinking to the real-world international law-making.

Information

Type
Original Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The World Trade Organization
Figure 0

Table 1.Analytical levels of explanations

Figure 1

Figure 1.The Ambition of Competition Provisions in PTAs: 1960–2015

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Table 2.Operationalization of explanatory variables in hypotheses

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Table 3.What explains the ambition of competition provisions in PTAs

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Figure 2.Standardized coefficientsNote: The 95% confidence intervals are shown.

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Figure 3.What explains the ambition of competition provisions in PTAs: Out of sample predictionsNote: This figure is created based on model 6 in Table 3. Only statistically significant variables are shown.

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Table 4.What explains the ambition of competition provisions in PTAs: Substantive effects

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Table 5.What explains the ambition of competition provisions in PTAs: Considering the complementarity thesis

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Figure 4.What explains the ambition of competition provisions in PTAs: Bilateral vs. plurilateralNote: The ratio of linguistic affinity is omitted to increase the legibility as its magnitude is unproportionally large. The 95% confidence intervals are shown.

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