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On assessing the cost of TRIPS implementation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 February 2003

TRAVIS J. LYBBERT
Affiliation:
Cornell University
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Abstract

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Efforts to ensure that intellectual property rights are respected and protected world-wide have met increasing resistance by critics who see extreme imbalances in the costs and benefits of implementing stronger intellectual property protection. The WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) attracts particular criticism as an enforceable multilateral embodiment of these efforts. While few disagree that developed countries stand to benefit more in the short term from TRIPS implementation than developing countries, precisely estimating associated costs and benefits is challenging. This paper comments on an approach to estimating the ‘indirect’ costs of implementing TRIPS proposed by McCalman (2001) and argues that the approach overestimates the costs born by developing countries. Specifically, this overestimation is due primarily to an inadequate representation of the TRIPS Agreement and a counterfactual assumption that countries would not have strengthened their intellectual property policies in the absence of the TRIPS Agreement.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2002 Travis J. Lybbert