As Moscow and Washington move toward a second round of SALT, analysts in both capitals raise serious questions—not only about the accords concluded in 1972, but, with still greater concern, about the agreements that will be considered in the years ahead. Communists may well ask: If revolution is the stepchild of war, should we welcome conditions that make international stability more likely? Western skeptics, for their part, ask whether Soviet leaders will not exploit a nuclear stalemate to advance the Communist cause through subnuclear diplomacy or nonmilitary means in which the West is generally at a disadvantage. Some U.S. strategists, for example, contend that there is a basic asymmetry which turns the SALT agreements to Moscow's favor. Since Moscow's objectives are unlimited, they contend, they may be effectively pursued as long as the USSR enjoys at least rough equality with the United States. For America to deter Soviet probes, overwhelming superiority is needed, both in strategic and other arms.