Some historians as well as theorists of international relations have recently expressed an interest in discovering whether medieval ideas and practices have survived, in some form or other, to penetrate later, modern political theories and practices of international relations. My having been invited to contribute to one of their workshopsFootnote 1 inspired me to begin this paper by sharing some reflections that resulted from our discussions. But as I hope will become clear: ‘in my beginning is my end’.Footnote 2
There has been some serious reconsideration of chronological periodisation, of what is meant by the ‘medieval’ as a distinct period separate from, say, the early modern and the modern.Footnote 3 Those of us who are medievalists have long been aware of the tendency amongst some medieval historians to problematise the sixteenth-century Renaissance as a unique event, their insisting instead on an earlier twelfth-century Renaissance as a necessary precursor and forerunner so that the sixteenth-century version was not so ‘new’ or ‘unique’.Footnote 4 As historians, we also know of concerns within the discipline as to where precisely the Middle Ages may be said to end and the Renaissance, or, indeed, the Reformation, to have begun. Our discipline is filled with publications entitled ‘Forerunners’ of something or other.Footnote 5 And Britain has had a famous and long-enduring legal fascination with retrieving and implementing an ‘ancient constitution’ by which was meant, of course, the medieval constitution.Footnote 6 So this paper tries to deal with ‘continuities’ within what might be considered a European tradition of thinking and acting ‘as Europeans’.Footnote 7
The very idea that the Middle Ages was left behind, ‘thankfully’, with the emergence not only of the sixteenth-century Renaissance, but certainly of the Reformation is, from an historian's perspective, an extremely interesting ‘modern’ ideological project that seeks breaks and new beginnings, engaging a wilful forgetting of yesterday and the past. Earlier in my career, I spent considerable time trying to investigate how ‘the past’ was construed, what remembering entailed and how the psychological ‘faculty’ of Memory was thought to function, according to classical Greek, Roman, medieval and early modern thinkers.Footnote 8 My aim was to discover the perspectives of those who bothered to address these issues in their pursuit of saying something about what they thought history to be, why they thought anyone bothered to write historical narratives and how these affected political thinking and practice. I came to the conclusion that in contrast to the variety of views of earlier thinkers, the ‘modern’ project was working with an underdeveloped understanding of what language is and how it works, over generations. Furthermore, the ‘modern’ project was seeking to locate the beginnings of ourselves as ‘modern’, and the consequence was that the centuries-long belief that historia magistra vitae – that history is the teacher of life – was thought no longer to be relevant to us. Moderns, it is said, ‘ make it new’ and do not repeat the past because ‘the past’ is now taken to be ‘over-and-done with’.Footnote 9
What it means to be a ‘modern’ person is defined according to one prevailing view as being a uniquely subjective, passion-driven, self-interested individualist, where individual choices to act in one way or another are guided by one's Will rather than by one's Reason. The ‘modern’ voluntarist person is then situated within a ‘moral’ frame that is relativist, in the sense that moralities are understood as having emerged from, and been modified by, our different states’ conventional, positive, coercive laws. These laws are taken to have developed as responses to perceived threats to the security of the whole, i.e. responses to contingencies as historical emergencies. So over time, the laws can and do change and the specifics of the enforceable moral frame also change. Any citizen of a modern state is said to possess equal rights, of a certain kind, enshrined in his/her state's positive law. These rights, in law, are open to modification. The laws do not and cannot cover every action. Where momentarily the laws have nothing to say, each of us is left with permissions to act in ways that the laws remain silent about. All of this can and does change. But there is an underlying presumption that the changes are progressive and they alter the past in ways that are better in the present and will ensure an even better future for self-interested individualists as described.
The details of any moral order that is enforceable are said to have emerged as secondary conclusions from what is a primary ‘logical’ solution to everyone's problem, experienced everywhere and at all times: the problem is said to be that we are naturally competitive, envious and intolerant in our interpersonal relations.Footnote 10 A knowledge of history is thought simply to show examples of this ‘fact’ but history does not establish its truth. Rather, it is logic, a more general understanding of consequences, that reveals how men have always solved the problem about how we are, and have ever been, everywhere, non-cooperators, driven by what each of us takes to be individual self-interest and certainly not driven by some elusive and substantive common good. The logical solution to our problematic interpersonal relations is the founding of the body politic or commonwealth. History provides examples but its construction is always a product of logic, not of history. Humans uniquely show themselves to have established artificial (not natural) contracts which entail a mutual renunciation of the exercise of their individual, subjective judgements, and on the part of each voluntarist individual, the transference of his right or power to be an authority over himself to a representative third party. Union only in this artificial, representative actor or third party is achieved through the consent of every individual in a (non-unified) multitude to transfer his own power to make judgements to it. But the reason for seeking such union is that each individual aims at something else: peace and security, that is, an end to interpersonal conflict.
On this view, the political is conceived as a sovereign artificial person. We, however, as individuals, are natural and not artificial, persons. So the body politic that we construct through Reason is a representative persona not a natural persona . In it alone is there a concourse of Wills that produces the desired, same effect: peace and security. Only in the modern sovereign state itself is there said to be a union which uniquely has the power to compel each of us to keep the peace should any of us be so foolish as to believe he can break laws with impunity. This ‘modern’ project establishes its own teleology: that the European citizen (and the statecraft which gave rise to it) was always implicit in the abstract and has finally come to be realised, indeed actualised, entirely by human Will and by the human capacity for deductive logic that understands consequences. Hence, it sustains a view that this is not simply Europe's history, but universal history although its truth has only recently come to pass, Europe having been the place of its most clear, rapid and rational emergence. To me this is bad history. In fact, as held by self-confessedly modern persons, it is not history at all.Footnote 11
Those with some interest in and knowledge of European history and who tell this story of the emergence of our ‘modern’ selves sometimes begin with the fifteenth century as the ideal type of the ‘late medieval’ as ‘forerunner’, supposedly in the process of transforming itself into ‘the modern’. There was, of course, a fifteenth-century shared range of languages, in law, in theological and social discussions, not least in using and abusing a classical Greek and Roman inheritance of ways of speaking about what politics is, what it is for and how the social is best to be arranged for the kinds of beings humans are presumed to be. But these are the questions. And my argument is that these are the questions that endure into ‘the modern’, allowing us to negotiate the medieval in the modern.
What are/ were we presumed to be? And what is the scope of politics? The answers to these very questions had been contested, certainly during the Middle Ages. The range of socio-political theories with which I am most familiar is heavily invaded by scholastic Catholic theology, which did not, in fact, hold to one view on these matters, most certainly not during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Briefly, I want to demonstrate this. And scholastic Catholicism did not end either with the sixteenth-century Renaissance or Reformation. It did, however, come to be transformed by the socio-political and theological debates of Reformers and in conflict with them.
Medievalists are familiar with the twelfth-century Cistercian St Bernard of Clairvaux's De consideratione Footnote 12 in which he spoke of the whole world, and not simply of ‘Europe’, as a Christian unity under the spiritual and material jurisdiction of the papacy, expressed in the Church's universal, canon law. Perhaps this may be considered, using modern jargon, to be some kind of Christian cosmopolitanism. This Pauline language of world evangelisation and conversion, of Gentiles first and Jews thereafter, did not, of course, begin in the Middle Ages, nor did it end with the Reformation. The shift away from a unified Catholic Christendom was not to some secular characterisation of Europe but, rather, to confessional divides as discrete objects of loyalty wherever one found religiously identifiable communities of practice within defined but ever-changing geographical borders. All such were Christian of one kind or another. The forging of Europe as a recognisable set of concepts over time was continuously undertaken sub specie aeternitatis and notably in socio-legal languages penetrated by doctrinal Christianity of one sort or another.
Nietzsche observed something that shocked me when I first came across it. He said that words in European languages were steeped in presumptions about Being. In Human, All too Human, he wrote:
To the extent that man has for long ages believed in the concepts and names of things as in aeternae veritates he has appropriated to himself that pride by which he raised himself above the animal: he really thought that in language he possessed knowledge of the world. The sculptor of language was not so modest as to believe that he was only giving things designations; he conceived, rather, that with the words he was expressing supreme knowledge of things.Footnote 13
But a fourteenth-century theologian, William of Ockham, whom we might call a philologist, as was Nietzsche, observed this well before Nietzsche, at least when he came to insist that spoken language was and ever had been ad placitum, a conventional means of signifying or referring. Language was not a mirror of the inner constitution of nature. Knowledge, for Ockham, is about the logical consistency of our propositions and, hence, we are living our lives in a realm of probabilities rather than certainty, beyond our immediate experience of things.Footnote 14
Nietzsche did not, however, presume that the more humble position, as conventional designators, would solve any problems. After all, Europeans having been taught an attitude to their languages, to language itself, to the Word (St John's Gospel) as a reference to some inhering ‘Being’, had shifted to a view of language as designating or signifying by convention. And when they realised this, they learned to designate and then think themselves confronting enemies who signified differently, thereby ensuring their own presupposed fixity and self-identity. The very idea that language use and its designations were subjective opinions, habituated practices enforced by convention, already had been realised during the Middle Ages. And then the battle began as to whose conventions better approximated to the Truth.
It was military outcomes that determined subsequent, regional social systems and the varieties of Christian dogma practised therein: the sixteenth-century wars of religion and thereafter were based on the principle cuius regio eius religio which authorised rulers to establish in their own territories the doctrinal Christianity of their choice. Insofar as Europe is an historical entity, I am here suggesting that its historicity is in the fact of the on-going internecine spiritual/political warfare, the emergent conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, their mutual post-Tridentine absorption of the positions of their opposites, while nonetheless maintaining distinct attitudes to the following agenda, an agenda that was already set and debated during the Middle Ages. This agenda dealt with the following concerns:
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What is a community as a societas, i.e. as a collective or corporate entity and what is its relation to individual members and their political governance?
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What is considered justified/legitimate coercion of individuals on the part of ‘state’ authorities, and is justified rule to be by law or by force?
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What perspective should we endorse concerning man's rationality and capacity for disciplined self-governance?
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When we consider what motivates men to act in one way or another, what is the role of the individual's Will, his desires, and their relation to his Reason?
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What is the relation between the individual's good and the common good?
And in tackling this agenda, regional habitudes and conventions developed to determine who was ‘in’ and who was ‘out’.
To oversimplify: the long-enduring debates from within Christianity itself concerned what were taken to be different consequences of the Fall and what Christians call ‘Original Sin’. It is from the answers to questions on this agenda that I think we can trace the modern European, indeed Euro-American, debate over whether right is prior to the good or the good prior to right, a debate that is still on-going between modern liberals and communitarians.Footnote 15 In short, it is my view that those who study the evolution of law and politics from the Middle Ages to modernity need to study the theologies that underpinned them. And if one examines the theologies, one finds two positions that were vigorously debated during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries precisely by men educated theologically and with remits to advance views on state and church governance. The debate was between those whom I have called neo-Augustinian voluntarists on the one hand, and neo-Aristotelian intellectualists on the other.Footnote 16 What was being examined was the source of human motivation to act in one way or another and the degree to which Reason could be expected to trump a contrary Will.
Neo-Augustinians held that we are first and foremost self-lovers, and lovers of the community only secondarily and in consequence of the utilitas of the community for beings whose primary love of self defines their fallen status.Footnote 17 Neo-Aristotelian intellectualists, on the other hand, argued that naturally we love the community and neighbours before the love of self so that the common good always takes priority over the good of the individual which, in fact, derives from it.Footnote 18 My focus hereafter will be on some of the positions of neo-Augustinians because they reintegrated Augustine into their theories of knowledge to lasting effect. It is their views, not least on what after the Fall we are able to know, and how we know what we know, that came to exert a huge influence on the European future and its ‘modernity’.
Fourteenth-century Franciscans like Duns ScotusFootnote 19 and William of OckhamFootnote 20 were concerned to sever the association of God and Necessity in order to replace a contemporary radical Aristotelian interpretation of a determined universe with a realm of contingency. Man could then understand God as free-willing in a realm of what was called His potentia absoluta, where His freedom was not limited by His commitments to the world as it now is, established de potentia ordinata. Our world as contingent led to an affirmation that God had committed Himself to this world rather than to possible other worlds, so that man was to look upon his world as issuing from a contract, a pactum Dei. But this was a very special kind of contract, and Hobbes would later correctly recognise it as covenant. According to fourteenth-century neo-Augustinians, the contingency of the world does not make it unreliable; but its creation and man's salvation were simply not to be viewed as ontologically necessary, so that God's free Will could remain in absolute freedom.
Already in the early fourteenth century we have the Franciscan theologian Duns Scotus asserting that after the Fall the natural law had been suspended,Footnote 21 and, hence, we no longer have access to its principles naturally, innately and intuitively to guide our behaviour, by which he meant that the philosophical order of rationality gives us no access to the other order of rationality, that of God and His absolute Will; that our rational capacities are now limited to a kind of non-judgemental, intuitive awareness of existents as here and now and this simply allows us to doubt something or be aware of thinking something. But this intuition does not give us knowledge of the individual in its singularity ut hoc. We do not now have the power to grasp individuating difference. Instead, the first object of our cognition is confused and indistinct, what Scotus called a ‘species’ above the individual and this is achieved by abstractive cognition which knows the nature of the individual but not its individuating difference; what is known distinctly by the intellect is the concept of the individual's being, its haecceitas, its more ‘universal’ ‘thisness’, and this is the intellect's own object as a representation of the individual. Mind now works through symbolic expressions representing the quiddity of the object, referring to the intelligible aspect, the essential, formal characteristics of things. What is emphasised is that the ‘thisness’ of a thing is not determined by its im-mattered existence; and against intellectualists like Aquinas, Scotus argued that man's intellection was not limited to concepts that were abstracted from sense experience, because if this were the case, we could not have the face-to-face vision of God that is promised to man in the afterlife. But for God's immediate presence to be an object of our intellection, this must be a result of His free act, His Will to be present to any created intellect in all the proper and essential meaning of divinity to be known intuitively. We cannot achieve this on our own in our present condition.
Scotus is concerned to underline the distinction between Nature and Will, between an unconscious biological determinism on the one hand, and conscious choice on the other. He is also concerned to argue that our intellect can be conceived as being separate from the material world as perceived by the senses. And in so doing, he opens up a realm of plausible mental fictions, a realm of mental possibilities divorced from empirical certainties. Furthermore, all that experience does for us is confirm the cognitive possibilities that are open to the human intellect concerning what God's Will does creatively. But there is no unconditional necessity in the natural world. Hence, a demonstrative deductive science – that of logic – must only be concerned with the possible in a world of contingents. We must presume that Nature functions in a regular manner, determined by a formal linking of causes up to God's Will. The finite created world is knowable to us only through the mediation of form and abstractively, and any created intellect now can reach finite being by virtue of causes which naturally move it, but, again, any individual finite being is not grasped ut hoc but rather by the quiddity of material things.
What has happened to the belief that the image of God is somehow in us and is what is best in our nature, even though fallen? Scotus insists that perfect intellection depends on the divine exemplars and cannot exist without the Word being there, if we have heard it. Drawing on Augustine, this means that once evangelised, the Word is somehow lodged in our memories.Footnote 22 Citing Augustine, he insists that we attribute to the memory everything that we know and it is our will to remember that causes a more perfect understanding especially of things spiritual. Scotus must affirm that man's end is salvation, an immediate union with God through an intuitive vision of God's essence, but unlike the intellectualists, it is not sufficient to say that through a rational contemplation of God by means of sensibles alone, man can achieve his end. Philosophical Reason is limited; it falls into the error of believing that there are rational means of attaining salvation and the vision of God. This would give no place to the necessity of God's freely willed initiative in man's salvation. It is the divine initiative that constitutes the radically contingent acceptance of man. Through God's free initiative to offer grace we see how this may allow a rational creature consciously to turn towards his final end, through an act of now enlightened Reason whereby Truth, the summum bonum, is willed for itself. What is occurring when a man as creature receives the free initiative of grace and wills to turn to God as the sovereign good is the implementing of a commandment, which is itself a duty to love God more than anything else. Although we possess a rational and natural love of God, and from which issues moral order, beyond that moral order is a radical divine initiative ad extra.
If our Reason is now so limited, then what were the consequences for our liberty to control our choices to act well or ill? If there is no rule, not even the Ten Commandments, to which right reason need conform in order to obtain the radical divine initiative, salvation, then could our free will, on its own, and unaided, as it were, voluntarily choose faith and to love God? But this itself could not be sufficient because Scotus sketches a radical distinction, indeed distance, between God's infinite, absolute, initiating Will and that of man. Absolutely, God's Will cannot be held to any obligation to us. Our condition here and now is one where neither God nor Nature is ‘legible’ merely through our own efforts.
William of Ockham, another Franciscan theologian who similarly sought to establish the radical liberty and autonomy of God, went further than Scotus to insist that cognitively we only have access to concrete existents, and that everything exists only in its own singularity.Footnote 23 This turns every universal, everything conceptualised as a collectivity, into nothing more than a name or grammatical term signifying the individuals within the collectivity, the collective having no real existence, it being only a name for singular existents of which it is comprised. This is what is called his nominalism. Furthermore, relations between individuals have no reality. There ‘is’ then, no common nature, which equates to there ‘is’ no common human nature. There are only singulars, individuals and our philosophical or logical Reason has no capacity to assert, with certainty, a common telos or common good. There is neither a common nature nor a universal as a direct object of our intelligence. Human intelligence, as created but now fallen, cannot be so perfect as to judge and understand with absolute certainty. Our intellect, now, has no innate knowing and therefore no immediate knowledge of Truth and therefore, of God. We are left with a capacity to suppose, logically, the hypothetical existence of a subject; we cognitively depend on sensible, exterior things that we perceive and experience, and we reason based on our experiences in the circumstances. We know moral precepts either as (logical) self-evident principles, per se nota, i.e. avoid evil, or we know them from and in experience: deductively, we reach conclusions as to further moral precepts, thereby discerning right from wrong in the circumstances. This moral knowing is not from authority. It comes from every individual having an intuitive notion that he is by nature free and by this Ockham means that each experiences a Will to do or not do what is rational. We possess as individuals a libertas and we know of it only by experience. We do have a natural liberty and Reason is central to its exercise. But Ockham separates recta ratio, a judgement of Reason, from what happens when we will, because he says that everyone from his own experiences can observe how he can and does will what is bad against precepts of Reason. Politically this has consequences: what we know we owe to others, what our moral obligations are, objectively, we also know from experience that we do not infallibly and necessarily will to do or perform.Footnote 24
Augustine plays a central role in the shaping of all of these arguments. Especially during the fourteenth century there was a huge effort to reexamine the texts of St Augustine. His texts helped fuel the debates just described, between intellectualists and voluntarists, not least in the voluntarists taking the view that the consequences of the Fall left our Reason insufficient to control the experienced exercise of our contrary Wills. Contrary Wills, the clear evidence of there being contumacious persons who would not be guided by Reason or authority, penetrated the theory and practice of procedures and justifications for inclusion and exclusion in the community, notably in excommunication, and in church inquisitorial trials mirrored in ‘state’ and city courts. It reflects pre-modern social mentalities and attitudes to the criteria that determined social inclusion and exclusion. Over the centuries, it raises issues of intolerance and tolerance concerning external behaviour in the foro externo, and by the sixteenth century, it has been shown that interior dispositions in the foro interno were to be ‘read off’ of external behaviour, including speech. As a consequence, the respective roles of both church and public authorities in maintaining communal discipline, peace and order became high priorities not only in discourse but in legal stipulation and enforcement. This reveals an evolving tradition of European discourses on the ways in which, depending on one's status in a hierarchy of citizenship, one was to be held responsible before the community for maintaining one's fama, i.e. one's public self or reputation in good order, in both Catholic and Protestant regions. This took the form of procedures for correcting one's sins for the public good, e.g. defamation by public rumour of individuals judged contumacious, either by communities or by representative authorities in their name.Footnote 25 Increasingly, what was considered ‘the public good’ was peace and security of the whole. How anyone might negotiate the private quality of his life was not a matter of politics but of private conscience, an intensely internal, personal and unmediated dialogue between his Maker and his private self that escaped juridical scrutiny. The problem, however, came to be acknowledged that so much of one's ‘private’ self was held to spill out, evidently, into the foro externo, being ripe for scrutiny as an expressed, usually disruptive, Will, that the private self's ‘true’ intentions could only and uniquely fully be known subjectively by oneself – and God.Footnote 26
In contrast, what one might call the earlier medieval conception of the self was a normative self. But it was not self-defining, subjective or unique. Rather, it was thought that the self's normativity had already been defined by God in whose image man was made and the self's responsibility for self-discipline or governance was through the deployment of right reason, recta ratio, available to all humans and in the same way. Hence, there were said to be powers given to each and every member of the species for exercise by individuals as self-governors in their living a morally constrained life. Moral rules were a priori obliging and to which men had access through rational comprehension of the natural law, supplemented by the divine law of the Decalogue. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries both Catholic and Protestant natural law theorists reveal that there still remained a confrontation between protagonists of a variety of recognisably scholastic and ancient ideas of morality and values as naturally a priori inherent in the structure of the world, and of God's providential ordering of human ethical normativity, accessible in some way or other to human Reason.
What this implied was that whatever was to be understood by humans having moral rights emerged from their prior grasp that there are natural duties to be fulfilled. These duties do not depend on the existence of particular personal or institutional ties based on convention, local contracts, themselves based on voluntary, local consent between a rights-holder and a duty-bearer. Natural duties to others of our kind are, on this view, said to go well beyond the duties of citizenship and derive from valid claims of need, requiring our acknowledgement, everywhere, of having natural duties of mutual assistance to the species. But the issue that was debated, especially from the fourteenth-century scholastics onwards, was not only how such duties come to be known by us but whether we can in fact voluntarily will to perform them even if they are known. If, as some held, following Augustine, God's wishes concerning the constitutional and legal specifics of the political may no longer be inferred by us, then the political is not some sacred ordering according to our knowledge of God's Will because we have no such knowledge. What politics actually is, is simply what we or our governors deem useful in the circumstances. The consequence is that moral rights cannot be thought to be substantively stable over time concerning what one must or must not do, other than: be obedient to sovereign rules, whatever they are, for peace and security. If, on this view, using only our natural faculties, we have no access to prior objective justice, and cannot implement a lex securely to ensure that our own willed acts with others of our kind will be obeyed in reciprocity, then the logic of understanding consequences gives us no option other than to set up politics in a very distinctive way. Calvin in his Geneva made it quite clear what this was: natural law morality can only be accessed from grace and faith and not by Reason. For him it was only Christians under Christian political governance of the kind he instituted who could be positively induced to live according to the Ten Commandments.Footnote 27 What some had thought to be praecepta certa, certainly known precepts of natural law available to everyone and everywhere, and, hence, capable of implementation, were to be replaced by positive law and convention.
In his recent lecture on Cromwell and the protectorate, Blair Worden observed that the mistrust of Cromwell was largely inspired by his deployment of the beliefs and language of Puritanism for political ends.Footnote 28 Only recently, seventeenth-century historians have become more interested in the content of his religion, rejecting an earlier historical perspective that religion was simply the seventeenth-century's way of talking about something else, i.e. economics, political aspirations.Footnote 29 Worden is correct in saying that Cromwell's religion never turned away from the world it sought to transform. But from the Middle Ages onwards, religion never did turn away from the world it sought to transform. That there was always a religious dimension to political debates, admonitions against betraying the divine spirit, that politics was about not being blind to God's purposes, and the ways in which political calculation could be seen as congruent with the divine Will was at the heart of European Protestantism and the central place it held in Cromwell's ‘heart’. Cromwell's programme of religious and moral reform at home was meant to create a commonwealth fit for God's eyes and to avert divine wrath.Footnote 30 Something was seen to be amiss in church and state, and to be rectified; lawyers and antiquarians went back to explore medieval parliamentary history to find forerunners and precedents for a vision of parliament as a great council of the realm and with ultimate authority, especially concerning where emergency powers legitimately lay. From whatever political ‘side’ preferring what they took to be either the ancient constitution or a republic, everyone knew that God permits mankind to alter the forms of rule for reasons of prudence and circumstance. Politics was up to us. Worden demonstrates that the debates concerned the site of authority (i.e. parliament), and were intended to counter the view that force or soldiers constituted legitimate authority. Parliament rules by law and not by the sword, whether the constitution be a monarchy resting on public consent, or a mixed government, similarly resting on public consent. No sword-government but law-governmentFootnote 31 with the sword backing the law for the non-compliant.
Enter Hobbes. When he developed what he thought was his original theory of political association in his Elements of law Footnote 32 and De cive,Footnote 33 he insisted that he was presenting something contrary to what he said the books penned by university dogmatics had proposed, because their views were incompatible with peace and security as the aims of government. For him, the body politic can only signify a situation in which the Wills of many concur and this only to some one and same action, effect or consequence.Footnote 34 This is not the same thing as saying that men do not continue to have conflicting ideas because they will be divided after they agree on the best way of coming together for security. For Hobbes, the natural causes of conflict, interpersonal envy and rivalry remain, so that men will not be willing to help each other or keep the peace unless they are compelled to do so by a common fear.Footnote 35 What, according to Hobbes, the old dogmatics had claimed to be a societas that was formed only for mutual aid does not, then, afford the parties of this association what they really and ultimately desire: security in their interpersonal relations. Something more needs to be done to prevent discord amongst individuals and what they take to be their private goods that override security. Politics, then, is about everyone directing their own actions to the same end, a summum bonum understood simply as the common peace, and this requires a renunciation of the exercise of private Will and desire, and judgements issuing from these. And this can only come about through the construction of a single Will concerning matters of peace and defence. To set up this single Will each must subject his own private Will to the Will of a single representative ‘other’ be it one man or an assembly. This general submission or subjection is called union. The body politic is not then simply equated to a summing of each citizen's Will in the creation of a civitas or commonwealth. Rather, the body politic is a consequence of many concurring about one and the same effect, and when unified is to be conceived as one artificial, representative persona whose Will, by agreement of several men, is taken to be the Will of them all.
I have written about how this replays only one of the two relevant corporation theories developed during the Middle Ages.Footnote 36 It is the nominalist theory that insists that collectives or corporations are not natural existents but are, rather, grammatical terms signifying something that does not itself have its own natural Will to engage in action. Instead, it is our concept, what Hobbes calls a mortal god that we set up, which draws its powers to act and to judge from the natural individuals who have transferred the exercise of their own powers to this artificial entity as a third, representative party that unites the Wills of all only in itself.
Similarly, for Ockham, public authority, the office of a sovereign ruler, is a legal concept or persona , created by a corporation of individuals who only come to be a unified collection of real persons when represented by something that is itself not real but is, rather, a persona ficta, imaginaria et repraesentata.Footnote 37 Fictive entities on their own cannot perform real acts or possess legal rights under law. It is only real, autonomous, rational individuals who are capable of renouncing or holding legal rights. Public authority must unify the wills of natural persons and have their powers or rights of exercise from the populus – a term signifying a collection of rational individual agents who unanimously constitute government.Footnote 38 Government then acts for the public utility, determining what is expedient in the circumstances. Ockham argued that a man is praised for what he wills rather than for what he understands, since man's cognitive acts are natural, but his power to perform or not, his power to act on what he knows, is what is to be judged. Ockham is, then, what I have called a rational voluntarist, in that he is not sceptical about human knowing but about our willing what we know.Footnote 39 Since no individual's Will can be represented, and since a collective Will is not a real thing, then it is not that an individual is alienating his moral autonomy and responsibility to some other individual, as neighbour. Instead, political authority is something else and once established certainly could be ‘absolutist’. Ockham means by this that there need not be any regular participation of the people once sovereign public authority or government is established, nor need there be institutions to restrain the power of sovereign government that has been constituted by a unanimous consent of all rational individuals. Once established, it will be the circumstances that will dictate whether or not sovereign government acts according to its own positive laws that preserve public safety. The Fall has ensured that men conclude that they need to live under positive law because it is evident now that we are incapable of ruling ourselves by Reason. Ockham argued in his Dialogus that men know from experience that they are now inclined to conflict and to seeking their own interests, and precisely because they come to know this, not least from observing their contrary Wills, it is they who conceive the sovereign as an exit from such conditions.Footnote 40
In Hobbes's version of this, we ask: what is left to the individual who thus transfers his power of judging others to an entity that now commands and requires obedience? His answer: a private conscience that only can be exercised in the public domain when the artificial persona has not spoken, made law or commanded, a position that is surely the same for the fourteenth-century voluntarist, neo-Augustinian, nominalist Ockham.
Conclusion
International relations has taken as its paradigm what is called ‘realism’. Hence, I was particularly interested to find political realism to be engaging political theorists more generally in a recent special issue of the European Journal of Political Theory. Footnote 41 Some notable observations are made in the Introduction by Richard North about the several contributions published therein. The first is that liberal political philosophy is the philosophy of our times, although just whose liberalism is being endorsed – Rawls's, Dworkin's, Habermas's, Kant's – leads to confusions. Although liberalism has received criticism from communitarians, what is presented in this issue is a criticism of liberalism from a variety of political realisms. One of the major realist critiques (Glen Newey) proposes that justice is not the only consideration relevant to politics and, indeed, is not the first virtue of social institutions. Further, that there is no compelling reason to believe that morality trumps other kinds of reason of action. Instead, if we recognise that political authority, on the one hand, and morality, on the other, are disparate sources of normativity, rather than taking morality as fixed and politics as negotiable, then we can, it is asserted, have a more realistic practical political theory. Take as a ‘fact’ some ‘cooperative’ existence but put morality's standpoint and content as variable. Then we are told that political realism can appreciate the historical contexts in which political decision-making and action take place without reducing the study of politics to history (Philp). Politics, then, for realists is not overly concerned with justice, or morality, or indeed history. On this view, politics is largely about a focus on the conditions of peace and security, with a maintenance of social order that is somehow sufficient to enable the living of a minimally worthwhile life (Horton). So the thrust of much realism comes down to a desire, the need, to recognise the priority of politics over ethics, with politics defined as focusing exclusively on the conditions of peace and security.
North rightly asks: is this realism only another form of liberalism, of a Hobbesian or Lockeian variety? It focuses on preventing public harms rather than on realising moral goods. Politics on this view is nothing other than the securing of peace, security, stability and is not some Kantian (or other) moralised notion of autonomy.
How ‘new’ is this so-called modern and new, realistic, thinking? That it can be asserted that early modern thinkers, who can be called realists, broke with the ancients – as though the ancients spoke with one voice, which of course they did not – indicates an unfamiliarity even with the Master of the Modern: Hobbes. I have tried to indicate that Hobbes reflected on and used both Greek and Roman sources and especially the positions of medieval neo-Augustinian nominalists. And he argued against ‘the other side’, the Aristotelian ‘intellectualists’. I have tried to indicate that there was already at the heart of medieval scholasticism of the neo-Augustinian kind a tendency to present a voluntarist, conflictual model of interpersonal relations; there is no doubt that other scholastics followed the Aristotelian intellectualist tradition, well into the nineteenth century and beyond. But it was because of the medieval neo-Augustinian answer to the question regarding what we may presume ourselves to be, that politics as a solution to our fallen status and problem came to be viewed as primarily about peace and security. Politics was not, for them, about any stable, moralised notion of actualised, individual autonomy. I suggest that modern political realism is a secularised version of one long-enduring interpretation of the consequences of Original Sin. Modern political realists, unbeknownst to them, are the heirs to medieval scholastic neo-Augustinianisms. They are negotiating the medieval in the modern.
