Wolfgang Mommsen aptly notes that “Europeans who settled or traded in distant lands overseas took their own laws with them, rather then let themselves be subjected to alien laws and legal institutions . . . [They] expected their legal disputes to be conducted according to the laws valid in their countries of origin.”Footnote 1 This certainly reflects the worldview of European merchants, entrepreneurs, and investors operating overseas, who expected their governments to create conditions that from their point of view would support doing business in the colonial or semicolonial world. A case in point was the struggle to establish a judicial system attuned to the aspirations of European capitalists who came to the major urban centers of the Middle East during the long 19th century. From the perspective of European merchants and entrepreneurs, shariʿa or ʿurfī laws in the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran were far from satisfactory in a number of vital areas, including the protection of property, honoring written or oral contracts, the settlement of debts, and dealing with bankruptcies. They repeatedly complained to the diplomatic representatives of their countries, or pleaded their case before senior government officials and politicians in their home countries, regarding the intolerable ease, from their standpoint, with which both Muslim and non-Muslim merchants who were subjects of the host countries evaded their commercial and/or financial commitments. They contended that local judicial systems did not grant them, or were perhaps incapable of granting them, the necessary legal protection and that they thus incurred heavy financial losses.
From the standpoint of European business people, the solution was to be found in the establishment of special European judicial frameworks for “mixed cases” in which both foreign residents and local subjects were involved. The aim was not the imposition of European codes of law on the entire population but rather the creation of “legal islands” that would satisfy their needs and in which their claims against local subjects would be heard. In the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and a number of countries outside the Middle East (Morocco, French Indochina, and Siam) this notion of judicial “islands” took shape during the 19th and early 20th centuries in the form of “mixed courts,” where local and foreign (mainly European) judges sat side by side, in varying proportions, and administered justice in mixed cases in accordance with foreign (European) legal codices.
On the face of it, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt should have rejected the establishment of mixed courts, since the very principle of it constituted a violation of an important element of judicial sovereignty.Footnote 2 Yet, over the course of the 19th century the rulers of both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt either supported or initiated the establishment of these judicial islands, as the extant situation prior to the establishment of the mixed courts was, from their point of view, worse. In actuality, mixed courts were meant to check the violation by foreign consuls of Ottoman or Egyptian judicial sovereignty.
Such courts, however, were never established in Qajar Iran even though European, especially British, merchants and entrepreneurs urged their governments to form legal islands to meet their expectations and needs. Like the rulers of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, the Qajars were unable to ignore these pressures, but they adopted a different approach, unique to Iran. They established an institution––that of the kārguzār (agent; pl. kārguzārān) and his majlis (court)—that served as a sort of substitute for mixed courts. To understand the uniqueness of the Qajar solution to the mixed-cases dilemma, I shall first briefly examine the evolution of the mixed courts in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, followed by a discussion of the very different institution of the kārguzār and his court in Iran.
MIXED COURTS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND EGYPT
The Ottoman Empire entered the 19th century in a state similar to that of Qajar Iran regarding mixed cases. Such cases were brought to the shariʿa courts, where qadis tried the cases in accordance with Muslim law.Footnote 3 However, treaties signed by the Ottoman sultans with foreign rulers as far back as the 16th century stipulated that cases of foreign nationals heard in the maḥkama (shariʿa court) required the presence of the respective consul or the consulate's dragoman.Footnote 4 Over hundreds of years, from the 16th to the 19th centuries, the Ottoman authorities scrupulously upheld two basic principles: (1) the preeminence of the local subject's legal rights over those of the foreign national in instances of mixed cases, in that the hearing would be in a local court before a local judge and that judgment would be in accordance with Muslim law; and (2) that the case of a foreign national would be heard under fair conditions, namely, that an authorized person would be present in the courtroom who understood the language in which the hearing was held, was familiar with the legal procedures, and was capable of providing legal assistance to the foreign national, whether plaintiff or defendant.
During the 19th century, the first principle was eroded in both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. Underlying this development was the dramatic rise in the number of foreigners residing in the major port cities, the increased economic activity of European firms there, and the intensive involvement of the European powers in the political and economic affairs of Istanbul and Cairo. To this should be added two further developments: the growing unease of foreign subjects with maḥkama proceedings due to the a priori inferior legal status of a non-Muslim's testimonyFootnote 5 and the beginnings of a practice, mainly by British consuls, of hearing mixed cases in consular courts in which they served as judges.Footnote 6 This last development was evident in commercial and criminal cases alike and was an obvious violation of the Capitulation treaties. Not surprisingly, it was a contentious issue within the British diplomatic network and created tension between the British and the Ottoman authorities.Footnote 7
Faced with this state of affairs, the Ottoman government was prepared to adopt the mixed-court model as the lesser of two evils. Unlike the consular court, the mixed court was an Ottoman court under the state's control and supervision, and a majority of its judges were Ottoman subjects. The first mixed tribunal was established in Istanbul in 1841, becoming a formal court in 1848.Footnote 8 By 1860, permanent mixed courts had also been established in Izmir, Beirut, and Alexandria. In that year the Ottomans reformed the institution, mandating that five judges sit in each of the courts—three (including the president of the court) who are Ottoman subjects and two who are foreign nationals.Footnote 9 In the following two decades, the central government initiated a number of changes in the procedures of the mixed courts with the aim of curtailing the dragomans’ growing influence in the courtroom.Footnote 10 Yet despite the Ottoman government's abiding efforts to restrict the legal privileges of subjects of the Capitulatory states, its success in the context of mixed cases appears to have been limited,Footnote 11 and up to the abrogation of the Capitulation agreements in 1914 by the Young Turk government, foreign firms operating in the empire made effective use of the mixed courts.
In Egypt, developments were more far reaching. By the 1850s and 1860s the consuls of the Capitulatory states were in fact in control of mixed cases. Egyptian subjects sued by foreign nationals found themselves in British, French, Italian, Greek, or other consular courts. No less than fifteen countries maintained consular courts, which tried Egyptian subjects in accordance with various legal codes.Footnote 12 Addressing this legal chaos, the Egyptian authorities sought to curb the grave deterioration in the country's judicial sovereignty.Footnote 13 Nubar Pasha, one of Egypt's most prominent statesmen in the 1860s and 1870s, initiated the establishment of a new legal structure with the encouragement of Khedive Ismaʿil. In 1876, after eight years of complex preparation, a “progressive” version of mixed civil and commercial courts was inaugurated in Cairo and Alexandria.Footnote 14 The judges in these courts, who relied mainly on French legal codes, were experienced senior jurists. In both the first and the appellate instances, foreign judges were in the majority (four of seven in the first instance and seven of eleven in the appellate). The appointment of judges was made in consultation with the Capitulatory governments.Footnote 15 Some of the foreign judges had previously served their own governments as senior jurists and apparently viewed themselves as representatives of their home governments rather than as an integral part of the Egyptian judiciary.Footnote 16
Mixed courts operated in Egypt for over seventy years and were dissolved only in 1949. Although an analysis of the costs and benefits of these institutions to the Egyptian economy and to Egyptian local entrepreneurs has still to be made, there is little question that mixed courts made an important contribution to foreign economic penetration and economic control of Egypt during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.Footnote 17
THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL ROLES OF THE KĀRGUZĀR
The foundations of foreigners’ privileges in 19th-century Iran were laid down in the Treaty of Turkmanchai signed between Russia and Iran in February 1828.Footnote 18 Iran, which had been defeated on the battlefield, was compelled to accept the terms of the treaty imposed by Russia. These terms were similar in many respects to the Capitulation agreements that Russia had signed with the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century. Article 7 of the commercial treaty stipulates that “suits or differences” between Russian and Iranian subjects would be brought before the hakim, or governor, for his decision,Footnote 19 signifying that the hearing in mixed cases would be before an ʿurfī, not a shariʿa, court. This article also stipulates that the hearing must be held in the presence of the dragoman of the embassy or consulate of the country of the foreign national.Footnote 20 With the passage of time, additional countries, first and foremost Britain,Footnote 21 signed trade agreements with Iran that granted their subjects rights identical to those set out in the Treaty of Turkmanchai. It is not clear whether the establishment of the function of the kārguzār by the Qajar authorities was an outcome of Article 7.Footnote 22 In any case, this function is not mentioned in either the Russian or the British commercial treaties with Iran.
Important aspects of the history of the kārguzār have already been discussed in a comprehensive study by Vanessa Martin and Morteza NouraeiFootnote 23 and in Willem Floor's articles.Footnote 24 An aspect that has not been explored to date, however, is the demand of British consuls and merchants to introduce mixed courts into Iran. To clarify this issue, an outline of the development and main characteristics of the office of the kārguzār and his court must first be presented.
The kārguzār was an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (dīwān-i ummūr-i khārija) answerable directly to the ministry in Tehran. He may have been an upgraded bureaucratic functionary (the dabīr-i mahāmm-i khārija), as he had a number of responsibilities similar to existing functions before the treaty of 1828.Footnote 25 Both Iranian and British documents reveal evidence of the activity of kārguzārān in several northern and southern provinces in the 1830s and 1840s.Footnote 26 During the 1880s and 1890s, with the growing number of foreigners and their economic activities in Iran, and the consequent increase in the number of foreign consulates, additional kārguzār offices were opened in many urban centers and in the Persian Gulf ports. By the beginning of the 20th century there were thirty-six kārguzār offices throughout the country, most of which had several employees to assist the kārguzār in discharging his duties.Footnote 27
The kārguzār had three main roles. First, he dealt with applications from foreigners residing in the city or province in which he sat, which usually reached him through the various consuls, in all matters pertaining to the settlement of claims or commercial and other disputes between foreigners and locals. Foreign consuls also expected the kārguzār to assist them whenever they faced difficulties in their relations with local inhabitants.Footnote 28 Second, he served as an important conduit for conveying the authorities’ instructions to foreign nationals and reporting to superiors in the foreign ministry in Tehran on events involving foreigners. Third, he performed additional tasks assigned by the authorities that were directly or indirectly connected with the activities of foreigners or of individuals or groups connected with the Capitulatory states. In sum, the network of kārguzār offices provided the central government in general and the foreign ministry in particular with an important means of monitoring and controlling developments in the foreign communities in the provinces.
In order to settle business disputes between foreign firms or individuals and local subjects, the kārguzār was given the authority to summon foreigners and locals to his office (kārguzārī) to examine their complaints or claims, interrogate the parties to a dispute, and adjudicate mixed cases in his majlis. His judicial authority also included the imposition of small fines and the imprisonment of local subjects for short periods. The kārguzār's judgment was based broadly on shariʿa law, although he was not obliged to have an Islamic legal education and was not bound to judge in accordance with this law. An additional source for his judgments was local custom (ʿurf).Footnote 29 Yet another important difference between the shariʿa maḥkama and the kārguzār’s majlis was the greater reliance on written documents in the majlis deliberations.Footnote 30 The judicial position of the kārguzār should be viewed as part of the ʿurfī legal system in which provincial governors played a central role as judges.
Evidence of the kārguzār's activities and methods of operation clearly show that in dealing with claims and disputes between foreigners and locals, he did his best to find an agreed solution between the two parties. More than a judicial authority, he was an arbitrator and mediator who strove to bring the litigants to a compromise.Footnote 31 In many cases, the arbitration process was protracted and exhausting, and the compromise was unsatisfactory to the plaintiff (generally, foreign merchant houses) but was accepted purely out of resignation: the plaintiff realized that nothing better could be achieved than the proposal worked out by the kārguzār.Footnote 32
The central government accorded a relatively high status to the office of kārguzār. In more than one case, members of Qajar elite families were chosen for the position, including tujjār (big merchants) and members of their families,Footnote 33 and it appears that relative to the pay scale of the Qajar bureaucracy the kārguzār enjoyed a high salary.Footnote 34 This status is not surprising: the institution of the kārguzār served the Qajars well, providing a reasonable framework, from their point of view, to nationals of the Capitulatory states in matters pertaining to mixed cases. Because foreign consuls in Iran avoided violating Capitulation agreements insofar as mixed cases were concerned, and because the kārguzār was accessible—a fact that the foreign consuls did not deny—the central government was not motivated to establish mixed courts. Thus, the institution of the kārguzār was a convenient means of safeguarding the judicial sovereignty of the state.
Moreover, the way in which the kārguzār carried out his functions accorded with Nasir al-Din Shah's policy, until the late 1880s, regarding European economic penetration into Iran. Until October 1888, the shah did not support the opening of the Iranian economy to European investors and entrepreneurs. It seems that in 1885 he even considered prohibiting the importation of foreign goods into Iran.Footnote 35 The main reason for this attitude was strategic. Opening the Iranian economy to foreigners, he believed, would prepare the ground for the total domination of the country by the great powers.Footnote 36 Another reason was his reluctance to adopt European social and economic innovations because they did not suit Iranian society.Footnote 37 Hundreds of files in the British, Russian, French, Austrian, Italian, and U.S. state archives tell the story in various forms of the failure of European entrepreneurs, with or without the support of their respective governments, to receive the shah's permission to initiate new enterprises in Iran. There were very few exceptions to this pattern: between 1848 and 1888 only a negligible number of economic concessions were granted by Nasir al-Din.Footnote 38 There seems to have been one major exception to this generalization, the abortive Reuter concession (granted in July 1872, canceled in November 1873). Regrettably, little is known about the considerations that led the shah to grant this unprecedented concession.
Nasir al-Din was not opposed to economic change, but in view of the country's military weakness he wanted economic investments to be made at the initiative of local groups, first and foremost the Iranian big merchants.Footnote 39 In comparison to Muhammad ʿAli's successors in Egypt, and the bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century, Nasir al-Din was considerably more fearful of the outcome—namely, the loss of political sovereignty—of increased European economic activity in Iran, especially by subjects of Russia and Britain. The institution of the kārguzār, with its approach to handling business disputes and claims of damages by foreign merchants and investors through a long and exhausting process of arbitration, served Nasir al-Din's policy well until the late 1880s. During the last years of his rule (1888–96) a dramatic change in his attitude toward foreign economic penetration took place,Footnote 40 but by that time the pattern of kārguzār conduct was firmly established.
Evidence of bitter complaints, especially by British merchant houses, regarding the difficulties of collecting debts from local merchants, and protests about the unsatisfactory functioning of the kārguzār's court, which from the foreigners’ standpoint was inefficient and one-sided, can be found in numerous commercial reports written mostly by British consulsFootnote 41 and in detailed transcripts of sessions of the kārguzār's majlis.Footnote 42 H. G. Chick, who served in various consular positions first in Bushihr and then in Shiraz from 1906 to 1929, wrote in May 1927:
Over twenty years’ practice in Karguzarate Courts has shown me that it is enough for any Persian trader to decline to pay a debt, or for goods ordered; he may not have a title of right, and be merely out to defraud, yet the other Persian merchants nominated by him and the complainant to arrange a settlement, or act as “assessors” [at the kārguzār's court], will, in 99 cases out of the 100, suggest payment of half the indebtedness, more or less, as a compromise.Footnote 43
No wonder, then, that British consuls in Tabriz, Bushihr, and other towns or ports reported losses of many thousands of pounds sterling incurred by British and other European firms due to unsettled debts of Iranian merchants.Footnote 44 Similarly, a Russian official—the head of the Mashhad branch of the Discount and Loan Bank—complained in 1911 or 1912 that Persian merchants acting as members of the kārguzār's court always “defended” their co-religionists in disputes with Russian merchants and that the latter paid dearly for this situation.Footnote 45
While the central government made various attempts at administrative reform,Footnote 46 the institution of the kārguzār remained unchanged, as reform was not in the government's interest. Thus, although the idea behind the establishment of the kārguzār's office was, inter alia, to settle disputes between foreigners and Iranians, de facto it became an effective hindrance to European economic activity in Iran, a development that accorded with the central government's policy.
THE QUEST FOR MIXED COURTS IN IRAN
The complaints of British representatives in Iran not only focused on the performance of the kārguzār and his majlis but also included criticism of the institution itself and a demand to establish a different legal institution—mixed courts. Given developments in the Ottoman Empire, namely, the opening of mixed courts in Istanbul and other cities, British representatives in Iran may have demanded the establishment of mixed courts as early as the 1850s, and it seems that a mixed court heard cases in Tabriz in the mid-1850s.Footnote 47 It was, however, a short-lived experiment. The court soon ceased its activity, apparently as a result of grave differences between its Muslim and non-Muslim members regarding the admissibility of testimony by dhimmī witnesses.Footnote 48 In fact, the experiment failed because there was no a priori understanding between the local (Muslim) and foreign (non-Muslim) judges regarding the legal procedure to be adopted by the court.
Nevertheless, British representatives in Iran continued to advocate the establishment of mixed-judicial frameworks. Since the economic interests and activities of British merchants and investors were concentrated in the southern and central provinces during the late Qajar period,Footnote 49 it was mainly the consuls serving in these regions who called for change. Noteworthy among the many cases attesting to dissatisfaction with the existing situation, and advocating the formation of mixed courts, is an 1872 proposal by the British political resident in Bushihr, Lewis Pelly, who “strongly urged the establishment of a mixed tribunal for the adjudication of cases in which British subjects are plaintiffs and Persians are defendants.”Footnote 50 It seems that during the 1870s the idea of mixed courts was prevalent at the Bushihr residency,Footnote 51 and in the late 1870s, Edward Charles Ross, the British consul general in Bushihr, reiterated Pelly's proposal:
At the larger ports of the Persian Gulf the administrative system [i.e., the kārguzār's court] does not provide adequately for efficient, speedy, and authoritative hearing and decision of suits brought by British or other foreign subjects. Recourse is invariably had to a council of merchants [majlis-i tujjār],Footnote 52 but this arrangement is on no formal basis, and responsibility is not sufficiently determined. The establishment of mixed commercial courts has been suggested, and would probably best meet [the] requirement.Footnote 53
The question of mixed courts in Iran was considered by both the Foreign Office and the India Office during the 1870s. It was discussed in connection with the judicial authority (The Foreign Jurisdiction Act) of British consuls in Iran, particularly in the Persian Gulf region.Footnote 54 It was clear, however, that a move to initiate the establishment of mixed courts would require a new commercial treaty between Britain and Iran.Footnote 55 Lord Salisbury, the secretary of state for India (1874–78), whose opinions regarding Britain's policy in Iran had great influence in the government, discouraged such an initiative in 1877. A dispatch from the India Office explains his views on that matter:
. . . without denying that advantage might be expected to result from the establishment in Persia as in Turkey of consular and mixed tribunals to which every class of case might be referred . . .[Salisbury] is not satisfied that the necessity for such tribunals is so urgent as to justify the commencement of a negotiation with the Persian Government which would certainly be lengthy, could not fail to raise difficult and delicate questions affecting not only our relations but other questions with Persia which might be made a pretext for troublesome counter-claims and pretensions on her part and might after all prove abortive.Footnote 56
Salisbury had substantial knowledge about Iran in 1877, and it is reasonable to assume that he knew about the crisis that the Reuter concession had caused in Tehran and about the great influence that several leading ʿulamaʾ, particularly Mulla ʿAli Kani, had on the people in the capital. Moreover, it seems that by 1877 Salisbury intended to include Iran in his plans for the defense of India, and he did not wish to create new areas of tension. Salisbury could assume that Nasir al-Din, as well as the leading ʿulamaʾ, would vehemently oppose the introduction of mixed courts in Iran, since neither party would see any reason why Iran should surrender a significant component of its sovereignty. He also took into account the many other issues under negotiation between London and Tehran, including the opening of the Karun River to international (i.e., British) navigation.Footnote 57 These negotiations were strained in the mid-1870s, as Nasir al-Din resented Britain's pressure to strengthen its presence and influence in southern Iran. In Salisbury's view, imperial strategic considerations outweighed arguments in favor of British commercial and economic interests in Iran. Ultimately, the Foreign Office adopted his approach regarding the question of mixed courts,Footnote 58 and despite continued reports from representatives in Iran emphasizing the damage sustained by British firms at the hands of the existing judicial institutions, the upper echelons of the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the government of India never proposed reconsidering the issue.
In the late 1870s, British diplomats in Iran, unaware of the decision made at Whitehall, continued in vain to stress the need for a suitable framework for hearings involving British and Persian subjects.Footnote 59 The reform of the Iranian customs administration in the late 1890s and the transfer of the collection of customs dues in Persian Gulf ports to Belgian officials in 1900 raised the expectations of British representatives in Iran for a fundamental change in the adjudication of mixed cases. Charles A. Kemball, consul general in Bushihr, wrote in his commercial report for 1900:
Now that the customs administration has been organized on a proper basis . . . the Persian Government would be well advised if it went a step further, and established a regular [mixed] court for the administration of justice. The absence of such a court is keenly felt by the British mercantile community when they have any claims to recover from Persian subjects. If prompt justice could be obtained, one of the difficulties which British merchants encounter in their dealings with Persians would be overcome . . . Footnote 60
Indeed, a Belgian official (the legal advisor of the new customs administration) prepared a scheme in 1904 “. . . for a regular gradation of original and Appellate Tribunals, which were to decide mixed suits by the application of a fairly simple commercial code, based on that now existing in Turkey.”Footnote 61 Obviously, the shah did not approve the proposed reform nor did he have to invest great efforts in rejecting it. According to the British ambassador in Tehran, two powerful players, the ʿulamaʾ and the Russians, opposed the legal advisor's proposal. The ʿulamaʾ objected to any change that would weaken the standing of the shariʿa courts, and the Russians negated any amendments in the Treaty of Turkmanchai.Footnote 62 Nevertheless, this abortive attempt to reform the adjudication of mixed cases did not prevent British consuls from continuing to advocate the establishment of mixed courts.Footnote 63 The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 did not alter the judicial position of foreigners in Iran, and during the years preceding World War I the British business and diplomatic communities in Iran accepted the fact that a new judicial institution more amenable to them would not be established. They thus concentrated their efforts on persuading the Iranian authorities to implement a number of reforms in the functioning of the kārguzār.Footnote 64 Reform was indeed initiated but in a direction different from that expected by British diplomats and merchants. The Iranian Majlis decided in 1910 to transfer some of the kārguzār's judicial roles to the new ʿadliya courts under the Ministry of Justice.Footnote 65 This measure was part of the central government's efforts to gain greater control of the entire judicial system, and it obviously weakened the position of the kārguzār.Footnote 66 Various attempts by Tehran to abolish the institution of the kārguzār in the closing years of the Qajar era failed, and only in 1927 did the Pahlavi authorities announce that all the kārguzār's judicial functions would be transferred to the ʿadliya courts. Several British consuls observed that foreign merchants would not lose much by this move.Footnote 67 The institution of the kārguzār was in fact annulled in 1928, the year the Capitulation treaties were finally abrogated.Footnote 68
THE KĀRGUZĀR AND RUSSIAN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
The experience of Russian merchants, bankers, and diplomats with kārguzār offices was apparently less frustrating and disappointing than that of their British counterparts. The commercial reports written by Russian consuls and other consular officials in Iran scarcely mention matters related to kārguzārān. The correspondence of both Russian and British consuls reveals that Russian merchants did not intensively require the services of the kārguzārān, because the management of their business with Iranian merchants was quite different from that of their British colleagues: Russian merchants were not inclined to grant long- or medium-term credit to their customers and generally required payment in cash on delivery. In 1896, Ney Elias, the British consul in Mashhad, who closely followed the operation of Russian trading houses in Khurasan, wrote: “while the system of long credit is the invariable custom in the Meshhed bazaars among Persians in dealings with each other . . . the Russians will have nothing to do with it and sell for ready money only, except in rare cases, when they give credit for two to five months.”Footnote 69
Another way Russian merchants reduced their risk in providing credit was to make barter deals with the Iranian merchants. This was the advice of the head of the Russian consulate in Bushihr, G. Ovseenko, in a 1903 report on the import of sugar.Footnote 70 Employing these methods probably limited the number of Iranian merchants who defaulted on their financial commitments to Russian merchants.
Moreover, it seems that Russian bureaucrats succeeded in enlisting the goodwill of several kārguzārān to promote Russian financial and commercial interests in Iran. This point is illustrated by the following two cases detailed in the files of the Russian Discount and Loan Bank of Persia (Uchetno-ssudnyi bank Persii).Footnote 71 The first concerns a loan of 100,000 rubles (about 55,000 tūmāns or 10,000 pounds sterling [796,000 pounds sterling in 2009 retail prices]) given in 1903 to Hajji ʿAbd al-Husayn Tabrizi Zawwar, a prominent tājir in Mashhad,Footnote 72 by the bank's branch in that city. Zawwar did not repay the loan by the agreed date, and by 1907 the sum of the principal and interest he owed the bank had risen to 56,792 tūmāns and 17,300 rubles (9,515 tūmāns). The bank, seeking to realize the sureties he had deposited with it––primarily his mansion—involved the kārguzār of Mashhad in this complex case. Zawwar, who had been sentenced to imprisonment, presumably by the kārguzār, agreed to transfer the ownership of his mansion to the bank. The bank, however, was concerned that by the time the transfer went through, Zawwar would succeed in mortgaging the property to a third party. At this point, the kārguzār came into the picture. He suggested that Zawwar undertake not to make any changes in the status of the property without the approval of the bank and the kārguzār himself. Both parties consented to the proposal, whose significance was that the kārguzār had assured the Russian bank that its right to the ownership of the property would be honored and that he would not enable Zawwar to violate his commitments.Footnote 73
The second case concerned Hajji Muhammad Riza Raʾis al-Tujjar, one of the wealthiest merchants in Mashhad and a large landed proprietor.Footnote 74 In 1905 the Mashhad branch of the Russian Discount and Loan Bank of Persia granted him a loan of 179,080 tūmāns (about 32,560 pounds sterling [about 2,590,000 pounds sterling in 2009 retail prices]). As in the previous case, Raʾis al-Tujjar failed to repay the loan, and in January 1913, when the debt (principal and interest) reached 260,113 tūmāns (about 47,293 pounds sterling), the bank pressed for an arrangement outside the kārguzār's court for repayment of the loan. Raʾis al-Tujjar was prepared for the bank to realize part of the assets he had given as surety when he took the loan, but, as in the case of Zawwar some years earlier, the bank feared that the borrower would dupe it and that no sooner would the bank accept the proposed arrangement of the debt then the assets transferred to it would be remortgaged by Raʾis al-Tujjar for a loan from another source. In this case, too, the kārguzār of Mashhad proposed that the lender undertake not to make any changes in the status of the assets without the kārguzār's and the bank's approval. The bank viewed this proposal as an acceptable solution and agreed to the repayment arrangement undertaken by Raʾis al-Tujjar.Footnote 75 So pleased was the manager of the Mashhad branch of the bank with the assistance of the kārguzār that in June 1914 he wrote the bank's board in St. Petersburg requesting it to approve a special personal grant of 750 tūmāns to the kārguzār for his vital assistance in reaching the repayment arrangement for Raʾis al-Tujjar; the request noted that the Russian consulate would require the kārguzār's good offices in the future. The board, with the approval of the Russian minister of finance (the bank was state owned), made the grant.Footnote 76
In 1915 the same kārguzār was asked by the Russian consul in Mashhad and the manager of the branch there to be involved in new arrangements for the repayment of Raʾis al-Tujjar's debts to the bank.Footnote 77 Close relations between kārguzārān and Russian consuls developed in other towns in the northern provinces as well. When the kārguzār of Astrabad was arrested by the nationalists in 1909, the Russian consul in the city made efforts to obtain his release.Footnote 78 In sum, it seems that during the first two decades of the 20th century Russian diplomats and officials found ways to enlist the support and cooperation of kārguzārān serving in the northern provinces. This, however, should not be taken as a rule, since they also complained about instances of improper and unjust treatment of Russian merchants in the kārguzār's court.Footnote 79
WHY WERE MIXED COURTS NOT ESTABLISHED IN IRAN?
Three factors explain why Iran's history differed from that of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt as far as the establishment of mixed courts was concerned. The first is connected with the scope of the economic activity of nationals of the Capitulatory states in these three diverse regions during the long 19th century. Whereas the number of foreigners in Iran in the years that preceded World War I was estimated at about 1,200 souls,Footnote 80 in Istanbul alone their number was estimated at 130,000Footnote 81 and in Egypt approximately 221,000.Footnote 82 Similarly, the number of European trading houses active in Iran at the beginning of the 20th century did not exceed a few dozen,Footnote 83 while there were several hundred in both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt.Footnote 84 The scope of foreign investment capital in Iran totaled a few million pounds,Footnote 85 while in both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt it amounted to hundreds of millions.Footnote 86 The influence of foreign entrepreneurs on the economic development of Iran during the long 19th century was quite limited, whereas they had great influence in the Ottoman Empire and immense influence in Egypt, particularly during the last decades of the period under discussion.
The causes of these significant differences between Iran and the Ottoman Empire and Egypt are to be found in the highly varied entrepreneurial environment in the three economies and the dissimilar business potential for European capital in each of them. Egypt, with its vast growth in the cultivation and export of cotton among other economic processes in the second half of the 19th century, was extremely attractive for European—especially British and French—investors. Similarly, albeit to a lesser degree, regions adjacent to the Mediterranean and other areas within the Ottoman Empire attracted European investors and trading houses because of the high returns on investment yielded by commercial agriculture, banking, and transport. Iran's business potential, in foreign eyes, was also considerable, but for reasons to be discussed, foreign investments did not match those of the Ottoman Empire or Egypt.
The commercial activity of nationals of the Capitulatory states was accompanied by intensive involvement of those states in creating favorable conditions for their enterprises. The instructions of foreign ministries in London, Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Rome to their representatives in the region in the late 19th and early 20th centuries operated on a similar principle: firms and individuals should be backed and assisted in their business ventures. Ambassadors and consuls invested a considerable amount of time in doing just that. A vicious cycle developed, in which increasing business activity by the subjects of the European states led to greater involvement by European governments in protecting the interests of these merchants and investors, which encouraged additional entrepreneurs and investors to embark on economic activity there. Embassy and consulate archives, especially those of Britain, France, and Russia, contain a large number of documents relating to requests by merchant houses and investment firms to their countries’ representatives for assistance and support in competition with other European firms and in their negotiations with the local authorities. The latter type of requests concern the cancellation of levies, compensation for stolen property, collecting debts from customers, winning concessions for exploiting natural resources, cultivating agricultural products, manufacturing industrial goods, and providing services (mainly transportation and banking). Ambassadors and consuls were barely able to cope with mounting pressure by the foreign business communities active in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Iran, but their governments instructed them to do their utmost to assist their fellow countrymen. This situation prompted the consuls and dragomans in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt to exceed the authority granted them by the Capitulation agreements. In Iran, too, the diplomatic corps of the European powers were instructed to assist and protect entrepreneurs and investors from their countries, but the scope of these commercial activities was considerably smaller. Hence, the judicial deviations witnessed in the empire and Egypt were unknown in Iran, and the constraints that led the rulers in Istanbul and Cairo to establish mixed courts were nonexistent in Tehran.
The second factor accounting for the absence of mixed courts in Iran relates to the stance of the rulers in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Iran regarding the economic and commercial activity of foreign nationals and particularly the application of extraterritorial legal rights. The Egyptian khedive Ismaʿil Pasha viewed the economic activity of European firms in Egypt favorably, and investments by British, French, Belgian, Italian, and other European nationals were welcomed. In his view, these investments advanced Egypt and its elite economically.Footnote 87 Hence, he acceded to the establishment of a judicial framework that would create better conditions for the flow of foreign investment into the country. The relinquishing of an important element of the country's judicial sovereignty was perceived as an unavoidable price to pay for Egypt's economic progress. There were probably also more immediate reasons to acquiesce, resulting from specific developments in Egypt in the 1860s and 1870s, such as Ismaʿil's wish to prevent legal claims against him in the consular courts or Nubar Pasha's aspiration to curb the khedive's private business transactions.
During the Tanzimat period, the position of the upper echelon of the Ottoman bureaucracy toward European economic penetration was more moderate and nuanced than that of the Egyptian khedives, but on the whole the Ottoman leaders were in favor of this development.Footnote 88 Moreover, the establishment of mixed courts was probably considered by Istanbul to be one of the political and economic prices the empire had to pay for British and French diplomatic support.
The attitude of the Qajar rulers, especially Nasir al-Din Shah, to the economic activity of European merchants and investors differed significantly from that of their counterparts in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. While sometimes inconsistent in this policy, the attitude of the Qajars toward foreign economic penetration was characterized by suspicion and grave concern lest this activity lead to increased political involvement of the European powers and serious damage to Iranian sovereignty far beyond that which the country had already endured.Footnote 89 Not only were they averse to encouraging foreign economic activity, but also they tried to curb it and slow its pace. Hence, mixed courts were not an institution the Qajars were ready to consider.
The third factor is connected to the stance of the religious leadership in Iran regarding foreign economic penetration. In this, too, Qajar Iran differed from the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. To a far greater degree than the senior ʿulamaʾ in the other two countries, the ʿulamaʾ in Iran were vehemently opposed to European economic penetration, maintaining that it posed a serious threat to the Islamic character of Iranian society. More than once they mounted campaigns, or supported struggles by the tujjār, ṣarrāfān, and bāzāriyān, against concessions granted by the government to foreign entrepreneurs (well-known cases are the Reuter concession, the tobacco concession, and the Imperial Bank concession to issue banknotes)Footnote 90 and against the import of European manufactured products, especially textiles.Footnote 91 Apart from their general opposition to foreign involvement in Iranian life, the ʿulamaʾ opposed the formation of any new judicial framework that would weaken their dominant status in the Iranian legal system. A relevant example is Nasir al-Din's attempt in 1884 to grant judicial powers in the sphere of commerce to the tujjār councils of representatives (majālis-i wukalā-yi tujjār), which prompted fierce opposition by the leading mujtahid of Tabriz and his ṭullāb, resulting in the dissolution of the councils.Footnote 92 It is conceivable that one of the reasons British representatives in Iran did not doggedly press for the establishment of mixed courts was that they had foreseen the fierce and hostile response of the ʿulamaʾ and their followers.
CONCLUSION
Frustration and disappointment with the functioning of the kārguzār were shared by most British firms operating in Iran in the late Qajar period. Many of these firms incurred heavy losses due to unpaid debts and/or goods that were not supplied. No wonder, then, that some firms were unable to sustain their operations in Iran.Footnote 93 A considerable number of British merchants and their consuls held that this situation was the outcome of the absence of an effective judicial system for dealing with mixed cases.
The limited economic influence of European firms in Iran during the Qajar period, in contrast to the situation in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, had a number of significant causes.Footnote 94 One was the absence of a supportive judicial system in the form of mixed courts. On a more basic level, the negative position of the central government and of the ʿulamaʾ regarding foreign economic and commercial activity, which underlay the failure to establish a mixed-judicial framework, played a major role in curbing foreign economic activity in Iran. European merchants and investors found it difficult to prosper in an environment where the rules of the game differed vastly from the modus operandi to which they were accustomed.
The absence of a judicial system that would satisfy foreign merchants was a situation the central government was unwilling to change. The institution of the kārguzār, with its slow and cumbersome procedures, its interminable efforts to reach a compromise between the parties, and its tendency to favor local litigants, was illustrative of the authorities’ attitude toward dealing with mixed cases.
Ultimately, the office of the kārguzār, which was ostensibly intended to assist foreigners in their economic ventures in Iran, in fact curbed and restrained foreign merchants and entrepreneurs. The British consuls viewed the kārguzār and his majlis as another manifestation of the weakness, laxity, and corruption of the Qajar bureaucracy. It did not occur to them that the functioning of the kārguzār was largely the result of a conception, an approach, and perhaps even a policy projected by the central government to its agents in the provinces.
The performance of the kārguzār suited the interests of the Iranian tujjār,Footnote 95 who more often than not were the defendants. Morteza Nouraei and Vanessa Martin have pointed out that the tujjār exploited their power and status in Iranian society to create a supportive attitude toward their suits in the kārguzār's majlis in the face of claims by foreign firms.Footnote 96 This is an insightful observation. To this I would add that in their disputes with foreign merchants in the judicial space the tujjār received important direct or indirect support from both the central government and the ʿulamaʾ. This cooperation between the three elite groups—high-ranking government bureaucrats, senior ʿulamaʾ, and prominent tujjār—though rare, was not surprising. They shared a common purpose: to halt foreign economic penetration. It was a struggle carried on in a well-defined space, and it proved to be quite effective.
From a business standpoint, the Iranian tujjār reaped handsome benefits from the extant system of dealing with mixed cases. Weakening the foreign firms’ competitiveness obviously reinforced the tujjār's commercial standing, maneuverability, and bargaining position. Foreign merchants and investors, aware that they would not gain effective assistance from the Qajar judicial system, were perhaps open to reaching compromises favorable to the local tujjār outside the kārguzār’s court. Furthermore, in view of their disappointment with what they regarded as the ineffectiveness of the kārguzār's court, foreign firms sometimes preferred to bring their disputes with local merchants to the majālis-i al-tujjār.Footnote 97 Most significantly, in the hearings at the kārguzār's majlis, tujjār who were in dispute with a European merchant or entrepreneur did not feel that they were in an inferior position or would be discriminated against. On the contrary, they held an effective advantage over foreign merchants and investors. It would not be too far reaching to conclude that the absence of mixed courts was a contributing factor to the prospering of local Muslim entrepreneurs in late Qajar Iran.
