I. INTRODUCTION
From the 1920s to the 1980s, Dr. Eveline Mabel Burns made significant contributions to the discipline of economics. During her career, she taught at world-class universities, including the London School of Economics and Columbia University. She published in the fields of labor economics, general economic theory, economic forecasting, methodology, and social security in leading economic journals including Economica, the American Economic Review (AER), and the Journal of the American Statistical Association (JASA). In the 1930s, she helped to establish the social security system in the United States. First, serving as a consultant to the Committee on Economic Security, she helped to design the Social Security Act of 1935. She went on to explain the nuances of that legislation to a variety of audiences, from academic economists to politicians to professional social workers to the public. From 1939 to 1943, she served as the Research Director of the Economic Security section of the National Resources Planning Board. Under her direction, the board issued what became a controversial report entitled Security, Work and Relief (1943a), which recommended extending the New Deal philosophy of active government involvement in the economy after the war. Dr. Burns also served on the executive committee of the American Economic Association from 1945 to 1948; the organization elected her vice-president in 1953 and 1954. In 1964 she became an Honorary Fellow at the London School of Economics (LSE), her alma mater.
Yet, despite this multitude of accomplishments, the work of Eve Burns is barely discernible in accounts of the evolution of twentieth-century economics.Footnote 1 This essay aims to remedy that neglect by explaining her career and economics. First, it will recount her early years as an economist as she laid the foundation for her professional career. Second, it will outline the methodology Burns used in analysis. Third, it will describe how social security became her life work and provide an example of how she employed her methodology. Finally, the essay will conclude with an interpretation of the near neglect of the place of Eve Burns in twentieth-century economics.
As the story unfolds, it will become clear that this neglect stems from two sources. First, it is a story about gender. Like many women in her generation, Burns faced obstacles in building a reputation in economics. Not only did she have to deal with the complexity of balancing two careers in economics with her husband Arthur R. Burns, but also she had to contend with the practice of pushing women academics toward so-called women’s issues.Footnote 2 Second, it is a story about changing standards of practice in economics, because her work exemplified the pluralism “evident in beliefs, in ideology, in methods, and in policy advice” of American economists during the interwar period (Morgan and Rutherford Reference Morgan, Rutherford, Morgan and Rutherford1998, p. 4).Footnote 3 For Burns and many others, the irony of this era was that the amelioration of the desperate conditions of the depression required “this variety, along with a certain tolerance” by economists (Morgan and Rutherford Reference Morgan, Rutherford, Morgan and Rutherford1998, p. 4). However, after World War II in the era of neoclassical ascendancy, that same catholicity oftentimes meant restricted opportunities and diminished professional prestige for its practitioners.
II. EARLY YEARS
Burns called herself a “century baby”; she was born on March 16, 1900, in London, the daughter of Frederick Haig and Eveline Falkner Richardson.Footnote 4 Her paternal grandfather was a silversmith in Sheffield, and her father administered an office in London that sold silver flatware. She characterized her father as very conservative and as a man who aimed to control his household. He did not encourage secondary education; he did not think women should work; he did not approve of government provision of services, even public libraries; and he “disapproved of [her] marriage and [her] husband, because [her] husband came from what [her] father called ‘the working classes’” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 2).
From later decisions, it is clear that Burns did not let her father control her or her political views. She left Streatham Secondary School at the age of sixteen to study at the LSE with the goal of becoming a teacher. She was interested in teaching ancient history, but she discovered that she did not have adequate training in Latin to pass the necessary matriculation exam. The headmistress at Streatham, a graduate of LSE, advised Burns that she did not need to pass a Latin exam to study economics. This conversation was the first time that she had heard of economics, and, because of it, Burns changed her academic focus so that she could enter LSE. The switch was serendipitous, because she passionately enjoyed the subject from her first course and went on to receive a BSc degree in economics with first-class honors in 1920 and a PhD in 1926. Burns claimed that her liberal political views originated in her experiences at LSE, including having discussions about a negotiated peace and working with prominent supporters of the Labour party, such as Richard Tawney and Hugh Dalton.
Burns decided to enter the workforce at age seventeen. Because of the war, employers were seeking women to fill jobs left vacant by soldiers. In 1917, she moved to the evening school at LSE and began her long career of public service as an administrative assistant in the British Ministry of Labour. This experience influenced her to study wage regulation for her dissertation project. In 1921 Dalton, her dissertation supervisor, helped her to obtain a position as a lecturer in economic theory at LSE. She also served as an assistant editor of Economica from 1923 to 1926.
Burns married economist Arthur R. Burns in 1922, five years after she met him as a fellow student at LSE. From 1926 to 1928, she and her husband were awarded two of fifteen annual Laura Spelman Rockefeller fellowships. Ostensibly, they received the fellowships to meet with, and lecture to, economists across the United States, including prominent faculty at Harvard University, the University of Chicago, the New School for Social Research, Stanford University, the Robert Brookings Graduate School, and Columbia University. Burns believed that the program’s administrators also intended to bring together a generation of European economists separated by war and to provide them with exposure to a broad range of intellectual ideas.Footnote 5 Near the end of her life, Burns claimed that her best work achieved its quality in part because of the time this fellowship gave her “to develop, expand, broaden her horizons” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 15).
The Burnses also spent this time searching for academic appointments, a saga that she described in her correspondence with Oscar Morgenstern, another Rockefeller Fellow who became a good friend during these years. They wanted to return to Europe and LSE, but Burns reported to Morgenstern that an unfavorable review of her 1927 wage regulation essay by Allyn Young and a “more general feeling against [her] on the part of the authorities at the School” made the prospects dim (Burns to Morgenstern, March 24, 1928). Northwestern University contacted them, and Miss Kingsbury at Bryn Mawr inquired about her availability. In 1928 E.R.A. Seligman, with the help of Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, finally convinced his colleagues at Columbia University to hire a woman. He asked Burns to serve as lecturer in the Department of Economics in the Graduate School. She felt that this offer stood out as “a great triumph . . . for it is the first time they have had a woman, and everyone here regards it as a matter for great rejoicing” (Burns to Morgenstern, May 3, 1928). Her husband was offered an appointment as a lecturer at Barnard University at the same time. They accepted the positions, in part grateful to find work as an academic couple with an adequate salary to live in New York City, but also bitter at the refusal of their former colleagues at LSE to hire them. Further, they were frustrated with their appointment at the rank of lecturer. At the same time, Burns recognized the challenges for academics with their backgrounds engaged in a joint search: “It looks as tho’ [sic] if the Columbia thing falls through, we shall have to take some beastly separated jobs for a year, for the difficulty of people of our rank getting in [to Columbia] is pretty considerable. . . . when it comes to an assistant professorship there is a lot of pressure from people already on staff for promotions” (Burns to Morgenstern, March 24, 1928).
III. DISCOVERING A METHOD FOR ANALYSIS
Burns reported that her years as a Rockefeller Fellow were “an exciting time,” because “America was quite a bit ahead of England in the development of the social sciences, especially economics” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 12). As described by Morgan and Rutherford, during the years she met with American economists, US standards of practice contrasted sharply with those advocated by modern practitioners. First, economists employed a variety of methods, selecting the one best suited to answer the particular question under investigation: “an economist was an investigative scientist whether he or she used the methods of history, statistics, theoretical deduction, empiricism, mathematics or whatever. There was no hegemony of method” (Morgan and Rutherford Reference Morgan, Rutherford, Morgan and Rutherford1998, p. 6). Second, economists focused the bulk of their research on solving problems, rather than developing abstract theories and conducting statistical tests of them. Third, the scientific status of analysis was associated with the personal integrity of the researcher, rather than with a particular set of methods. Finally, economists did not aim to conduct value-free analysis, because a variety of methods led to a variety of results: “It became the professional ethos of economists of the period to teach both sides of the case.
. . . Professionalization demanded evenhandedness” (Morgan and Rutherford Reference Morgan, Rutherford, Morgan and Rutherford1998, p. 8).Footnote 6 Since two sides often emerged from analysis, the economist did serve as an advocate in public policy debates, “but only if his or her views were buttressed by objective scientific inquiry” (Morgan and Rutherford Reference Morgan, Rutherford, Morgan and Rutherford1998, p. 8).
Burns had numerous opportunities to explore the richness of interwar pluralism. In England, she had developed expertise in labor economics, with her published writings focusing on issues related to wage regulation, including the French minimum wage (1923), family endowments (1925), and a comparative study of the extent and institutional context of wage regulation in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States (1927). When she came to the US, she planned to “do more on wages and wage regulation” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 14). She later reported that Larry Frank, the “genius” behind the Rockefeller program, instructed her to use the time to expand her horizons: “Don’t narrow yourself down to whatever it is you are going to study. Use the time to get some fresh insights. To talk to—you’re an economist. Talk to people who know something about psychology or the lawers [sic], or this, or this, or this. . . . In other words, they always urged you to go around and meet new points of view” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 12). She followed Frank’s advice during her travels. She conferred with those she termed as practitioners of mathematical economics, including Henry Shultz and Jacob Viner; of quantitative economics, including Wesley C. Mitchell and Mordecai Ezekial; and of institutional economics, including Walton Wade Hamilton and John Commons.Footnote 7 Likewise, when Burns came to Columbia in the late 1920s, first as a Rockefeller Fellow and later as a department member, she found a department distinguished by this pluralism. More orthodox economists included her champion Seligman, who had studied in Germany, helped to set up the American Economic Association in the 1880s, and played a prominent role in founding the field of orthodox public finance. Newcomer James Angell was a student of Allyn Young at Harvard, and he studied and taught orthodox monetary economics. Columbia at the time of Burns’ arrival was also “a major center for institutionalism with Mitchell, [J.M.] Clark, [Rexford] Tugwell, F.C. Mills, [Robert Lee] Hale, and others” (Rutherford 2000, p. 283).Footnote 8
For a while, Burns was pulled toward neoclassical theory. As she reported in January 1927 to Morgenstern, she was “on the straight and narrow path of theory,” with the “dangerous encouragement” of him, Viner, and Schultz (Burns to Morgenstern, January 6, 1927). She “got interested in innovation in manufacturing” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 14), and she read, discussed, and thought extensively about the theories on dynamics and statics with the intention of applying Shultz’s work on supply and demand curves to study the elasticity of the supply of capital. Schultz “encouraged [her] to think that [she was] capable of understanding what the mathematicians are after and criticizing their implications, assumptions, claims—even tho [sic] I am one of the despised ‘literary economists’” (Burns to Morgenstern, January 6, 1927).
At the same time, Burns appeared reluctant to commit fully to this method of analysis, sometimes referring to her practical nature and sometimes to the promise of contributions from all approaches. For example, after discussing supply curves with Paul Douglas, she reported to Morgenstern that “I don’t think that much is to be gained from such highly abstract treatment of the possibilities of the various curves, until you know a little more what the actual curves themselves are like. But I admit this is my practical, concrete mind, at which you are inclined to scoff from time to time” (Burns to Morgenstern, March 9, 1927). In her Rockefeller Fellowship diary, she also described discussions that took place in what she characterized as a “controversial” January 1928 conference on quantitative economics in Washington, DC. While she represented herself as a pure theorist, she noted:
Each ‘School” has tended to concentrate on the dangers of the opposite method instead of seeking for positive contributions. Yet in fact, in calmer moments we are all willing to concede that there is a danger that the quantitative worker may concentrate too exclusively upon those things which are capable of measurement, and may even shape his concepts to the limited nature of his available data, while the qualitative worker . . . the pure theorist . . . may become so pure as to be unhelpful in a world where measurable quantities play an important role (Burns to Morgenstern, February 5, 1928).
Burns also commented on the tendency of some institutional economists to focus on the limitations and stereotypes, rather that the possibilities, of other schools. In a 1926 letter to Edwin Cannan, she described her meetings with institutional economists at Columbia. J.M. Clark “seems to have great charges to make about the ORTHODOX ECONOMISTS,” but she “believe[d] that the orthodox economist is a myth. I think that a good many of these people who throw stones at orthodoxy really don’t know what is being done” (Burns to Cannan, June 12, 1926). She “went to a class by Tugwell . . . and found him offering as a choice and novel morsel the fact that the subject matter of economics was material welfare. He seemed genuinely amazed when I said that English economics has worked on that assumption for some years” (Burns to Cannan, June 12, Reference Burns1926). She summarized her observations about American institutionalism in a 1931 paper she wrote for a roundtable at the annual meetings of the American Economic Association: “Economic Theory: Institutionalism—What it Is and What it Hopes to Become.” Similar to her criticism of advocates for pure theory or quantitative economics, she wanted to focus on the contributions of institutionalism. She stated in a letter to Morris Copeland, clarifying the content of the session, that she did not think she could “take the case against institutionalism. . . . [because she was] not altogether sure how far [her] inclinations take her toward a negative view”; rather, she believed, “quite frankly I feel that these ‘for and against’ arguments get us nowhere and that it would be much more profitable to discuss what we have so far gotten out of institutionalism and what there is reasonable ground for expecting in the future” (Burns to Copeland, October 13, 1930).Footnote 9
To discover “the brilliant promise” of institutionalism, Burns began the paper by investigating “why the institutionalist propaganda that has been prominent in the economic discussions of the past fifteen years in this country, has not been more productive of concrete works and changes in the curricula of our graduate schools” (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 80). Her beginning answer highlighted the difficulty inherent in any new form of analysis supplanting entrenched methods, particularly when it required theoretical economists “to be seduced from the precision and intellectual elegance of classical economics in its purest mathematical form by an institutional economics whose principal claim is rugged realism” (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 80). Of greater import was the continuing “vagueness of the concept of institutionalism itself” (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 80). She stated that it was not the quantitative method identified with Mitchell, because many of its advocates recommended a broader, empirical analysis of institutions, which often could not be reduced to statistical measurement. Likewise, it was not the new economics that would take into account findings of contemporary psychology, because orthodox economists such as Philip Wicksteed had already made revisions in orthodox analysis to rid it of its hedonistic language.
Notwithstanding these problems, Burns argued that institutional economists could move their program of research to one of “solid achievement” (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 80). To accomplish this goal, Burns argued that institutionalism and neoclassical economics could be complementary. She began this harmonizing project with a definition of institutionalism:
A method of approach to economic problems in which prominent place is given to interaction between social institutions on the one hand and economic relationships and the economic aspects of behavior on the other. It aims to present an orderly arrangement of economic phenomena in which institutions are elevated from the status of exception or footnote, and integrated in the main body of economics (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 82).
She then proceeded to list examples of American, English, and German economists. In America, Thorstein Veblen did institutional work “brilliantly” in the form of criticism, while in Germany, Max Weber (1904) provided a model of “genetic studies of the development of institutions” (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 82). Americans Clark (Reference Clark1923) and Commons (Reference Commons1924), and English economist Josiah Wedgewood (Reference Weber and Parsons1929) supplied samples of specific studies that examined the effects of legal and technological institutions on economic relationships and activity. She alluded to Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means’ study of corporations as an example of how analysts can use institutionalism to study the effect of organizational behavior on economic activity.Footnote 10 Finally, Hamilton and Helen Wright (Reference Hamilton and Wright1925) provided a model of “analyz[ing] a specific economic problem in terms of its institutional environment” in their study of the coal industry (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 83).
To build on the promise of these institutional studies, Burns first referred her readers to Mitchell’s appeal for “‘for a framework within which all sorts of contributions may find their proper places’” (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 83). She recommended adoption of a type of analysis that viewed the economy as instituted as a means to provide coherence for the variety of methods employed by economists during the interwar period. Beginning steps to building that framework included two factors. First, the framework should clearly demarcate the boundaries between economic and other types of social behavior. Citing the work of her LSE colleague Edward Cannan, Burns suggested using the traditional focus on solving the problem of material scarcity as this demarcation point. She argued that by “Treating the economic problem thus without reference to any prevailing system of organization, [the analyst] is relatively free to consider how different institutional arrangements bear upon his problem” (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 86). Second, the framework required a common definition of an economically relevant institution. She believed that some of the American economists whom she had met—Mitchell, Clark, Hamilton, and Sumner Slichter—had made a start in identifying some of the relevant qualities. Nonetheless, without greater precision, institutionalists might “work at cross purposes” (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 86). Unfortunately, Burns did not remedy this vagueness by offering her definition of an economically relevant institution, but rather she referred to the work of Weber and Werner Sombart as possible methodological models.
To modern practitioners, Burns’ recommendation to harmonize institutional and neoclassical analysis seems somewhat odd. Yet, upon reflection, the pluralistic climate of the times certainly could have created an environment in which her project seemed reasonable. First, the focus on greater realism in assumptions and outcomes was a value shared by the majority of economists during this era, whether neoclassical or institutional. Second, her definition of the economic aspects of behavior relied on the neoclassical focus on scarcity, that is “the fundamental problem of obtaining any kind of production in a world of supplies limited in relations to wants”; at the same time, she did not even conceive that this definition precluded her from studying the problem of scarcity from an institutional perspective (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 86).Footnote 11
Burns’ views about the proper function of the economist also featured the commitments to personal integrity and objective advocacy characteristic of the interwar period. Later remarks in the Foreword to her 1936 Toward Social Security were typical. She stated that explanations of the consequences of the Act called for both the “technical knowledge” of the professional economist and “judgments about social values” (1936, p. vi). She intended to draw on her technical expertise to provide objectivity in the explanation. At the same time, she acknowledged that her preconceptions could influence her description: “Inevitably, however, my own prejudices and social values obtrude themselves” (1936a, p. vi). To aid her readers in making informed choices, she proceeded to list those values: (1) “it is the function of the government to concern itself with the economic as well as the physical or political security of the citizen”; (2) “in a democratic society voters are more likely to chose intelligently when they are fully informed as to the implications of the available alternatives. . . . It is the function of the economist to use his technique to explain”; and (3) it might be necessary for the federal government to “encroach” on the rights of the states (1936a, pp. vi–vii; and 1949, p. viii).
Throughout her career, Burns followed this general approach. She employed a pluralistic method of analysis that studied how humans used social institutions to reduce scarcity. Using this method, she completed careful empirical studies of the existing economic institutions underlying a variety of real-world problems. Likewise, she subjected possible solutions to thorough analysis. As a social scientist with personal integrity, she accepted that her personal beliefs could influence her analysis, and was vigilant in documenting them in her published work. Finally, she often advocated a particular point of view that was based her technical analysis first, yet, inevitably, reflected her personal prejudices.
IV. TAKING ON A SUBJECT FOR ANALYSIS
At the beginning of her career, Burns concentrated on social insurance when she investigated the French minimum wage (1923) and the economics of family endowment plans (1925). But during her early years in the US, while Burns refocused on the theory of capital supply curves, her interest in social insurance remained in abeyance. But she came to know two individuals who changed her path: Molly Dewson and Abraham Epstein. While completing her dissertation, Burns had started a correspondence about US minimum wage laws with Dewson. This connection grew into a lifelong friendship, after Dewson served as a tour guide and provided introductions during her Rockefeller Fellowship travels. When Burn accepted the position at Columbia, Dewson, then president of the Consumer League of New York, brought her on to serve on the organization’s board. Since provision of social security was a state function at that time, Burns was soon going to Albany and participating in public hearings on behalf of the Consumer League (Burns Reference Burns1977, pp. 10–11). She met Epstein, the administrator of the American Association for Old Age Security, as a student in one of the first classes she taught at Columbia on foreign labor movements. He frequently organized conferences, and asked her to present a paper about old age security in Britain at one of them. She did not know much about this topic, but, as she stated, “If you’re going to give a lecture, you’ve got to find out something about it” (1979, p. 17). She educated herself and subsequently published her first paper on this subject in an American journal, the Political Science Quarterly, entitled “State Pensions and Old-Age Dependency in Great Britain” (1930). She became fascinated with the subject, and proceeded to participate actively in Epstein’s organization (Burns Reference Burns1977, pp. 3–10). Thus, through her work with these two groups—the New York Consumer League and the American Association for Old Age Security—Burns “got very much interested in American social policy,” and, in the process, found the subject of her life work (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 18).
In 1933 Burns applied her pluralistic method of analysis to social security in an article entitled the “Economics of Unemployment Relief” in the AER. The article was problem-focused: she started it with the premise that unemployment relief had emerged as “a major problem of practical economics for many years to come” (Burns Reference Burns1933, p. 31). It employed institutional analysis, as she carefully developed an empirical study of current views on unemployment relief and identified related problems. One view recommended the establishment of an employment exchange to make labor markets more orderly. The problem was that exchanges did not increase the number of jobs, but just improved the information about available jobs. A second view recommended spreading the costs of unemployment relief among employers so they would have an incentive to stabilize the volume of employment. The problem with this view was threefold. Employers did not have great control over the number of jobs available; insufficient information was available to trace the link between industry demand and unemployment; and employers could shift the costs of unemployment to employees, property owners, and consumers. A third view recommended setting up government relief so that purchasing power was transferred over the trade cycle. The problem with this view was in finding a means to transfer purchasing power without adversely affecting the economy, in obtaining funding for public works, and in assessing the effects of public works relief on the morale of workers. A fourth view recommended that the government not provide unemployment relief, because it prevented readjustments in labor markets. This view erred in not recognizing the ill effects on displaced workers living in a free society that “encourages changes in productive technique and sets high value on the freedom of the consumer to change his mind” (Burns Reference Burns1933, p. 37). Based on her analysis, she advocated unemployment relief that was financed with earmarked reserves paid by employees and employers, and supplemented by the federal governments in times of great stress. At the same time, she clearly stated ethical values must play a role in the financing decision: “In the last resort the decision is only partly economic, for the determination to shoulder certain economic costs, when they cannot be shown to involve any economic return, is an ethical decision” (Burns Reference Burns1933, p. 40).
In 1934 Burns was appointed as a junior staff member of the Committee on Economic Security. Following from her approach to analysis, she used this opportunity to become an active advocate for federal unemployment insurance. As she related the story, while current discussion focuses on old age insurance, the fervently debated topic in 1934 was the unemployment insurance program. As Burns described: “And the big fight at that time was, first of all—was it to be a federal program, or was it to be a state program? And if it was to be a federal–state program, was it be a grant-in-aid program, or was it to be a tax offset?” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 21). Wisconsin people, such as E.E. Witte and Arthur Altmeyer, and John B. Andrews, head of the American Association for Labor Legislation, argued for a state program. Many of the junior staff members of the Committee on Economic Security, including Burns, argued for a federal program. To resolve these conflicts, the Committee on Economic Security “called a conference on social security and what should be done. . . . [deliberations at the conference] reflected the absolute truth, that everybody . . . was arguing about unemployment, and nobody seemed to be doing anything about old age” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 25). President Roosevelt aimed to present a social security bill to Congress in January 1935, so they appointed a National Advisory Committee with Frank Graham as the chairman, hoping to resolve the debates quickly. Burns had been in a hiking group in England with Frank Graham when he had taken courses at LSE as a discharged veteran from World War I. She and her junior colleagues, including Caroline Ware, Irma Rittenhouse, Bryce Stewart, and Barbara Armstrong, arranged a dinner party with Graham to advocate their views on unemployment insurance, and subsequently he called them to answer technical questions during the meetings of the Advisory Committee. Ultimately, the National Advisory Committee went against the junior staffers and recommended adoption of the Wisconsin plan for unemployment relief. Nonetheless, the committee members spent so much time arguing about unemployment relief that “the result was that the much more important age old insurance program didn’t get nearly the amount of attention and raise the same amount of controversy” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 27). This lapse gave Doug Brown, the dean of the Princeton economics department, and Barbara Armstrong, the lawyer whom Graham had met at the infamous dinner party, the opportunity to present their more ambitious plan for old age insurance, “and it more or less went through” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 27).
After passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, Burns stayed true to her value that people chose more wisely in a democratic society if they were fully informed, and she took on teaching a variety of groups about the new program. She wrote Toward Social Security in six weeks, and made speeches around the country as a means to inform the average citizen (Burns Reference Burns1936a).Footnote 12 Hamilton, who had become the director of research at the Social Security Board, hired her to teach the individuals who would administer the new program.Footnote 13 She also explained the financial aspects of the Act to economists in a 1936 paper in AER. Once again, she drew on her hybrid form of institutional analysis to emphasize that scarcity for financing required a redistribution of existing resources, not “an addition to the burden already carried by the productive elements in the community,” as many critics claimed (Burns Reference Burns1936b, p. 12). In addition, as an economist with personal integrity, she noted:
Admittedly the decision where the burden should fall involves value judgments beyond the sphere of the economist. Yet economists may assist in forming that judgment by indicating where the burden will fall as a result of certain taxes, and by showing the incidental economic consequences of throwing the burden in one direction or the other (Burns Reference Burns1936b, p. 16).
She then proceeded to delineate carefully aspects of that redistribution from an institutional perspective, using both deductive logic and examples from Europe. Interestingly, the issues she emphasized and the predictions she made are an important part of modern discussions. For example, she highlighted the significance of who should bear the financial burden across classes and generations. She pointed out that the enforced private savings by employers and employees to fund unemployment relief would cause political and economic problems for years to come. She predicted “that low income receivers will also carry a major responsibility for financing new security given by those sections of the Act which are allegedly financed out of general taxation” (1936b, p. 17). She recognized that the pay-as-you-go system, which did not take into account the possibility of an aging of the population, would impose a burden on future generations.
Through the late 1930s and early 1940s, the years she was associated with the Columbia economics department, Burns continued to use this method of analysis as her prominence in the field of social security increased. In 1937 the Social Sciences Research Council supported her travel to Britain to examine its new comprehensive assistance plan, which she later described in British Unemployment Systems (1942). In 1939 Bill Haber, an economist from the University of Michigan and chair of the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), asked her to meet with committee members “to see if [she] had any ideas about how they might develop this study “ of existing US social insurance programs (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 36). Based on her recommendations, the committee hired her to be the research director for the Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief Policies. In 1942, as its primary author, she completed a 640-page report entitled Security, Work and Relief Policies, detailing “the status and prospects for the nation’s social welfare programs” (Reports and Studies). Unlike the reception to the 1943 Beveridge Report in Great Britain, which Burns reviewed in the American Economic Review (1943b), this report and the other two published by the NRPB became extremely controversial because both Congress and the public disliked the centralization of executive power they entailed.Footnote 14 Ultimately, Congress ended funding for the NRPB in 1944. Even though Burns’ report ultimately was ignored, it “had value in that it was the most thorough document then available of the nation’s social welfare programs, and some of its recommendations would actually come to pass,” a similar response to the 1943 Report on Social Security written by Leonard Marsh (Reports and Studies).
V. FROM DISCOURAGEMENT IN ECONOMICS TO RECOGNITION IN SOCIAL WORK
The recounting of the early career of Dr. Eveline Mabel Burns notes significant contributions she made to the discipline of economics, yet her work is barely visible in its history. The puzzling question remains why. It is tempting to argue that her neglect is due to her gender, following the pattern of disregard of earlier women economists by members of the profession.Footnote 15 And it does seem clear that her gender did affect her situation in economics. From the outset, she recognized that she faced difficulties as a married female professional in the field of economics. When she and her husband were trying to get back to LSE in 1927, Morgenstern, somewhat tongue in cheek, advised her to give Arthur her job and remain at home as a housewife and researcher. Burns retorted that an academic position was essential for her success in the male profession of economics:
Of course I dont [sic] agree with you about giving up my work. . . . Writing is all very well but you know that I must have some stimulus to write, and the necessity of giving lectures provides that. Still more important is the meeting of my contemporaries, a thing which is almost impossible when you are not ‘of’ the academic world, especially if one is a woman. . . . All the while I can hold my own I’m going to show these disgusting anti-feminists that there are some women who are keen on their career, who can permanently be interested in those branches hitherto regarded as men’s, and that the old view of a woman giving up her job becaus [sic] she is married isnt [sic] necessarily a true one (Burns to Morgenstern, November 11, 1927).
Later she noted that her marital status affected her standing in the Columbia economics department: “I suspect that the real truth is that we don’t have any particiular [sic] patrons here and it is known that even if we dont [sic] get the promotions we are unlikely to move because of the problem of ‘joint supply’ . . . . Take my warning, and never marry a fellow economist! It ruins your bargaining powers” (Burns to Morgenstern, February 2, 1931).Footnote 16 Burns also remarked that when she was putting together her staff for the National Resources Planning Board in 1939, the staff turned out to be composed primarily of Jews and women, “because they were the people who had difficulty . . . good people, having difficulty in getting jobs” (Burns Reference Burns1981, p. 50). Ultimately, despite her prominent work in social security and her continued record of publication, in 1942 Columbia dropped her as a lecturer, the same rank at which she entered the department fourteen years earlier.
Later in her life, she stated that her release from Columbia in 1942 was the “most serious blow I think I’ve had in my life” (Burns Reference Burns1979, p. 54). Burns told an interviewer:
One of the things I’ve always had to try to instill in my students is that you must never let yourself get discouraged, because you’re going to find, through your life, you’ll be working for all kinds of things; most of the time you won’t get anywhere. But ‘don’t’ I would say to them, ‘don’t give up, because if everybody gives up and says, “Well, it’s just too frustrating for words, and I’m not getting anywhere,” nothing will ever, ever change. Somebody’s got to think [things] out.’ And I used to say to them, ‘you never know when you may have a chance, and if you haven’t made your mind clear as to what it is you want, and worked out how you think policy should develop, and so on, you’ll lose the opportunity when it comes’ (Burns Reference Burns1981, pp. 38–39).
Following her own admonitions, Burns was only temporarily discouraged by the rejection by her colleagues in the Columbia economics department. Rather, to resurrect her academic career, when Walter W. Pettit asked her to come to the Columbia School of Social Work in 1946, Burns accepted his offer, and followed the path of female economists who wanted to participate in academia.Footnote 17
Yet, despite her dismissal by the Columbia economics department, it would not be fair to say that her contemporary economists neglected Burns. After she moved to the School of Social Work, Burns continued to participate actively in the AEA. In the late 1940s, she was appointed to the Committee on the Development of Economic Thinking and Information, and the Committee on Economic Opinion and Public Policy. In 1953 members of the AEA elected her vice-president, and in 1957 she chaired the nominating committee. In addition, she continued to write in economic journals until the late 1960s. Finally, the American Economic Review and the Journal of Political Economy published reviews of books that she wrote during the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, Burns appeared visible in the economics community during her working life, though, subsequently, economists neglected her contributions.
In contrast, this inattention did not take place in the social work community, which provided Burns with celebrated and long-standing visibility. In one obituary, the staff and trustees of the Community Service Society (CSS) of New York described Burns as “a distinguished economist, professor, CSS Senior Fellow and beloved colleague. She was a pioneering analyst of social policy, an internationally recognized social planner, and a crusading advocate for social justice and the poor” (“Eveline Burns”). In an introduction to a collection of essays in her honor, Vera Shlakman stated that Burns had “major responsibility for creating the field of social policy studies” in the US (Shlakman Reference Rutherford and Emmett1969, p. 4). She developed a doctoral program in social work at Columbia that moved the profession from its individualized casework focus to address issues of broad-based social policy development. She wrote the basic text about social insurance analysis (1956). Governments around the world continued to call on her to serve as a consultant about social security. In 1960 she received a prestigious Florina Lasker Social Work Award, cited as “‘an outstanding authority on social security systems throughout the world’” (Moritz Reference Moritz1960, p. 66).
“A central part of her work was to provide [social policy studies] with a methodology” (Shlakman Reference Rutherford and Emmett1969, p. 4). As Burns described:
Social policy analysis I take to be the study of the organized efforts of society to meet the identifiable personal needs of, or social problems presented by, groups and individuals, evaluating them by reference to their adequacy and effectiveness in attaining certain goals, their economy in the use of scarce resources and their consistency with accepted social values (1961, p. 23).
The similarity between this method of social policy analysis and the one she described in the 1931 institutionalist paper is striking. Her continuing use of this method became the second reason for her invisibility in the discipline of economics. Because, in fact, the neglect of Burns is typical of that of many of that generation of economists; in particular, individuals who saw some merit in institutional analysis, and who became professionals during the years of interwar pluralism. She rejected abstract mathematical modeling in favor of a pluralistic method that prominently featured institutional analysis. She recognized that economic analysis could not be value-free. Further, she believed that being an economist demanded that she participate in solving the real problems of real people, through both the research she chose to undertake and her service as an advocate in public policy discussions. When those standards of practice altered after World War II, in essence, her visibility as an economist also became a victim of “changing notions of science and scientific objectivity” (Morgan and Rutherford Reference Morgan, Rutherford, Morgan and Rutherford1998, p. 24).Footnote 18
The irony of her pluralistic stance is that even with her espousal of institutionalism, Burns recognized early on some of the problems that would undercut its “brilliant promise” (Burns Reference Burns1931, p. 80). By the late 1920s, she already criticized some leading institutional economists for their preoccupation with dissent rather than with constructive work. Likewise, she realized that the linkage of institutionalism with modern psychology was losing importance, as neoclassical economists developed accepted ways to deal with the hedonistic base of economic behavior. Finally, she understood the lack of an agreed-upon definition of an institution left an avenue for external critics to charge institutional economists with vagueness, and for the internal dissension that has characterized post-war institutionalism.
Yet, even with this knowledge, Burns did not give up on institutionalism. Rather, like other practitioners, she found a professional home in another branch of the academy.Footnote 19 This change must ultimately be attributed to both her resilience and the fact that leaders in the social work community could recognize her talents. She made this move because she was concerned that schools of social work focused solely on the preparation of students to serve as caseworkers for individual clients. As the role of the government in the life of the community increased, she recommended that schools of social work also teach the methodological approach to analysis she had used with social security, so that they could gain an institutional view of the impact of social policy. Thus, Burns used the opportunity provided to her by social workers to move to a discipline that esteemed her pluralistic method, and, in the process, she spent the next forty years helping to build the US social security system and training the people who analyze and administer it.
