International Organizations (IOs) are instances of much coveted international cooperation. Their existence and actions have important implications for international relations. Depending on the particular theoretical angle, such implications stretch from playing a key role in the transformation of the social reality of state interaction to increasing the transparency of state action in the international system and facilitating further cooperation. So, what accounts for the behavior of IOs? Is it the preferences of key nations or powerful private-sector actors, the organizations' legal mandate, or the bureaucratic nature of IOs? And, as a consequence, who benefits the most?
Both books reviewed here contribute to a growing and increasingly sophisticated literature on IOs. Yet they embrace diametrically opposed approaches, with Soo Yeon Kim emphasizing power and the persistence of rules and Jeffrey M. Chwieroth highlighting dynamic change “from within” IOs (p. 23). In particular, Kim investigates whether membership in the GATT/World Trade Organization has improved country welfare in an equitable fashion. Her book is “squarely in the power politics paradigm” of IOs (p. 10). Chwieroth explores how the International Monetary Fund contributed to the norm that capital account liberalization is desirable. His account is sociological and constructivist and focuses on the role that the IMF's staff has had in forging, interpreting, and applying the new norm.
Power and the Governance of Global Trade is well within the confines of research suggesting that IOs promote the interests of the states that form and dominate them. Kim argues that the “compulsory power” of the United States at the end of World War II allowed it to design GATT rules that tilted the global trade system heavily in its favor. Furthermore, she suggests that the initial rules transformed compulsory power into institutional power, which has a high degree of resilience, thus cementing distributional inequities. That is, the formal and informal rules of the GATT reflect US preferences and constraints: The unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) provision of the General Agreements enshrined the US desiderata of reciprocity and nondiscrimination. In direct contradiction sometimes, the rules, however, followed US constraints closely and involved 1) bilateral negotiations, the biggest supplier rule, and item-by-item negotiations; 2) exceptions to tariff negotiating items following sometimes directly from the US law; 3) ensuring the recovery of the most important allies of the United States, especially Britain; and, finally, 4) trade regime flexibility.
The crucial step in Kim's book is to link rules to important distributional consequences. For small nations, she argues that the principal-supplier rule biased negotiations in favor of goods from the large economies, which had specific factor endowments different from those of developing countries. The item-by-item negotiation rule further tilted trade against small countries, by allowing very narrow definitions of products in order to maximize the reciprocity of tariff reductions and minimize positive externalities for countries not offering concessions. Because of these effects, she suggests, the MFN treatment was actually not able to neutralize the effect of market power and item-by-item negotiation. This is an important claim, argued to the contrary in recent accounts (e.g., see Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System, 2002). So the examples and illustrations in Chapter 3 provide important support for Kim's arguments on how the principle-supplier rules and item-by-item negotiations can have distributive effects on trade. However, in tracing the evolution of the GATT, Chapter 2 shows quite a bit of diversity across the different GATT rounds over the item-by-item negotiation protocol, raising the question of whether the argument is conditional on time.
To test her argument, Kim investigates empirically the effect of the GATT/WTO on the volume and patterns of member-country trade. The expectation is that membership in the global trade regime would generate trade increases mostly for powerful countries. The key new finding in Chapter 3 (with Joanne Gowa) is that even within industrialized countries, trade expansion has actually been limited to the major trading nations (Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the United States). Further, because the principle-supplier rule did not encourage trade liberalization between small and large countries, small countries are shown to continue to trade more within the interwar currency blocks. In Chapter 4, the most important finding regards the patterns of trade: While trade among nonindustrialized country pairs has increased significantly under the WTO, trade between pairs of industrialized standing WTO members and early and late entrants into the WTO has not just been stagnant but has decreased significantly.
Capital Ideas is also preoccupied with the link between IOs and key power holders. In contrast, however, Chwieroth sides with the literature arguing that IOs have substantial autonomy. He shows that underneath the formal transformations in the IMF's approach to capital controls, informally within the IMF, the staff either lagged or led in promoting and prescribing change. This surprising finding, he argues, is a result of staff recruitment, professionalization, adaptation, learning, and norm entrepreneurship. For example, Chwieroth shows convincingly that the United States did not dictate the Fund's position directly, and, even more, staff did not follow management views very closely: Historically, in the 1960s and 1970s, the staff continued to be largely supportive of capital controls even though key principals (the United States, West Germany) were changing their position. On the other hand, in the 1980s and 1990s, staff started to encourage liberalization selectively, without prodding from key nations or management. In fact, against conventional wisdom, the author argues that in the 1990s, the United States and the Wall Street financiers did not have an interest in the IMF's having a formal mandate to promote capital account liberalization. And, the staff moved in the camp of capital account liberalization prior to the arrival of the orthodox Michel Camdessus as managing director in 1987.
In Kim's view, the institutional power of the GATT cemented U.S. interests, and her account is largely static. Chwieroth, on the other hand, finds that the IMF staff position on capital account liberalization has changed significantly. One of his key concerns, therefore, is to trace the source of staff ideas and the process of ideational change. He argues that the IMF staff position on capital account liberalization is driven by the particular nature of the issue, in that there was less consensus on it than, for example, on free trade, and the evolving beliefs of staff. Staff beliefs, he argues, largely reflect the evolution of ideas in the economics profession, and they change because recruitment reflects evolving education backgrounds and because of a process of slow and contentious adaptation to outside events. To support the argument, Chapter 3 traces the evolution of ideas regarding the appropriateness of capital controls, and then, using new survey data, it links the educational backgrounds of 263 economists to ideas about international capital markets. Subsequent chapters cover in detail how the ideas in the economics profession have permeated the Fund for broad periods of time.
Chwieroth also prominently emphasizes the role of informal interpretation of norms and rules, internal IO debate and ideational splits. Contrary to common perception, he shows forcefully that within the Fund there was widespread discussion and dissent over ideas and interpretation of evidence, and, consequently, on how to proceed with capital liberalization. The role of staff interpretation is shown in countless examples throughout the book, from the use of exchange controls to regulate capital movements in the 1950s to the failure of staff to change their practices after the formal amendment of the IMF's Article IV in the 1970s and the disagreements over how to apply the norm of capital freedom in the 1990s.
Both books deepen our understanding of the role of IOs and how they work. Some questions remain, nevertheless. While the core of Kim's book is clear and systematic and the evidence is generally convincing, she makes a broader claim that US preferences led to the GATT's failure to formalize. Clearly, the early attempt at formalizing global trade governance under the International Trade Organization (ITO) was withdrawn from ratification in the United States. Yet there is just not enough substantive comparison of the GATT with the ITO charter to understand why the United States did not choose more institutionalization. On the other hand, while global trade governance did later formalize under the WTO, the US role remains unexplored. Also, Kim's finding that trade between industrial and nonindustrial countries drops in the WTO years is thought provoking but underexplained. Arguably, “the politically charged process of accession to the regime” (p. 113) may explain why late entrants trade less with standing industrial-country members (this is not statistically significant across all data), but it cannot explain the drop in trade where accession has been conciliatory to the developing country entrants. Relatedly, while during the GATT prewar currency block trading groups were maintained, the WTO years saw large increases in trade among developing countries, including new members into the global trade regime. This is a positive finding deserving more discussion.
Chwieroth's book is captivating and persuasive because of a rare combination of interviews with former IMF staff, archival research, and original survey evidence, with an impressive overview of a diverse secondary literature. Still, while the book offers a rich description of the evolution of staff ideas, we are left asking whether these ideas changed significantly the behavior of countries borrowing from the Fund. The author gives few hints regarding the effectiveness of staff ideas and actions, given that the Fund cannot legally include conditions on capital account liberalization in their lending. In another study, Chwieroth himself pursues more of this angle (“Testing and Measuring the Role of Ideas: The Case of Neoliberalism in the International Monetary Fund,” International Studies Quarterly 51 [no. 1, 2007]: 5–30). A second issue pertains to the generalizability of the book's emphasis on the crucial role of the staff. For example, the author acknowledges that on particular aspects of capital account liberalization like coordinated controls, the US opposition to cooperation clearly prevailed. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics, 2004) offer additional insight concerning when IOs may have more or less autonomy, depending on the degree of conflict with state interests.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that while using different approaches, both authors arrive at the broad conclusion that the rules and formal and informal norms of IOs, as well as the patterns of staff recruitment, tend to favor powerful countries, with negative distributional consequences for developing nations. Both books also raise concerns about the legitimacy of IOs and the integration of developing countries into the global governance of trade and finance, and both have high hopes for the Group of 20, rather than the Group of 7, to drive the governance of the global economy in the future.
