This book is a revised version of A.'s Ph.D. dissertation completed in 2012 at the University Pierre Mendès France (Grenoble II). It deals with the ethical and political sides of value judgement by Roman Stoicism, especially by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. The Stoics invented a system of valuation (‘dispositif d’évaluation’) founded on an axiological division (real good is virtue, real evil is vice) whose function is to control our valuations. A. uses Foucault's concept of ‘dispositif’ (see Dits et Écrits II [1977], text no. 206, p. 299), but for A. it means a conceptual elaboration (p. 9 n. 2). This system of valuation is not a Roman discovery. Ancient Stoics already used it. But Roman Stoics employ it in an original way. They take into account Cicero's objections (Tusc. 2.29–30), which underline the inefficiency of the system of valuation as a cure for pain. Thenceforth, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius focus on its dysfunction and try to resolve these difficulties. This work begins with an examination of the modifications introduced by Roman Stoics (Chapters 1–3), then explores the causes of this dysfunction and remedies (Chapters 4–5) and ends with a discussion of the political implications.
While Hellenistic Stoics describe a tripartite division of the real (goods, evils, indifferents), the Romans use a binary one. Epictetus expresses the axiological division through his concept of prohairesis and the opposition eph'hemin/ouk eph'hemin; while Marcus Aurelius employs the notion of hegemonikon to describe what is in our power. What we cannot control depends on Nature and Fortune. A. proposes an interesting clarification of the notion of nature by Marcus Aurelius (pp. 26–7): kata phusin does not always mean a moral standard, phusis may be a productive power, i.e. ‘le fonctionnement et les lois de développement de cette nature’ (Meditations 2.17.2). In this meaning, phusis is used as a criterion to distinguish indifferents. These new categories simplify and make Hellenistic theories more radical. The binary opposition replaces the division into goods, preferables, evils, non-preferables (DL 7.102 and Stobaeus, Eclog. 2.7.7g, t. II, p. 85, 3–4 W = SVF III 128). This simplification has a pedagogical benefit and gives rise to what A. calls a ‘motif de subjectivation’ (p. 35) which is not the Cartesian ego (see F. Ildefonse and G. Aubry, Le moi et l'intériorité [2009] and V. Carraud, L'invention du moi [2010], p. 201). The Stoic ego is not a substance; it is a pure capacity to value. But most people use this faculty in a wrong way, hence the idea of a dysfunction of the system of valuation (Chapter 2). The insane is not aware of his power to value and does not know that he is the only one who must be blamed for his own frustration, which A. describes as an ‘état de dysphorie à l’égard du monde’ (Diss. 2.17.18).
Chapter 3 explores the causes of this dysfunction. When it is used in a wrong way, it jeopardises the sociability. One who does not respect the stoic axiological division acts like a predator (for instance, when he robs, commits adultery). But the husband who is cheated should not victimise himself. Indeed, if he grows angry, it is because he treats his wife as if she were in his power (Diss. 1.18.11–14). To use our capacity to value in the right way, does not mean breaking all our relationships with others. On the contrary, we have, by playing properly our different functions, to fulfil our kathekonta (appropriate behaviours) according to our different skheseis (relations) (family, conjugal, politic). The system of valuation secures the civic order, whereas relationships between insane people always risk being suspended.
Chapter 4 begins with a non-intellectualist approach to stoicism (for an intellectualist interpretation see A. Jagu, Épictète et Platon [1946] and A.-J. Voelke, L'idée de volonté dans le stoïcisme [1973]. For other arguments against intellectualism, see J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy [1969] Chapter 2 and J. Brunschwig, ‘Le modèle conjonctif’, in J. Brunschwig [ed.], Les Stoïciens et leur logique [1978], pp. 235–60), focusing on the troubles felt by the novice philosopher: theoretical knowledge may not be a sufficient condition for acting right. A right opinion may be inefficient, if it cohabits with a system of wrong opinions. When it is isolated, the right opinion cannot be effective. Social pressure and traditional systems of values delay the practice of knowledge. How to produce a real psychic change? Chapter 5 explores the traditional question of spiritual practices and substitutes for the tripartite division of P. Hadot (Introduction aux Pensées de Marc-Aurèle [1992]) a binary one of exercises devoted to the soul and mixed practices. Exercises described by Roman Stoicism take into account the problem of the difficult passage from theory to practice. The conviction is not automatic, it needs time to mature which helps habituation. These exercises are none the less for novice philosophers and not for insane people.
The work ends with a study of the figure of the actor (Chapter 6) which formalises man's relation to the world. The quality of his interpretation paradoxically depends on a form of ‘distanciation’. The good actor has to distinguish the way he plays (himself) and the role which does not depend on him. But A. goes further: the performance becomes a model for acting and the philosopher is himself a performer. He makes a difference between what he shows of himself and what he really is. The figure of the actor underlines that it is possible to fulfil his function of man in a concrete world made of interactions and interdependences (p. 200). In the last chapter, A. explains the political consequences of the system of valuation: how to think about the relation to power if it does not depend on us? Stoicism is in a sense non-interventionist. Is it necessarily politically conservative? Objections that could be made to the prince have to be interiorised, as if there was no more place for parrhesia (free speech). But through a linguistic analysis of what is said in instances of opposition (pp. 218–19), A. shows the importance of the figure of actor; we can use ‘distanciation’ between the role and the way to play it, or we can even judge that our ethical role is more important than contingent functions (for instance, senator Helvetius, Diss. 1.2.19–22). Even if the price for disobedience is life which does not depend on us.
The book ends with a conclusion, a rich bibliography (A. omits M. van Ackeren [ed.], A Companion to Marcus Aurelius [2012] and M. van Ackeren, Die Philosophie Marc Aurels [2011]), an index locorum, a subject index and a name index.
This work offers a clear and detailed study of ethical and political aspects of the value judgement by Roman Stoics. However, A. could have made more comparisons between Ancient and Roman stoicism, especially when it deals with febrile disorder, atonia (pp. 131–2) (see Plutarch, De virt. moral. 446F–7A = SVF III 459 = LS 65G and T. Benatouïl, ‘La raison stoïcienne face à elle-même’, in R. Lefebvre and A. Tordesillas [edd.], Faiblesse de la volonté et maîtrise de soi [2009], pp. 119–29). The approach used by A. none the less offers an original interpretation of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, especially because it raises some issues which go beyond the history of philosophy. A. uses concepts borrowed from contemporary philosophy (Foucault, Deleuze, Austin, gender studies for the philosopher as a performer) which invigorate the reading of ancient texts.
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius are nowadays the object of a renewed interest, as shown in the number of publications dealing with Roman stoicism. Among these works, A.’s book has an important place through her original and clear explanations.
