Far from a settled question, “when did the Civil War end” has been igniting significant historiographical conversation recently. On one level, Gregory P. Downs's new book, After Appomattox: Military Occupation and the Ends of the War, offers a straightforward answer—1871, when members of a congressional delegation from Georgia took seats on Capitol Hill—but it does more besides. Downs re-periodizes the Civil War Era into battle time from 1861 to 1865, post-surrender wartime from 1865 to 1871, and peacetime after 1871 (2). In the process, he advises more attention to Reconstruction's achievements, shortcomings, and structural obstacles, and less hunting for individual failings to explain the era's many tragic features. After Appomattox elucidates the military occupation of the defeated Confederacy, calls readers to contemplate the unsettled and unsettling relationship between civil and military authority, and invites reflection upon various states of unrest.
The most obvious contribution of After Appomattox is the attention it draws to the “little-understood, intermittently effective, and spatially ambitious post-surrender occupation of the American South” (20). Until the mid-twentieth century, most historians of Reconstruction (except W. E B. Du Bois) portrayed a massive, despotic U.S. Army crushing the rights, homes, and hopes of defeated but honorable white Southerners. Historiography since the Civil Rights movement has displaced that caricature, but in combating such myths, historians erased troops from the U.S. South more completely than they actually disappeared. After Appomattox and the website, www.mappingoccupation.org, created by Downs and Scott Nesbit to accompany the book, demonstrate that 100,000 U.S. soldiers remained in the states of the former Confederacy through December 1865, and that roughly 20,000 remained for the rest of the 1860s.
To Downs, as long as thousands of troops occupied southern soil, a state of war rather than peace remained, but peace did not mean tranquility. Rather, it meant that locally run courts, elected officials, and laws were “supreme,” while the military “serve[d] rather than supplant[ed] local government,” which sounds appealing unless you were a former slave whom “local government” intended to keep in servitude (4). Troops mattered because they “prevented a gloomy story from turning out even worse” (31). They marked “a change in who ruled the places where [freedpeople] lived,” which created space for biracial governments that legislated freedpeople's rights (32).
But the occupation could not outlast the violent resistance it provoked from defeated white Southerners without imperiling the proper relationship between civil and military authority. It took an army to stare down angry whites intent on terrorizing former slaves, because civil authorities consisting of equally angry whites would not pass laws protecting freedpeople, enforce any such laws if they did exist, or prosecute the neighbors who violated them. As a result, the only way to safeguard former slaves and create any space for them to make freedom real was to extend war powers, so that military courts and martial law continued to hold sway. But war powers in the hands of any government are dangerous. As Downs forthrightly identifies the dilemma, “in 1865, the government could protect freedpeople or it could return to peacetime, but it could not do both” (5).
Three options remained: perpetual martial law, abandonment of freedpeople, or fundamental reconfiguration of civil authority. Congress chose the last. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were designed to build emancipation and freedpeople's basic rights into civil authority, but “the only way to change the Constitution was to rely on the military” by maintaining martial law long enough to get the amendments passed, and by empowering the army to enforce them (83). Ironically, civil rights “were by-products of martial law,” dependent on “war powers” and “fashioned by coercion” (2, 7).
For Downs, former slaves' limited but real freedom was explicitly statist. While After Appomattox does not directly engage existing historiography about whether rights are best protected by central governments, or whether the notion of human rights is inherently anti-statist, this book provides an opportunity for reflection on precisely that question. For some scholars (for example, Samuel Moyn, author of The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History), central governments, with their insatiable tendencies toward violence, are inevitable violators of rights, and human rights and basic freedom can only meaningfully exist and be protected in extra-state contexts.Footnote 1 Downs, in contrast, portrays a nineteenth-century U.S. South in which freedpeople's rights were secure only when the central government exercised its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Freedom required the extension and continued wielding of federal might in unvarnished, hard-power ways. Reconstruction, in Downs's telling, fell short because of ex-Confederate violence that the federal government lost the power to combat when war powers expired.
That violence, and a closer look at the numbers and maps that document the occupation, invite reconsideration of the sharp distinction between peace and war that Downs ultimately retains, even as he shifts the moment of transition from Appomattox in 1865 to Washington in 1871. To return to numbers: 100,000 troops in 1865 is a large number, but compared to the two million who served between 1861 and 1865, the dramatic reduction is at least as relevant as troop persistence, especially since diminished numbers now had to control more than 750,000 miles of former Confederacy, rather than the 120 distinct posts held by the full-strength army during the battle years.
Countering decades of historiographical insistence on no military occupation is important, but portraying that occupation as the continuation of the previous four years of wartime flattens a much bumpier reality. In many ways, the years of the post-surrender were less a continuation of the 1861–1865 rebellion, and more a reversion to the antebellum conflict between would-be enslavers and resistant people whom they would enslave, with the important exception that the federal government switched from the side of slaveholders to the side of former slaves. Rather than just two conditions—war and peace with a bright line dividing them in either 1865 or 1871— the United States in the mid-nineteenth century endured numerous different states of unrest. After Appomattox makes clear that which side the central government backed mattered a great deal.
The final effect of After Appomattox is unsettling. At its heart rests the paradox of military power as both necessary and threatening, and Downs steadily refuses to subordinate either quality to the other. Instead, After Appomattox provides a meditation, both troubled and troubling, on the reliance of rights on government force, and on unrest rather than repose as the nation's typical state.
