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Doi Moi and Vietnamese threat perception of Chinese economic growth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 August 2020

Byunghwan Son*
Affiliation:
George Mason University, 4499 University Dr. 6b4, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
*
Corresponding author. E-mail: kalkas@gmail.com
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Abstract

A growing body of literature has recently emerged establishing that political socialization influences foreign policy preferences of the public. But the empirical domain of this literature has been confined largely to American foreign policy and whether and how this empirical regularity holds in a non-democratic, non-western setting is unknown. Filling this lacuna, this research note studies the Vietnamese public attitudes toward Chinese economic expansion. I argue that Vietnamese citizens who grew up amid Doi Moi (renovation) had a political socialization experience very different from that of the birth cohorts who immediately preceded them. I demonstrate that the traditional ‘socialist brotherhood’ rhetoric that used to moderate otherwise hostile public opinions about China became insignificant through the course of the reform. This abrupt change led to markedly divergent views between the pre- and post-Doi Moi birth groups on China. Using the data from the latest Pew Global Attitude Survey, I demonstrate that Doi Moi increased the Vietnamese public's negative perception of Chinese economic expansion.

Information

Type
Research Note
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Figure 1.From ambivalence to animosity.

Figure 1

Table 1.Benchmark RDD and robustness checks

Figure 2

Figure 2.Is Chinese economic growth a good thing? A comparative perspective.Note: The bars in the left panel represent the percentage of respondents in each country who have either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ favorable views on China. The bars in the right panel represent the percentage of respondents in each country who consider Chinese economic growth a ‘good thing.’ The latter questionnaire was available only in a limited number of countries in Pew 2017. In both cases, ‘do not know’ answers are treated as missing observations.

Figure 3

Figure 3.Regression discontinuity design.

Figure 4

Figure 4.Placebo tests: alternative cutpoints.Note: RDD estimates (circles) with 95% confidence intervals (bars) using different birth years as cutpoints. The benchmark estimate is located at the center. The RDD coefficients are not exactly at the center of the bars because the confidence intervals are bias-corrected.

Figure 5

Table A1.Descriptive statistics

Figure 6

Table A2.Covariates

Figure 7

Figure A1.Cumulative financial transfer from China to Vietnam: a comparative perspective.Note: Plotted are logged cumulative volume of financial transfer from China to countries in South and Southeast Asia. The case of Vietnam is marked red. The data are from AidData (https://www.aiddata.org/).

Figure 8

Figure A2.Observations by birth year.