The academic study of terrorism has long centered on violence initiation, especially the emergence of new groups, the launch of new campaigns, and the recruitment of new personnel. Scholars have only recently begun to pay systematic attention to the demise of groups, the end of campaigns, and the demobilization of individual activists (see, e.g., Audrey K. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 2009, and Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind, 2009). Among the latest and most interesting contributions to this intriguing line of scholarship is The De-Radicalization of Jihadists by Omar Ashour. In this groundbreaking book, Ashour studies voluntary collective demobilization of armed Islamist groups. Despite their reputation as uncompromising zealots, many jihadi groups have voluntarily laid down their arms over the years, and the phenomenon is on the increase.
Ashour's dependent variable is de-radicalization, which he defines as a group's transformation toward nonviolence. De-radicalization, he argues, has three dimensions: behavioral, ideological, and organizational. Depending on the degree of change on each dimension, three ideal types of de-radicalization may occur: comprehensive de-radicalization, when a group lays down arms, publicly condemns violence, and dismantles fighting units; substantive de-radicalization, when a group changes its behavior and ideology but is unable to dismantle all fighting units; and pragmatic de-radicalization, when a group suspends operations and dismantles fighting units but does not ideologically renounce violence.
De-radicalization outcomes are determined, Ashour argues, by four conditions acting as independent variables: 1) charismatic leadership in control of its followers, 2) state repression directed against the armed movement, 3) selective inducements proffered by the state and other actors, and 4) social interaction between the layers of the movement, as well as between the movement and the “other.” The central causal claim is that all four variables in combination constitute a necessary condition for the initiation and success of de-radicalization processes. Ashour explains the interaction among the variables as follows: State repression and interaction with the “other” affect the beliefs of the leadership; after updating its beliefs, calculating costs and benefits, and reassessing security dilemmas, the leadership initiates a de-radicalization process that is bolstered by selective inducements from the state and by internal interactions within the organization.
Ashour tests his theory on three sets of cases (13 cases in total) from Egypt and Algeria. First, he examines three successive attempts by the leadership of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to dismantle the organization's armed wings. The first attempt, made in the early 1950s, failed, primarily because the leadership was weak and fragmented. The second attempt, in the mid-1960s, failed even more miserably, due, again, to weak leadership, but also to the absence of selective inducements and to limited opportunities for social interaction within the organization. The third attempt, from 1969 to 1973, brought comprehensive de-radicalization because all four key variables were present. There was unanimity in the leadership over the futility of armed opposition to the state, heavy repression in the mid-1960s had demotivated most cadres, prisons offered good opportunities for social interaction, and President Anwar Sadat's post-1970 accommodation policy included selective inducements.
In the second set of cases, Ashour examines two younger and more radical Egyptian organizations, namely, the Islamic Group and Islamic Jihad, each of which attempted de-radicalization twice (thus generating four cases). The Islamic Group, which waged a terrorism campaign in early 1990s Egypt, constitutes perhaps the most famous case of jihadist de-radicalization. Early de-radicalization attempts initiated by the government failed because the leadership was not interested and repression was very brutal. In 1997, however, the imprisoned leadership, observing a loss of military momentum, declared a unilateral cease-fire. The initiative gained traction because the historical leadership enjoyed considerable respect among foot soldiers. Selective incentives, first in the form of improved prison conditions and later in the form of early release and even financial compensation, helped bring about the group's comprehensive de-radicalization by 2003. The fate of the Islamic Group affected its smaller and more clandestine rival, the Islamic Jihad. In the early 2000s, several imprisoned midlevel Islamic Jihad commanders wanted to suspend the armed struggle, but factionalization and weak leadership prevented a consensus from forming. This changed in 2007 when the charismatic leader Sayyid Imam al-Sharif returned to Egypt after being captured in Yemen. Al-Sharif supported de-radicalization and was able to rally most factions behind it. Islamic Jihad's de-radicalization is currently only substantive, and the process of dismantling fighting units is still ongoing.
The third set of cases are from the Algerian Civil War and includes four attempts to de-radicalize the Armeé Islamique du Salut (AIS), as well as the two cases of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC). Between 1993 and 1995, three attempts were made to demobilize the AIS, the first two initiated by the regime and the latter by the AIS itself. All failed, Ashour argues, due to leadership factionalization and excessive state repression. A fourth attempt in 1997 succeeded in producing a pragmatic de-radicalization, mainly because AIS had a strong leader in Madani Mezraq and because its cadres had more social interaction with moderate Islamists. By contrast, the GIA and the GSPC suffered from very weak leadership and were socially isolated, and so limited negotiation attempts in the early 2000s failed.
Ashour's principal analytical contribution is to illustrate the internal organizational dynamics at play during voluntary demobilization. One might have expected state repression or group ideology to have a more direct effect on demobilization outcomes; indeed, the popular view has been that the Islamic Group de-radicalized because it was militarily defeated and that the Muslim Brotherhood demobilized because it subscribed to a pragmatic ideology. Ashour demonstrates the importance of intervening variables, such as effective leadership and internal channels of communication. Thus, no amount of repression and incentives will bring voluntary demobilization if there is no leadership to enforce the decision. Conversely, with a strong leadership and the right combination of sticks and carrots, even the most radical group will demobilize.
Ashour has a phenomenal grasp of the empirics. His study draws on a vast amount of primary sources and secondary sources in Arabic, and presents a wealth of new information about the groups under examination. However, his ability to convey the complexities of real-world demobilization becomes an obstacle to his theory-building agenda. The elaborate theoretical framework on pages 11 and 12 is only partially operationalized in the analysis. More important, one occasionally senses a certain confirmation bias, exacerbated by the conceptual vagueness of some of the key variables. For example, the absence of metrics of charismatic leadership and social interaction means that one often has to take the author's word for their presence in a given case. Moreover, in assessing the role of state repression, he sometimes takes liberties with the sequencing. In some cases (e.g., the Islamic Group), de-radicalization was helped by concurrent repression; in others (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood's third attempt), it was repression several years earlier—and thus less repression at the time of de-radicalization—that enabled the process. Finally, the analysis focuses exclusively on collective as opposed to individual de-radicalization; somewhat more attention paid to the strategic calculations of individual ideologues and foot soldiers might have yielded further insights on the collective disengagement process.
Overall, however, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists is a rich book that charts important new territory. It is not an easy read for newcomers to the study of Islamism, but those with some background knowledge will find the book highly rewarding.
