By the end of the Great War, and during its immediate follow up, a majority of European countries (both new and old as well as vanquished and victorious) passed through a phase of intensive paramilitary organizing marked by equally intensive paramilitary violence. As Robert Gerwarth and John Horne pointed out in their edited volume on paramilitary organizing in Europe after the Great War, paramilitaries often appeared in turbulent political circumstances where newly born national states were challenged by revolutionary threats from the East, as in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. On the other hand, in Germany, Austria, and Hungary, defeat and a subsequently created “culture of defeat” represented a mobilizing factor for all those having trouble coping with new realities. The tendency didn’t pass over victorious states such as France and Great Britain. Here, numerous paramilitaries appeared as well, whether spontaneously as a result of the fears of certain political groups that such a recently achieved victory might be endangered, as in France, or under state control, where intensive usage of different paramilitary formations was seen as a way to suppress separatist tendencies, as during the Irish War of Independence 1919–1921. The latter was also known as the Tan War, named after the Black and Tans—the notorious and extremely brutal British paramilitary formation (Gerwarth, Horne, Reference Gerwarth and Horne2012).
Like the rest of Europe, the Balkans witnessed the rise of paramilitarism. This rise happened during the period of immediate post-war consolidation. The two states that are the focus of this study, Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, were facing new and somewhat different realities. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, although a novelty in the region in its state formation, was a typical Great War victor and was about to experience a long though frequently interrupted process of unification and amalgamation of incredibly diverse territories, nations, religions, traditions, political, and legal systems. Bulgaria, on the other hand, was a clear loser, for the second consecutive time. A good illustration of the situation in which Bulgaria ended up in 1918 is represented by the name coined by Bulgarians themselves—the Second National Catastrophe (the first being the defeat in the Second Balkan War 1913). However, the period of consolidation in Bulgaria would be somewhat more painful compared to Yugoslavia, with several significant crises and a considerable death toll resulting from one coup, one revolutionary attempt, and follow-up violence (Vasilev Reference Vasilev1991; Yaanchev Reference Yaanchev2014; Bell Reference Bell1977).
Despite these differences, both states witnessed the appearance of certain features typical for most of post–Great War Europe. As already mentioned, one of these was the appearance of different paramilitary formations. In the Balkans a tradition or culture of paramilitary organizing played an important role in the process of creating paramilitary formations. This culture has different origins and followed different paths from the same phenomenon so widely present in Europe in this period (Newman, Reference Newman, Gerwarth and Horne2012). While paramilitarism in most contemporary European states was the product of the violence of the First World War and the brutalization which societies of both victorious and defeated countries went through, paramilitarism in the Balkans was closely connected with already existing traditions originating from the period of armed struggle against the Ottoman rule and state and nation building projects of the late 19th and early 20th century (Biondich, Reference Biondich2011). This article will present two examples of new paramilitary formations in the Balkans, which fit into the definition of paramilitarism as “military or quasi-military organizations and practices that either expanded or replaced the activities of conventional military formations” (Gerwarth and Horne Reference Gerwarth and Horne2012, 1). It will use the existing approach of comparing one victorious and one vanquished state (Kučera Reference Kučera2016) and examine how the post–Great War “cultures of victory and defeat” contributed to paramilitary mobilization. In both examples, paramilitarism appeared because of the weakness or crisis of official state institutions. While the Yugoslav example of the creation of the so-called Organization against Bulgarian Bandits followed existing patterns of organizing, originating from the period of Ottoman rule but applied in new political and social surroundings, the Bulgarian creation of the Orange Guards resembled contemporary European projects of paramilitary organizing, where an already functioning political organization, in this particular case the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), decided to create its own paramilitary component. These cases are interconnected; they occurred in the same time and to a great extent their appearance was caused by the same agents and their respective actions.
Although the appearance of the Organization against Bulgarian Bandits is closely associated with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and its actions in Bulgaria and the newly founded Yugoslav state, the appearance of the Orange Guards wasn’t originally connected with IMRO. However, BANU’s political platform was among the first to be confronted by IMRO, and these two organizations were in a state of war long before the 1923 June coup d’état ended the agrarian political experiment in Bulgaria.
The appearance of the Orange Guards appears novel if we compare it with other political formations in the region. Unlike other agrarian parties in East Central Europe, which “were often ambivalent towards grassroots direct action (certainly towards violence)” (Beneš, Reference Beneš2017, 211) BANU demonstrated a readiness to create its own paramilitary component. One of the reasons for this can be associated with the appearance of the Green Cadre during the last days of Austria-Hungary (in Slovenian, Croatian, Czech and Polish regions), where amidst army deserters, returnees from Russian captivity, and ordinary peasants, “radical agrarian populist agitation” could be heard among other sentiments (Beneš, Reference Beneš2017, 237). Although usually characterized as paramilitary formation, in its beginning the Orange Guards looked more like an ordinary party militia. Its members were not issued firearms, their only armaments were simple wooden clubs, and their duties were closely related to security and providing assistance to official institutions when they were unable to operate normally—such as during the strikes. Unlike Serbian chetniks or IMRO komitajis, Orange Guards were not associated with the legacies of the Balkan paramilitaries and guerrilla fighters. Here, we can compare the Orange Guards to, for example, Italian fascist squadristi (Gentile, Reference Gentile, Gerwarth and Horne2012) or the Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists—ORJUNA. ORJUNA was a paramilitary organization founded in 1921 in the Dalmatian town of Split. Close to the Democratic Party, it was a typical product of the “culture of victory” that existed in the newly founded Yugoslav state. It was primarily associated with its western parts and it had distinctive anti-Italian sentiments because of Italian territorial aspiration towards the Yugoslav Adriatic shores. However, not only Italians came into ORJUNA’s focus. The organization was hostile towards everyone who objected to the creation of Yugoslavia—communists, members of the Croatian Peasant Party, and former Austro-Hungarian officers. It adopted pro-violence vocabulary, glorifying figures like Gavrilo Princip, or the years of the Great War, since they pre-dated and announced the creation of the Yugoslav state (Newman Reference Newman, Gerwarth and Horne2012, 158; Gligorijević Reference Gligorijević1963; Bartulović Reference Bartulović1925). One of the differences was that in its ascent to power, BANU did not rely on violence, neither using it or pointing out its importance as the Italian fascists or members of ORJUNA did as a rule. Unlike ORJUNA, which was extremely suspicious, almost hostile towards the traditional parliamentary system, calling it compromised and recommending the introduction of a dictatorship as “an extraordinary means of self-defense” (Newman Reference Newman2015, 154), BANU came to power after general elections, by following and respecting democratic procedures, without causing a major political crisis in the country. The only similarity would be related to both organizations’ agrarian ambition to establish a peasant dictatorship through a major transformation of Bulgaria from parliamentary to corporate state.
As for relations with other paramilitary organizations, ORJUNA was very close with the Chetnik Association, primarily because both had a pro-Yugoslav agenda and both were close to the Democratic Party (although this was never recognized officially). Prominent Chetnik leaders Kosta Milovanović-Pećanac and Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin often gave addresses at ORJUNA rallies as honorary members. They used to speak about the need to pass on the values of war to a new generation of South Slavs (Newman Reference Newman2015, 153). However, the best description of ORJUNA and its propensity to violence was given by one Yugoslav war veteran in a series of articles in pro-Yugoslav newspapers, Nova Evropa, dedicated to ORJUNA. He characterize it as “bad copy of the sort of manifestation which one can see today in every war-torn country, amongst which are the fascists in Italy, de Rivera’s followers in Spain, Hórthy’s bands in Hungary, Ludendorf’s mob in Germany, Poincare’s chauvinists in France, and those ‘Macedonians’ on our sacred southern border. In spirit there is no difference between any of them, just differences in allegiance” (cited in Newman Reference Newman2015, 154).
The Creation of the Orange Guards and its Paramilitarization
After being released from prison where he spent most of the war years because he and his party objected to the Bulgarian war adventure, Alexander Stamboliyski began his final ascent to power (Vasilev Reference Vasilev1991; Bell Reference Bell1977; Crampton Reference Crampton2009). The new post-war Bulgarian government led by BANU and Stamboliyski actually represented a coalition with so-called “old parties” or parties that had led Bulgaria through the period of recently ended wars. Since agrarians could not strike a deal with socialists and communists, they turned towards the “old parties” which did not hesitate to accept the possibility of continuing to rule. This government literally had to reap what it didn’t sow and through no fault of its own, became responsible for the signing and implementation of the Neuilly Peace Accords in November 1919. This peace sanctioned many things agrarians had been criticizing for years, such as Bulgarian military build-up, the attitudes and political involvement of King Ferdinand, policies related to the Macedonian question, the outcomes of the Second Balkan War of 1913, and Bulgaria joining the Central Powers.
The story of the Orange Guards represents an integral part of BANU’s ascension to power in Bulgaria after the Great War, however, it is rather unclear how and why BANU leadership decided to found the Orange Guards. Either way its beginnings are definitely related, with the first challenges encountered by new Bulgarian authorities by the end of 1919.
In a situation filled with tensions because Bulgaria was about to lose new territories, to pay war reparations, and diminish its army to 20,000, the state institutions were facing serious challenges. Bulgaria was in the middle of inflation, which caused the devaluation of wages. Some basic commodities became very expensive and very difficult, if not impossible, to find. In order to turn attention to the ordeal of ordinary laborers, communists and socialists agreed to organize general strike. They chose the well-organized and important union of transportation, responsible for the functioning of railways and telegraph services. A general strike in these services would be a serious threat to the normal functioning of the entire country. In order to avoid this, the state made some provisions for this kind of situation. The army was authorized to intervene through so-called militarization of the railways and the telegraph. In practical sense it meant soldiers would take over the control of trains, depots, railway stations, and telegraph posts. The missing number of workers would be acquired through the mobilization of reservists—in this particular case, those would be some of the people already on strike. Refusal to answer to mobilization would result in consequences, such as eviction from state-owned housing, cancellation of their food ration cards, and prosecution in front of military courts. However, since the Allies were already disarming and reducing Bulgarian armed forces, there weren’t enough soldiers trained to perform the takeover of railroads. Another huge problem was the fact that Prime Minister Stamboliyski was abroad, actually in Paris where he was supposed to sign the peace treaty (Bell Reference Bell1977, 147–8).
After failing to reach an agreement with the union, the two agrarian ministers responsible for negotiations—Turlakov and Dimitrov—decided to use BANU infrastructure and membership in order to find an adequate answer to this problem. The basic units of agrarian party organization were so–called “associations” (druzhbi) and they encompassed BANU supporters organized on territorial principle. During the autumn of 1919, Turlakov and Dimitrov went on a tour visiting BANU druzhbi, where they selected able-bodied men, organizing them in units of Orange Guards under the command of their local leaders. The Orange Guards were put on alert and its members were assigned to take over control over local towns if the government got into danger. Because they were armed only with clubs, not with firearms, and because they didn’t have military training, at that moment they resembled more a party militia organized to control and secure party rallies than a paramilitary formation (Bell Reference Bell1977, 149).
The first test for the Orange Guards were the mass protests of the Bulgarian Communist Party planned for December 24, 1919. In response, some 10,000 members of the Orange Guards gathered on the streets of Sofia. Because of that, only a few smaller communist gatherings were reported, and most of them were too afraid to go out. However, after this typical example of intimidation of political opponents, the real test for the government was the above-mentioned general strike of transport workers scheduled for December 28, 1919. This time, the socialists decided to join the communists. The government immediately decided to militarize the railways on December 31. For that purpose, the army was strengthened by the Orange Guards. By January 5, 1920, the strike had collapsed. In the following general elections held in March, BANU won a majority of seats in the parliament and was able to form its own government (Bell Reference Bell1977, 150–3).
In a later parliamentary debate Stamboliyski, while addressing representatives of leftist parties, explained the reasons and causes for the creation of the Orange Guards:
Are your proletarian and bureaucratic unions state institutions? Are your clubs, your “people’s halls,” your groups state institutions? Who gave them the right to conceal weapons, to demolish bridges, to throw bombs, to terrorize government’s workers? … Against your organization the Agrarian Union will oppose its own … . (Bell, Reference Bell1977: 149)
The successful engagement of Orange Guards during social unrests provided BANU with some assurance for the future.
Although this victory over communists and socialists solidified BANU’s position, another adversary would appear to be much stronger and more resilient. In the following years the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) would take a high position on the list of BANU’s adversaries. After initial shock caused by Bulgaria’s 1918 defeat within the month after the end of the war, IMRO was again on its feet. IMRO’s Central Committee was activated, the organization possessed respectable finances, and its main asset—several thousands of experienced and battle hardened komitajis of whom a majority had been under arms since the beginning of 20th century—demonstrated both a willingness and readiness to continue fighting (Dobrinov Reference Dobrinov1994, 145–156). The soul of the IMRO renewal was its legendary champion Todor Alexandrov. Under his guidance the organization had created a stronghold in Petrich County which in the following years represented “a state within the state” (Tyulekov Reference Tyulekov2001).
Although IMRO was facing new Bulgarian realities—Allied occupation, a defeated and humiliated army that was rapidly diminishing, an economic crisis, and a changing political situation—it continued to maintain a presence in Yugoslav Macedonia where the situation began to complicate in terms of security. From thirty-two criminal offenses of IMRO members in 1919 and 1920—kidnappings, murders, attacks on law enforcement officials, arsons, mutilations, rapes, beatings, theft, and blackmail—by the end of 1923 the total figure rose to 261. The number of their victims grew as well: in 1920 only seven civilians were killed while in the following years the numbers kept rising. In 1921 it was 28; in 1922, 77, while in 1923 it jumped to 88. An identical situation happened with the number of killed and wounded members of Yugoslav security forces and komitaji fighters. In 1921 the Yugoslavs lost two servicemen, but in 1922 the number was already 24 killed and seven wounded, while in 1923 it was thirty-two 32 killed and 25 wounded. In 1921 IMRO lost two komitajis; in 1922 that number rose to 11 killed, four wounded, and one captured; while during 1923, these numbers reached 23 killed and 25 wounded komitaji fighters (Reiss Reference Reiss1924, 120–145; Mikhailov Reference Mikhailov1967, 923–931). Most of these incidents were accompanied by striking level of violence and brutality. In many cases murders were followed by mutilation, especially in cases of former members of the IMRO or distinguished representatives of “Serbian rule” such as village mayors, police officers, heads of districts and counties, priests, teachers, and so on. On several occasions victims were hanged at crossroads.
Immediately after the Great War, Yugoslav state authorities, faced with the insufficient security forces of the Gendarmerie and army, were forced, although reluctantly, to use services of remaining Serbian paramilitaries. The actions of the Jovan Babunski flying detachment during 1919 led to the detachment’s dismissal as independent fighting force. Their misconduct forced state authorities to disband the detachment and to introduce precise rules of engagement for paramilitary veterans strictly within the Gendarmerie as “special formations” (Tasić Reference Tasić2006, 81).
As the presence of IMRO komitajis in following years was increasingly visible, state authorities responded with the introduction of new institutions and practices. By 1922 they introduced the office of the Commissar for Southern Regions. At his disposal, the Commissar had the Gendarmerie, armed loyalist civilians, and so-called “special formations.” He was also authorized to request military assistance.Footnote 1 Although these and some other measures contributed to the limitation of manoeuvrable space for IMRO komitajis, they continued to be the number one threat to stability in Yugoslav Macedonia.
Since Stamboliyski and BANU publicly declared intentions to reconcile and improve relations with the Yugoslav state, they automatically became enemies of IMRO. At the same time, IMRO actions in Yugoslav Macedonia represented a major obstacle to the process of Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement. However, IMRO’s internal developments provided BANU with a possible solution. At that time, an internal clash between federalist and autonomist factions of the IMRO was reaching its climax (Todorovski Reference Todorovski2013: 56–7). The federalist faction was in favor of armed struggle for the liberation of Macedonia and her later joining the Balkan federation, while the autonomist faction was in favour of the closest possible ties with Bulgarian state. Todor Alexandrov, leader of the autonomists, practically declared war on the federalist faction by ordering executions of several prominent federalist champions. These assassinations caused the division between the two factions to deepen further (Paleshutski Reference Paleshutski1983, 119). In order to placate IMRO actions, BANU decided to support the federalist faction. Alexander Dimitrov, Minister of the Interior and Army became responsible for this task. His actions forced Todor Alexandrov to send him a warning letter saying that if he continued to introduce measures against the autonomist bands “he will lose his head.” In June 1921, Dimitrov had a meeting with Yugoslav Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, when they agreed that the IMRO komitaji action represented the apple of discord between two countries and that it had to be stopped. As a result, already in October Dimitrov was killed in a carefully prepared action (Todorovski Reference Todorovski2014, 206–7).
However, the trigger that would initiate a transformation of the Orange Guards into a proper paramilitary formation were two nonrelated events, which happened the following year. The first one was actually a series of events related to the intended mass rally of a group of old parties, mostly of right and center orientation, organized in the so-called Constitutional Bloc. A rally was supposed to happen in Veliko Turnovo, medieval Bulgarian capital and place of proclamation of the ruling constitution. Already before the rally, voices could be heard from the political right, intending to initiate a series of “hammering blows” against the agrarian government. Agrarian countermeasures, however, contributed to the radicalization of the political scene. In their previous congress, under the initiative of younger activists, agrarians had created the Committee on Peasant Dictatorship to adequately answer threats coming from right-winged parties. Their plan was to establish a “peasant dictatorship” as an answer to any attempt to overthrow the government (Bell Reference Bell1977, 219–220).
On September 17, 1922, on their way to a rally at Veliko Turnovo, leaders of the Constitutional Bloc were stopped at a small railway station in a place called Dolni D’bni. The place was swarmed by local peasants who disarmed supporters of the Constitutional Bloc. Its leaders, Andrey Liyapchev, Aleksandar Malinov, Stoyan Danev, Mikhail Madzharev and others, were publicly humiliated by shaving their beards and moustaches. The intervention of Rayko Daskalov, acting Prime Minister saved them, since Stamboliyski was attending peace talks in Lausanne. Daskalov was riding in the same train, going to Veliko Turnovo as well, but for another occasion—a convention of sugar-beet growers! However, the same ordeal happened in Veliko Turnovo where leaders of the Constitutional Bloc were nearly court martialed and executed. Again, Daskalov saved them (Petrova Reference Petrova1999, 99–100). In the meantime, the armed supporters of the Constitutional Bloc dispersed.
The second event happened almost simultaneously, on September 16, when IMRO organized armed action in the town of Nevrokop. Its bands invaded the town in pursuit of rivals from the federalist faction. However, they also attacked a small local garrison, taking soldiers as prisoners and their weapons and equipment as war booty. Surviving federalists managed to leave town in the midst of combat (Yaanchev Reference Yaanchev2014, 302–3). This action represented a serious challenge to agrarian authorities.
The above-mentioned incidents initiated rapid (para)militarization of the Orange Guards. A completely new branch of the guard was established under the name Agrarian Mounted Guards and it consisted of those guard members with horses. The basic idea was the creation of some sort of “flying detachments” that could act as rapid response units against any attempt opposition might try. Daskalov became commander of the Agrarian Mounted Guards (Petrova Reference Petrova1995, 34). Meanwhile, IMRO showed itself to be even more insolent because on December 4 they repeated the Nevrokop scenario, this time in Kyustendil. A significant but not precisely determined number of komitajis entered town. As in Nevrokop, they interned the local garrison and police forces, and after apprehending some ten members of the federalist faction they staged a show-trial and organized their public execution. They also used the opportunity to publicly announce death sentences against several agrarian top officials, including Stamboliyski and Daskalov. Acting-Prime Minister Daskalov dispatched the Minister of the Army, Tomov, to suppress IMRO incursion, but instead of acting, Tomov entered into negotiations with IMRO leader Pancho Mikhailov. Tomov returned to Sofia, accepting the IMRO demands which included that the Prime Minister would publicly correct his statements made in Belgrade regarding the Macedonian question, and terminate provocations against IMRO activists (Yaanchev Reference Yaanchev2014, 312–3). Meanwhile, the Orange Guards were summoned from northern and central Bulgaria. Some 2,000 came to Sofia by special trains and after arrival, they attacked the editorial offices of the opposition press as well as several foreign embassies. They were placed in army barracks of the Sofia garrison and remained there without engaging IMRO bands.
However, despite agrarian reluctance to use the Orange Guards against serious IMRO provocations, their conflict gradually intensified. After several attempts to assassinate Stamboliyski and Daskalov in 1923, BANU entered into open war with IMRO. But somehow, agrarians were misled and became overconfident. During the spring of 1923, BANU actions were marked by growing support to their cause, election success, and the signing of agreements with Yugoslavia on security issues and with Allies on war reparations. In one moment, after watching a parade of thousand members of Agrarian Mounted Guards Stamboliyski even said:
Do not think that the government will fall … but believe that Agrarian rule will continue for twenty-five years. Who can overthrow us? (Bell Reference Bell1977, 228)
While BANU attention was dispersed on several fronts, its enemies were able to prepare and execute the coup of June 9, 1923. Opposition parties joined with well-organized and experienced members of the secret paramilitary organization Military League. Together, with active and passive support of IMRO and “White” Russians emigrants present in Bulgaria, they were too strong for the Orange Guards. Spontaneous armed resistance that agrarians had organized throughout the country was more a consequence of their good party organization than that of military preparations. Although a majority of BANU membership and especially of the Orange Guards consisted of battle-hardened war veterans, they lacked proper training, structure, and rules of engagement. A comparison could be made to the communists and their secret military organization, which although active from 1919 wasn’t able to successfully execute its revolutionary attempt in September 1923. The communists were better organized, trained, and armed compared to agrarian Orange Guards, however, they also couldn’t withstand the combined forces of the Army, Military League, IMRO and “White” Russians.
Creation of the Organization against the Bulgarian Bandits
Circumstances related to the founding and later functioning of the Organization against the Bulgarian Bandits in Yugoslav Macedonia were complex, with multiple agents and influences. The official story behind the founding is very selective in term of reasons, main actors, and their personal histories and motivations. The official version claims that the organization was founded in a public rally in the town of Štip on September 9, 1923. The rally was organized to express public outrage at the overall security conditions in “South Serbia”—primarily in the so-called Bregalnica region or Bregalnica County in the eastern part of Yugoslav Macedonia (named for the main river in the region—Bregalnica). For decades, this region was known as ground zero for intensive IMRO activities and strong Bulgarian national and church propaganda (Spomenica 1933).
The main organizer of the rally was “simple” local merchant Mihajlo Kalamatijević, or Kalamatija. He had just survived an assassination attempt ordered and executed by IMRO. The reason for this attempt on his life was something people usually connect to organized crime and not to revolutionary organizations. Together with another fellow merchant from the town of Štip, Kalamatijević refused to make a “donation” to the cause. Because of that, IMRO instantly ordered his execution, as later leader of the IMRO Ivan Mikhailov admits in his memoirs. Unlike his friend, Kalamatijević survived and decided to change sides—a practice frequently seen in Macedonia in those years (Mikhailov Reference Mikhailov1965, 139; Tasić Reference Tasić2019, 404). Meanwhile, in the police follow up of this assassination fourteen locals, including five females, had been arrested, tried, and sentenced as responsible for this affair (Mikhailov Reference Mikhailov1965, 728).
A decade later, when he had already become a “respectable” member of the Yugoslav parliament, Kalamatijević was portrayed as leader of simple people willing to join forces and create a local militia-like organization for the sake of self-protection. The official history of the Organization against the Bulgarian Bandits, however, doesn’t say how Kalamatijević became renegade after being an active member of IMRO (Spomenica 1933, 30–1).
However, Kalamatijević definitely couldn’t pull this off on his own. Earlier that year a crucial personal change happened. Dobrica Matković, official of the Ministry of the Interior, was appointed to the position of veliki župan (the title given to heads of counties in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) of Bregalnica County. Matković appeared in very sensitive the moment after the office of the Commissar for South Serbia had been disbanded. Unlike many people concerned with state affairs, Matković had a loose notion of “rule of law.” Although his approach quickly brought results, the way in which it was achieved in the long run proved to be devastating for stability in Yugoslav Macedonia.
Matković assumed a position between two of the biggest incidents in Yugoslav Macedonia at the time—massacres in the villages of Kadrifakovo on January 16 and Garvan on March 3, 1923. The second massacre came as retaliation for the first. In Kadrifakovo, komitajis of Ivan Yanev-B’rlyo killed twenty-three Serbian settlers who came to Macedonia from various regions of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. They were primarily war veterans and poor farmers from mountainous areas of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Lika (Reiss Reference Reiss1924, 134). Behind the equally brutal Yugoslav action in Garvan was Dobrica Matković. Unlike previous actions, this one was executed by regular troops, but in the recognizable paramilitary manner. No one knows why Matković chose Garvan to execute retaliation; perhaps its dwellers somehow assisted B’rlyo’s band before or after the sack of Kadrifakovo, or were associated with it—it will probably remain a mystery. In total, the soldiers executed 28 people. This affair was used by IMRO propaganda as proof of how the Serbs treated the oppressed people of Macedonia (Garvanskata golgota 1924; Mikhailov Reference Mikhailov1965, 62–5, 666–7). Meanwhile, Matković introduced measures aimed at strengthening the Yugoslav security forces in the region by bringing in the additional forces of Gendarmerie and the Army and building new precincts (Jovanović Reference Jovanović2002, 193).
However, one other event provided Matković with extremely valuable assets for his actions against komitaji bands. That was the defection of several experienced and well-known leaders from the federalist faction of the IMRO—Stoyan Mishev, Gligor Tsiklev, Mita Sokolarski-Sudzhukareto, Vane Arsov, Pano Eftimov, Pano Zhiganski, Sande Pelivanov, Hristo Umlenski, and Iliya Pandurski) (Žežov Reference Žežov2008, 96). Their defection occurred in May, in the midst of their conflict with the IMRO autonomist faction. After two defeats, in Nevrokop and Kyustendil, and after BANU wasn’t able to support them for the remaining federalists, the only solution to avoid total obliteration was to leave Bulgaria and emigrate across the border to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. However, they did not defect only to ask for refuge; on the contrary, they demonstrated readiness to continue fighting, but this time by entering Yugoslav service.
However, it seems that defection had already been arranged by Yugoslav intelligence. Together with Yugoslav diplomats in Bulgaria an emerging schism between autonomist and federalist factions of the IMRO was noticeable. The first signs of a future rift appeared in autumn 1919, when a number of disgruntled leading komitajis secretly met with a Yugoslavian operative in Sofia. They thought that further fighting was pointless and they wanted peacefully to influence the Macedonians to be reconciled to become equal subjects of the great Yugoslavia. This group felt that the autonomy of Macedonia once and for all would neutralize the rivalries of the Balkan states and would bring lasting peace to the Balkans.Footnote 2 They also expressed the absurdity of the earlier ways of fight because the struggle against Serbia has been lost, while in the Yugoslav framework Macedonia could be finally able to find conditions for undisturbed cultural and economic development. They also asked for a full pardon and life safety.Footnote 3 This idea was not realized but it turned the attention of the Yugoslav intelligence towards this issue in the future.
Matković immediately agreed with defected federalist champion Stoyan Mishev and his associates, and as a result already during the summer 1923 there were five so-called “flying detachments” patrolling through five districts of Bregalnica county (Jovanović Reference Jovanović2002, 194). Since Matković provided them with considerable freedom of action—in other words, they operated almost without control—their “efficiency” is very hard to determine. But, we can draft a relatively clear picture of their status and impact and place it in the broader social context. The first to meet with the new reality were IMRO supporters among simple Macedonians. They were already aware of the federalist–autonomist confrontation followed by public proclamations of condemnations; after all, the history of the organization was marked by inner conflicts. However, until May 1923, that was an internal and solvable conflict. But now, when they saw former komitajis—some of them organization legends, such as Stoyan Mishev—coming to their villages but this time in Yugoslav service, it was probably shocking, surprising at least.
Thanks to Matković’s authorizations, freedom of movement, experience, speed, element of surprise, and his detailed knowledge of the IMRO, including their procedures, organizational structure in Macedonia, hiding places, liaisons, and passwords—everything that the Yugoslav Gendarmerie and Army lacked in their struggle against IMRO actions—they managed to dismantle the IMRO organization in Bregalnica County countryside. For these renegades, as their rivals quickly named them, there simply were no secrets. Their knowledge and brutality, spiced with vengeful sentiments, turned the tide in Yugoslav Macedonia (Mikhailov Reference Mikhailov1965, 133). After the foundation of the Organization against the Bulgarian Bandits in September, former federalist champions and their followers were simply incorporated into it. Thus, Matković managed to kill two flies with one stroke—he avoided the possibility of naming his enterprise as mercenary and he rallied for his cause both state and local political support. In follow up analysis, renegades or counter-chetniks were described as loyal to the Serbian cause. For example, Grigor Tsiklev publicly expressed the wish to become a “good subject,” similar to his brother who had already been in Serbian service and earned respect as an army sergeant. Although the author of this report openly qualifies Tsiklev’s statement as “potential comedy,” he continues that Tsiklev could be trusted, bearing in mind the circumstances that led to his entering Yugoslav service. However, it is admitted that the main driving force lying behind their decision to switch sides was hatred towards IMRO leader Todor Alexandrov and his followers—“it is simply a blood feud, and it is something that closely connects them to the Serbian cause.” The level of hatred and desire for vengeance was insurance enough for their new sponsors.Footnote 4
The impact of renegades’ defection from IMRO was very deep. One of the famous contemporary IMRO champions, Pancho Mikhailov-Chavdar, assassin of the Minister of the Interior Alexander Dimitrov and one of the leaders during the IMRO action in Kyustendil in December 1922, and who besides audacity possessed literary talent, wrote and published a short story in which he mentioned federalist renegades (Mikhailov Reference Mikhailov1924, 14).
Renegades in Yugoslav service became a major concern of IMRO leadership which in following years invested serious efforts to punish renegades and eradicate the rival federalist faction. Anti-renegade actions were often followed by violence and extreme brutality (Tyulekov Reference Tyulekov2001). Successful outcomes and the deaths of renegades would cause huge and colorful bursts of satisfaction in the ranks of the IMRO. Those who executed these actions used to be awarded.Footnote 5 For example, when one of the leading renegades, Mita Sokolarski-Sudzhukareto, was killed on market day in Vinica, in Kočani district, on July 30, 1924, in the official IMRO proclamation he was described as the “mercenary of King Alexander and Pašić” and the “fastest, boldest, … and most dangerous of traitorous bandits,” who, together with other renegades was at the full disposal of the agrarian regime and was “plotting with the Serbs to eliminate IMRO leadership.”Footnote 6 In December of the same year, another important federalist leader, Stoyan Mishev, was killed in Štip on December 30. His assassin was 21-year-old Kiril Grigorov, a poor Macedonian refugee who wanted to become a member of IMRO by performing an act of outstanding bravery. In a follow-up pursuit, Grigorov was apprehended near the Bulgarian border. He was tried and sentenced to death (Mikhailov Reference Mikhailov1967, 147–155).
From 1924 onwards, federalist renegades were able to organize numerous infiltrations across the Bulgarian border. They interrupted IMRO communications, created a federalist network, and recruited local supporters. Thanks to this, the IMRO had to seriously reconsider its revolutionary methods and adapt to a new reality.
As for the Organization against the Bulgarian Bandits, it began to spread beyond the Bregalnica region. By the time of its 10th anniversary, the organization was present throughout East Macedonia. However, by that time it was no longer known as the Organization against the Bulgarian Bandits but simply as Peoples Self-Defense (Narodna Samoodbrana), organized as a volunteer militia, and its members were known as militiamen (Spomenica 1933, 31). In order to support the organization, in 1930 the Army distributed some 25,000 rifles to trustworthy people throughout East Macedonia, mostly to the members of Peoples Self-Defense (Bjelajac Reference Bjelajac1994, 238). It practically coincides with the organization’s own claim that in 1933 they had some 25,000 militiamen-members “ready, at any moment, to be deployed whenever they are needed to carry out designated assignment, which is exclusively to pursue, apprehend and annihilate Bulgarian bandits infiltrated on our territory” (Spomenica 1933, 33). Ivan Mikhailov, IMRO leader at the time, used the darkest possible epithets to describe actions of the Organization and its champions:
Endless is the list of atrocities of this “Organization” against decent Bulgarians from several districts … Intimidations, beatings, plundering, arson, defilations, murders, burring alive, roasting living people until they die … after 100 years people will tell stories of demonic triad Kalamatiev – Stoyan Mishev – Serbian zhupan Dobrica Matković and their “Organization” … this police organization is second to none on whole European continent. (Mikhailov Reference Mikhailov1965: 767–773)
Unlike the initial name, the new name—Peoples Self-Defense—had a stronger populist sound. It was more efficient in achieving the wanted outcome – impression that poor and fed up people of South Serbia decided to organize them selves in order to protect their properties and insure their safety. This became much easier taking in mind that in two years after the foundation of Organization against the Bulgarian Bandits, leading federalist renegades were killed (Uzunov, Reference Uzunov2014, 320).Footnote 7
In following years, the Peoples Self-Defense became serious and massive paramilitary organization whose members liked to call themselves militiamen. Between 1923 and 1933, these militiamen were responsible for 128 killed, 13 wounded and 151 IMRO komitajis captured alive. 59 servicemen were killed and 14 wounded (Spomenica 1933, 33).
The organization’s network and massiveness combined with other improvements in safety in the Yugoslav South probably contributed to limiting the IMRO’s maneuverable space, forcing them to change their method of struggle. Mainly, this was visible in the shift from “old school” komitaji action, embodied in intrusions of small bands from Bulgarian territory, towards terrorist actions against representatives of Yugoslav civil and military authorities as well as against “renegades” and “traitors.” In the following years, these actions combined with planting bombs on railroad communications and random attacks on coffee places and other public institutions, became the main method of IMRO actions on Yugoslav soil.
Conclusion
Although the founders of the Organization against Bulgarian Bandits wanted to impose an impression of the organization’s creation as the spontaneous reaction of the local population, which in its despair addressed the inadequacies of central state authorities, the actual setting is far more complicated and includes a multitude of agents and influences. Beside its important place in efforts to prevent IMRO actions, the organization was equally important in imposing and demonstrating the “Serbian character” of Macedonia, as well as keeping these territories under the unchallenged control of the Radical Party—the greatest and strongest Serbian political party. The results were numerous abuses of power, scandals, endemic corruption, extortions, beatings, and various kinds of physical violence. Their real extent is difficult to determine, mostly because in their parliamentary addresses representatives of the opposition often exaggerated the extent of abuses. The same went for writings in the opposition press, especially from Croatian parties and communists. However, Vladan Jovanović rightfully argues that in “South Serbia” there appeared a “combination of bureaucratic and police repression as result of anti-komitaji action” (Jovanović Reference Jovanović2002, 189–201).
Average Macedonians lived for more than two decades in different state frameworks (Ottoman, Serbian, Bulgarian, Yugoslav) in conditions marked by uncertainty, repression, and violence. This was exacerbated by war in the years 1912–1918, food shortages, and epidemics of infectious diseases. Throughout the 1920s, inhabitants of Macedonia were harassed both by members of revolutionary-separatist organizations and by those who were supposed to protect them. Even though the Yugoslav state invested huge efforts in reconstruction and improvements in public health, agriculture, and education, these positive developments were overshadowed by the security issues and follow-up repression that occurred during the twenty-three years of Yugoslav rule over Macedonia.
Although throughout the interwar period Yugoslav state authorities officially expressed determination towards the introduction of modern administration based on rule of law and strong and reliable state institutions, the situation in Yugoslav Macedonia was quite the opposite. One thing that significantly undermined the development of this region was endemic corruption every level. During the 1920s, corruption manifested as a combination of old client-based relations inherited from the Ottomans and new allegiances based exclusively on party affiliation. One of the main causes for this was the unwillingness of the Serbian political establishment—primarily the Radical Party—to relinquish its control over South Serbia, as Yugoslav Macedonia was officially called at that time. For Radical Party officials, led by Nikola Pašić, an experienced master of political calculations, this region represented a vast pool of valuable votes as well as opportunities for personal enrichment. In the end, it should not come as a surprise that local officials decided to continue with policies that were more convenient for the unstable Ottoman times, instead of solving pressing security issues by using the rule of law to win the hearts and minds of the locals. In their own desire to somehow neutralize the strong impact that the IMRO exerted on the local population, as well as to strengthen their grip over the region, local officials and “national workers,” following existing and proven tactics, decided to create a completely new paramilitary formation. The conciseness of its title—the Organization against Bulgarian Bandits—and its gradual evolution into the Peoples Self-Defense, clearly described its agenda. Both officially and unofficially, Belgrade approved and assisted in this process. As for prominent federalists, their admittance in Yugoslav service solved the pressing issue of operational bases, after the loss of strongholds in Bulgaria due to the successful autonomist raids on Nevrokop in September and Kyustendil in December 1922. On Yugoslav soil, federalists were able to reorganize, use existing IMRO infrastructure, deprive autonomist bands of their communication channels and support points, and launch a new campaign of intrusions against autonomist centers in Bulgaria. For Yugoslav authorities, this turn of the tide was most desirable, but in the long term it only contributed to a prolonging of the conflict, the continuation of instability, and more causalities on both sides.
As mentioned, the appearance of the Orange Guards has certain differentiators if we compare it with other paramilitary formations in the region. Although characterized as a paramilitary formation, in the beginning the Orange Guards looked more like a party militia. Unlike Serbian chetniks or IMRO komitajis, the Orange Guards were not associated with the legacy of classic Balkan paramilitarism. A comparison of the Orange Guards with Italian fascist squadristi or the Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists—ORJUNA—reveals even greater differences, especially when we observe the agrarian commitment to non-violent methods. The only similarity would be related to the agrarian ambition to establish a peasant dictatorship through the major transformation of Bulgaria from a parliamentary to a corporatist state. This didn’t happen, because old political structures, the army, and especially the IMRO were constantly blocking the efforts of Stamboliyski to improve the Bulgarian position in international relations as well as to reform and stabilize the economy. In the end, despite a parliamentary majority and huge support among the Bulgarian peasantry, BANU could not exert control over important state institutions such as the police and army. The above-mentioned forces proved to be stronger than the legitimately chosen government and its Orange Guards. In the subsequent coup d’état, Stamboliyski was brutally murdered while the pre-1918 parties managed to seize power.
Funding Information
This paper is the result of a project of specific research: Paramilitaries in the Balkans After the First World War – Continuation of Old and Initiation of New Conflicts and Rivalries, supported by the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Hradec Kralove in 2019–2020.
Disclosure
Author has nothing to disclose.
